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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1. The nature of this study 
This thesis is an empirical examination of banking performance in Indonesia. It 
examines three specific issues: competition in provincial banking markets, the 
productive efficiency of Indonesian banking with special attention to a 
comparison of foreign and domestic banks, and the role of Indonesian banks in 
monetary policy transmission. 
A feature of this research is the high quality data. The data consists of monthly 
accounting statements of various banks used in the chapter on monetary policy 
transmission, quarterly data employed in the chapter to study banks‘ efficiency 
and annual bank accounting statements at provincial level used in the 
competition chapter. All the data come from the supervisory returns that 
Indonesian banks are required to make under Indonesian financial regulations. 
The thesis contains three distinct research studies on three different issues – 
competition, efficiency and monetary transmission. Because these topics are 
not closely related, there is no separate literature review chapter; instead each 
of the three research chapters contains its own literature review.  
1.2. Purposes and contribution of this study 
This thesis seeks to provide some insight about Indonesian banking. The main 
questions addressed in this thesis are the following: 
 How competitive are Indonesia‘s provincial markets?  
 Has the foreign acquisition‘s banks improved cost-efficiency of 
Indonesia‘s banking system? Is the cost-efficiency of foreign 
acquisition‘s banks different than domestic owned banks in Indonesia?  
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 How do Indonesian banks respond to a shift in monetary policy? How 
does this response vary with bank characteristics? 
There are many studies on these issues using data from developed countries 
especially from the US but relatively few studies using data from emerging 
markets. 
1.3. The geography and population structure of Indonesia 
In examining competition, efficiency and monetary transmission, the reader 
should be aware of the geography and population structure of Indonesia. 
The archipelago of Indonesia is located in South-east Asia and made up of 
more than 17,000 islands, of which about 6,000 are inhabited. With its 
thousands of islands, covering some 5 million sq km, there are substantial 
hurdles for transport and communication in Indonesia (CIA, the World Fact 
Book, 2009).  
Figure 1.1 Map of Indonesia 
 
 
 
This figure shows the map of Indonesia. There are 33 provinces separated in five big islands: Java, Sumatra, 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi (Celebes), and Irian Jaya. The capital city is Jakarta located in Java. Source: Central 
Intelligence Agency (2009). Available at : https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/id.html.
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In 2008, the total population was 220 million, but the distribution was very 
uneven (See table 1.1). The island of Java contains many of the most densely 
populated areas in Indonesia with more than 120 million inhabitants, or some 
940 persons per square kilometre. The population density of Jakarta, the capital 
city (which is situated in Java) is 12,162 persons per sq km while in contrast 
the West Irian Jaya population density is only 6 persons per sq km (BPS-
Statistics Indonesia, 2010). 
Much of the economic activity of the country and the majority of financial 
transactions are conducted in Jakarta. It has the highest regional GDP per 
capita at Rp33.9 million per capita or equivalent to about USD3,390. The 
lowest is Gorontalo with only Rp2.2 million per capita (See table 1.1). 
We exploit this geographical diversity in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The available 
data for each province cover all banks operating in the provinces. The 
information collected on individual banks at provincial locations allows us to 
investigate the impact of geography on banking competition in Indonesia. 
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Table 1.1 
Selected Indonesia‘s Provincial Data 
 
No Provinces Capital city Area
(km2)
Population
Pop 
Density
GDP 
growth
GDP/
cap
1 West Java Bandung 38,921.7 19,500,409 1,082 5.7 6.4
2 Banten Serang 9,310.5 4,519,239   1,033 6.0 6.5
3 Jakarta Jakarta 4,943.2 4,430,523   12,162 6.1 33.9
4 Yogyakarta Yogyakarta 3,261.1 1,673,392   1,087 4.6 5.1
5 Central Java Semarang 32,713.1 16,005,384 985 5.2 4.5
6 East Java Surabaya 41,892.2 18,171,040 786 5.9 7.2
7 Bengkulu Bengkulu 10,718.5 784,596     81 5.6 4.1
8 Jambi Jambi 24,068.4 1,343,013   60 6.3 4.9
9 30,397.2 2,044,773   74 -5.8 10.3
10 North Sumatra Medan 42,735.1 6,261,946   176 6.1 7.2
11 West Sumatra Padang 23,493.9 2,304,069   111 6.0 6.5
12 Riau Pekan baru 46,516.7 2,333,121   56 4.5 17.6
13 South Sumatra Palembang 33,712.2 3,436,966   115 5.1 7.5
14 Riau Islands Tanjung Pinang 4,768.6 641,525     169 6.7 24.2
15 Bangka Belitung Pangkal Pinang 8,773.3 529,940     66 4.0 8.6
16 Lampung Lampung 22,563.5 3,575,400   192 5.1 4.2
17 South Kalimantan Banjarmasin 21,165.4 1,660,369   87 5.6 7.2
18 West Kalimantan Pontianak 62,181.7 2,099,826   34 5.2 5.9
19 East Kalimantan Samarinda 98,971.9 1,526,666   15 2.9 33.6
20 Central Kalimantan Palangkaraya 77,810.9 1,034,232   13 5.9 7.4
21 Central Sulawesi Palu 35,264.1 1,178,341   35 7.7 5.2
22 South Sulawesi Makassar 26,960.7 3,778,211   166 6.4 5.2
23 North Sulawesi Manado 8,069.4 1,071,316   155 5.8 6.2
24 West Sulawesi Mamuju 8,909.7 493,108     59 8.8 3.7
25 Gorontalo Gorontalo 6,568.8 466,717     78 7.3 2.2
26 19,416.2 1,000,546   55 7.6 4.1
27 12,036.3 2,101,492   217 2.3 3.7
28 Bali Denpasar 4,482.7 1,694,676   633 5.5 6.3
29 25,336.1 2,154,506   95 5.2 2.4
30 Maluku Ambon 24,335.6 649,227     27 5.0 2.7
31 Papua Jayapura 155,995.5 1,097,212   7 -0.1 10.4
32 North Maluku Ternate 20,459.8 458,062     23 5.5 2.6
33 West Irian Jaya Manokwari 57,648.2 370,018     6 6.9 8.3
West Nusa 
Tenggara 
Mataram
East Nusa 
Tenggara imur
Kupang
Source: Statistical Year Book (various years) published by BPS Statistics-Indonesia .  All data is in 
average from 2000-2008 except data of area is in 2008. Pop density is population density that denotes the 
ratio of population to provincial areas. GDP/cap denotes gross domestic product of provincial areas to 
population.
Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam
Banda Aceh
South East 
Sulawesi 
Kendari
Average from 2000 to 2008
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1.4. Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is a review of the current 
structure of Indonesian banking sector, discussing how the banking sector has 
developed and the role of banks in the wider economy. 
Chapter 3 investigates competition in Indonesia‘s provincial markets. It uses 
structural-conduct-performance (SCP) model, efficient-structure hypothesis 
model and new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) model. It 
distinguishes a group of metropolitan provinces, the remaining provinces in 
Java and Sumatra and another group consisting of other smaller provinces (The 
Periphery). In the SCP model, the relationship between market structure and 
performance in the banking system are investigated from 2001 to 2008. OLS 
estimation incorporating both the measures of concentration, and also 
efficiency and other control variables in the regression is employed to test the 
price-concentration similar to Hannan and Berger (1989) and efficiency 
hypotheses following Berger (1995). The NEIO model is the dynamic Panzar 
and Rosse model (Goddard and Wilson, 2009) employed to estimate individual 
banks‘ market power over the same period. 
Chapter 4 estimates cost-efficiency within the banking sector using panel data 
from 2000Q3 to 2009 Q3. A stochastic frontier model is estimated to measure 
cost-efficiency. This is used to compare the level and change of efficiency in 
different sub-groups of the industry: state-owned banks, domestic private 
owned banks, and two groups of foreign banks, those acquired before the 1997-
1998 crises and other acquired more recently. 
Chapter 5 tests how Indonesian banks respond to the shift in monetary policy 
and how the response varies with the banks‘ characteristics. It distinguishes 
banks by size, liquidity and capitalization and examines the banks‘ responses 
using two different measures of monetary policy stance. Generalized Method 
of Moment estimator is used to investigate the effect to the banks‘ balance 
sheet to allow for correlating lagged dependent variable and error term.  
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Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the major findings, discussing policy 
implication, identifying some limitations of the study, and making suggestions 
for future research. 
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Chapter 2 An Overview of the Indonesian Banking 
Sector 
2.1. Introduction  
In order to set the stage for the later analyses, this chapter provides an overview 
of the Indonesian banking sector.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 gives an overview of the 
current structure of Indonesian banking. Section 2.3 describes how the banking 
system has developed. Section 2.4 explains the role of banks in the wider 
economy. 
2.2. The current structure of Indonesian banking  
This subsection describes the institutional structure of the Indonesian banking, 
and presents some descriptive measures of market structure. 
2.2.1. Institutional Structure of Indonesia’s Banking Sector 
There were 124 commercial banks operating in Indonesia at the end of 
December 2008 (see table 2.1). The number was reduced significantly after the 
crisis of 1997-1998 because of bank closures, and mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). Subsequently, during the period of 2000-2008, a further 13 banks 
were closed, 21 banks merged and one bank changed status to become an 
export and import financing agency. There was also one new, additional 
foreign bank that opened and started operations in April 2003 (a branch of the 
Bank of China). 
Out of the total banks in 2008, the government hold the majority of ownership 
in 31 banks out of 124 banks  (25%), consisting of 5 state owned banks, and 26 
provincial development banks (BPD). Of the remainder 47 banks are domestic 
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private ownership, 31 are joint-venture bank majority owned by foreigners and 
10 are branch offices of foreign banks.   
Table 2.1 Number of banks based on type 
 
Finally there are five sharia banks operating in the country. The sharia banking 
development in Indonesia was firstly marked by the establishment of Bank 
Muamalat Indonesia by the Indonesian Ulema Council and the Government on 
1 November 1991. The other banks are Bank Syariah Mandiri, Bank Syariah 
Mega, Bank Syariah Bukopin and Bank Syariah BRI. Moreover, there is other 
twenty-six banks open sharia banking units. Sharia banking has experienced 
quite rapid growth in recent years. However, its market share was very small at 
only 1.9% of total assets of banking system.   
There is one other type of bank that is similar in many respects to commercial 
banks. These are rural banks that have typically had mutual ownership and 
offered retail and small business banking services in rural areas. A recent trend 
had been for large rural banks to convert from a type of cooperative to a limited 
liability company, allowing them to expand their businesses to larger cities. In 
2008, there were 1,733 rural banks consisting of 1,375 in the legal entity form 
of Limited Liability Company, 324 in local company form and 34 cooperative 
banks. Most of these banks (65%) have less than Rp5 billion (USD50,000) of 
total assets in December 2008. Total assets of banking system were Rp32,5 
trillion (USD3,25 billion). This makes the share of rural banks was small, 
representing only 1.4% of the total banking system. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
% change 
between 
2000-2008
1. State owned banks:
a. Government of Republic of Indonesia 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0.0
b. Local (provincial) governments 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 0.0
2. Private domestic owned banks 78 77 71 69 63 57 55 51 47 -39.7
3. Foreign owned banks:
a. Joint venture 29 23 26 24 25 28 29 33 31 6.9
b. Branch office 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 10 0.0
4. Sharia banks 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 66.7
Total 151 144 141 138 134 131 130 130 124 -17.9
This table shows number of banks based on different types of banks operating in Indonesia  from December 2000 to December 2008. Source: Bank 
Indonesia. Various years. Indonesian Banking Statistics. 
9 
 
2.2.2. Market Structure of Indonesia’s Banking Sector 
Having looked at the different categories of banks, we can now look at the 
share of different markets. 
Table 2.2 
Banking markets‘ structure 
 
 
Table 2.2 presents market share statistics for the six main types of banks in 
2000-2008. During this period, the market share of state owned banks 
decreased slightly with the exception for the market share in saving accounts. 
The increase of foreign presences in the Indonesian banking markets, as it is 
shown by the increase of market share of joint venture banks.   
The increase market share of joint venture banks came from the acquisition of 
large banks by foreign investors. The original market share of joint venture 
banks in December 2000 was only 4.8% and now it has increased to 34.2%. 
The change will be beneficial for the Indonesian market if the investors bring 
better management and technology and improved efficiency, an issue discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
Bank Type
2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008
State owned banks 522.4 847.6 108.1 470.7 59.3 151.8 68.5 237.4 184.7 280.6
(50.2) (36.7) (38.2) (36) (37.2) (35.3) (44.6) (47.6) (48.1) (34)
Private domestic owned banks 358.3 220.5 86.3 136.3 52.7 30.2 76.9 29.2 146.5 115.6
(34.4) (9.5) (30.5) (10.4) (33.1) (7.0) (50.1) (5.9) (38.2) (14)
Provincial government banks 26.1 185.3 10.1 96.4 10.8 70.7 4.8 37.5 4.2 35.0
(2.5) (8.0) (3.6) (7.4) (6.8) (16.5) (3.1) (7.5) (1.1) (4.2)
Joint venture banks 50.2 789.5 30.4 465.4 9.8 125.2 0.4 170.7 12.5 313.2
(4.8) (34.2) (10.7) (35.6) (6.1) (29.1) (0.3) (34.2) (3.3) (38.0)
Foreign branch offices 82.3 233.7 46.9 113.4 26.7 49.4 2.7 14.1 35.4 65.0
(7.9) (10.1) (16.6) (8.7) (16.7) (11.5) (1.8) (2.8) (9.2) (7.9)
Shariah banks 1.9 34.0 1.3 25.6 0.2 2.7 0.3 9.6 0.5 15.4
(0.2) (1.5) (0.5) (2.0) (0.1) (0.6) (0.2) (1.9) (0.1) (1.9)
Total 1,041.1 2,310.6 283.1 1,307.7 159.6 430.0 153.6 498.6 383.7 824.7
This table presents market share of Indonesian banks in December 2000 and 2008. Demand deposits are a flexible deposit with very small interest rates. Saving 
accounts are an instant access that customers can withdraw their money instantly by using ATM cards. Time deposits are deposit with fixed time period and 
interest rates. Metropolitan is the area  with the largest banking markets and the most populous provinces. Java and Sumatra has moderate banking markets 
and population compared to Metropolitan. The Rest has the smallest banking markets and less population provinces compare to other groups. Source: Bank 
Indonesia. December 2000 and 2008. Indonesian Banking statistics.
(unit trillion Rupiah)
Assets (% of total) Loans (% of total)
Demand Deposits 
(% of total)
Saving Accounts 
(% of total)
Time Deposits (% 
of total)
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The market share of foreign bank branch offices is relatively small compared to 
state owned banks and joint venture banks. In December 2008, the total assets 
of foreign branches were US$23.4 billion. 
 
2.3. How the banking system has developed 
This subsection provides a brief account of the development of the Indonesian 
banking sector since the mid 1980s. It begins with the Indonesian banking 
deregulation in 1988; It then discusses the banking crisis of 1997-1998 and the 
policy responses after the crisis, and finally it discusses foreign acquisition on 
Indonesian banks that have occurred since 2000. Appendix 1 presents s a time 
line for all the various regulatory changes. 
2.3.1. Banking deregulation 1988  
The current legislation framework for banking is based on the Indonesian 
banking deregulation announced in 1988 (the October 1988 policy package). 
This simplified the procedures to obtain license for the opening of banks 
offices, for converting business focus from non-foreign exchange to foreign 
exchange, and for opening the new banks. 
The establishment of new banks, which had been prevented since 1973, was 
once again possible. The minimum paid-up capital for the establishment of 
private commercial banks was fixed at Rp10 billion (USD 5 million). One 
important innovation in 1988 was to allow the establishment of joint venture 
banks with foreign parties. These must be categorized as a major bank in the 
country of origin and this country should have diplomatic relationship with the 
Indonesian government. The requirements for a national bank to establish a 
joint venture bank was similar to the requirements for establishing a new bank, 
namely the criteria of soundness and capital adequacy. The paid up capital shall 
be at a minimum amount of Rp50 billion (USD25 million). The foreign partner 
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was allowed to own a maximum of 85% of the capital investment. The banks 
are allowed to domicile in Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, Bandung, Medan, 
Denpasar and Makassar and open one branch office in each of those cities.  
On the prudential front, the government sought to strengthen the soundness of 
banks by issuing regulations on lending limit, and net open position. The legal 
lending limit was aimed to improve sound banking principles in lending and to 
reduce the risk of bad debt. The limit was applied to the loans provided to 
individual borrowers, group of borrowers, shareholders, and executive staffs. In 
addition, the government also imposed a limit on the net open position of 
banks‘ foreign reserves, either foreign asset or net foreign liabilities, equivalent 
to 25 per cent of the bank‘s equity. 
2.3.2. Banking crisis 1997-1998 
The October 1988 package sparked off substantial increase in the number of 
banks, with a large number of local conglomerates establishing their own 
banks. The regulatory and supervisory framework was improved substantially, 
but enforcement, particularly of the legal lending limit, remained a problem. 
Also while the doors were wide open for new banks to enter the market, no 
proper exit mechanism was set up for failing banks.  
After the depreciation of the Thai baht in July 1997, the Indonesian rupiah 
came under severe downward pressure. The defence of the rupiah was 
abandoned and the authorities adopted an orthodox approach to exchange rate 
pressure. They floated the rupiah then raised interest rates sharply to moderate 
its slide. By October 1997, the currency had depreciated by close to 40%—at 
that stage the largest depreciation among the Asian crisis countries. GDP fell 
by 13.1% between 1997 and 1998 (Economic Report on Indonesia, 2000). 
This currency and economic crisis transmitted to the banking system through 
bank‘s short term foreign currency debts and also through rupiah‘s loan due to 
high interest rates and falling incomes. The non-performing loan ratio had 
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increased to over 32% by the end of 1997 and peaked at close to 50% by 
December 1998. Local banks‘ line of credit with Bank Indonesia had reached 
Rp15.3 trillion (USD1.7 billion), up from only Rp1.4 trillion (USD156 million) 
at the end of July 1997. By May 1998, this overdraft had ballooned to Rp79.7 
trillion (USD8,9 billion) (Enoch et al., 2001). Most of banks become illiquid 
and many banks were insolvent.    
Loan quality was especially weak amongst state-owned banks that did follow 
strict commercial criteria for extending loans. As of mid 1998 there were seven 
state banks, accounting for 50% of total banking sector assets that were deeply 
insolvent and would have been closed if they were private banks. 
2.3.3. Policy responses after the crisis 
During 1998-2000, banking policy was firmly focused on completing the 
banking resolution, especially the bank recapitalization program, and the 
accelerations of the restructuring and write down of non-performing loans. The 
management of problem banks and distressed assets were conducted by 
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) which was formed on January 
26th, 1998 to operate for five years. Other measures were aimed at building 
greater resilience by improving banking structure, tightening rules on bank 
supervision, and the introduction of improved corporate governance.  
In October 2000, the Government and Bank Indonesia (BI) completed the final 
phase of the bank recapitalization programme. During 2000, six banks were 
recapitalized including Bank Bali, Bank Danamon, Bank Niaga, Bank Negara 
Indonesia, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, and Bank Tabungan Negara. The 
government issued additional recapitalization bonds with the amount of 
Rp148.6 trillion (USD15,6 billion) and made up the total to be Rp430.4 trillion 
(USD45,1 billion) (Economic Report on Indonesia, 2000). 
In restructuring the loans, banks had choice whether to restructure internally or 
externally. Banks conducted internal restructuring in their asset management 
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department. Externally, they can use either the Debt Restructuring Task Force 
established by Bank Indonesia, the Jakarta Initiative or Indonesian Banking 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA). At the end of 2000, non IBRA debt 
restructuring was underway for 20,430 debtors owing a total of Rp59.9 trillion 
(USD6,3 billion) in bad debts, or 71.4 percent of all non performing loans. 
Meanwhile, IBRA managed in total Rp286.3 trillion (USD30 billion) of bad 
debts (Economic Report on Indonesia, 2000). 
The bank rehabilitation programme continued in 2000-2003 through the 
establishment of the government guarantee programme for commercial banks, 
monitoring the recapitalization programme, and enhancing the bank 
restructuring programme. Meanwhile, banking system resilience was pursued 
through the implementing a code of good corporate governance, and enhancing 
regulation and supervision in accordance with the 25 Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision (Economic Report on Indonesia: 2000, 2001, 
2002 and 2003). 
The other important policy was the divestment of government shares in the 
nationalized banks. This initiative was intended to ease government budget 
constraints and improve efficiency and performance of overall banking sector. 
Since 2002, government divested its shares in Bank Central Asia, Bank Niaga, 
Bank Danamon and Bank International Indonesia. The government also sold 
three state-owned banks shares through public offering in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (Economic Report on Indonesia, 2003).  
To increase market confidence and strengthen banking infrastructure, the 
government established the Deposit Insurance Agency on 22 September 2005 
(Act No. 24 Year 2004 concerning the Indonesian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (DIAI)).
1
 In addition, the Government, DIAI and BI have also 
developed a policy framework for the financial safety net to delineate the roles 
                                              
1
 DIAI insures time deposit, demand deposits and saving accounts. Since October 2008, the maximum 
amount of deposits insured is Rp2 billion (USD200,000) for each depositor in one bank (DIAI Annual 
Report, 2009) 
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and functions of each three institutions in maintaining financial stability 
especially in crisis management. The framework was set in a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) that sets out the mechanism for collaboration among the 
institutions in the Financial Stability Forum which serves as facility for 
coordination, information sharing and later as decision body to decide bank 
bailout.  
The government finally terminated the IBRA in April 30th, 2004 and 
transferred the assets to newly established agency–State-owned Asset 
Management Company (SAMC). Meanwhile, Bank Indonesia launched a 
further major structural reform of the Indonesian banking sector (See Appendix 
2 for more detail about the reform known as the Indonesian Banking 
Architecture). 
2.3.4. Foreign acquisitions in Indonesian banks 
During the period 2000 to 2009, seventeen banks were acquired by foreign 
investors (see table 2.3). The increased foreign presence has changed the 
structure of banking system‘s total assets, with the new foreign bank share 
rising from 4.8% (December 2000) to 34.2% (December 2008).  
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Table 2.3 
List of foreign acquisitions on Indonesian banks  
 
 
 
 
Most investors are non bank financial firms including hedge funds, sovereign 
wealth funds and individuals. Most of the new owners are of Asian origin from 
Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and India. This acquisition suggests a 
geographical motive of the investors and to the Indonesian banking sector 
because of familiarity with Indonesia‘s economic and financial condition, 
regulation, and culture; or the opportunity to finance trade between those 
countries and Indonesia. 
 
2.4. Banks in the wider economy 
This sub section discusses Indonesia‘s macroeconomic development and the 
role of banks in macroeconomy. It is important to give background for the 
following chapters especially about monetary policy transmission. 
Date Bank Name Investor Country
1 Feb-02 Bank Central Asia Farralon Capital Management US
2 Nov-02 Bank Niaga Khazanah Nasional Berhad Malaysia
3 Jun-03 Bank Danamon Temasek Singapore
4 Feb-04 Bank Internasional Indonesia Temasek Singapore
5 Nov-04 Bank Lippo Khazanah Nasional Berhad Malaysia
6 Jun-05 Bank Permata Jardine Group and Standard Chartered Bank Hong Kong and UK
7 Jun-05 Bank Bumputera Indonesia Tun Daim Zainuddin Malaysia
8 Jun-05 Bank NISP OCBC Bank Singapore
9 Dec-05 Bank Century First Gulf British Islands
10 Jan-06 Bank Buana UOB Bank Singapore
11 Jun-06 Bank Indomonex State Bank of India India
12 May-07 Bank Artha Niaga Kencana Commonwealth Bank Australia
13 May-07 Bank Halim Indonesia ICBC China
14 Jun-02 Bank Swadesi Bank of India India
15 Sep-07 Bank Nusantara Parahyangan Kinoshita Family and MUFG Japan
16 Dec-07 Bank Bintang Manunggal Hana Bank Korea 
17 Aug-08 Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional Texas Pacific US
Source: Banks' Annual Reports (various years).
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2.4.1. Macroeconomic development 
After the financial crisis, the Indonesian economy has achieved high growth 
averaging 5% since 2000 and peaking at 6.3% in 2007 (See table 2.4). The 
growth has been characterized by productivity improvements and 
diversification of activities in various economic sectors including trading, 
telecommunication, transportation, utility, construction and services sectors. 
(Economic Report on Indonesia, 2007). From its external activities, Indonesia 
Balance of Payment‘s has recorded a net current account surplus during the last 
ten years.  
Table 2.4 Macroeconomic indicators 
 
Indonesia has seen inflation fall substantially since 2001. The inflation rate has 
declined steadily from 12.5% in 2001 to 2.8% in 2009 (except for temporary 
increases in 2005 and 2008).  
The jump of the inflation rate in 2005 was caused by the increased price due to 
the reduction of oil price subsidy since 1 October 2005, the increased transport 
tariffs and the increased price of foodstuff and processed food. The y-o-y 
annual inflation rate in October 2005 reached its peak at 17.1%, up compared 
to the previous month 6.4% (Economic Report on Indonesia, 2005).  
Indicators
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Average 
2000-2009
Macroeconomics
GDP growth (%-yoy) 4.9 3.4 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.7 5.5 6.3 6.1 4.5 5.0
Inflation rate (%-yoy) 9.3 12.5 10.0 5.1 6.4 17.1 6.6 6.6 11.1 2.8 8.7
External 
Export (USD bn) 65.4   57.4    59.2   64.1   70.8   87.0   103.5 118.9 107.6   99.3   83.3     
Import (USD bn) 40.4   34.7    35.7   39.5   50.6   69.5   73.9   85.3   100.2   78.6   60.8     
Current Account (USD bn) 8.0    6.9      7.8    8.1    1.6    0.3    10.8   10.4   0.7      3.6    5.8       
Reserves (USD bn) 29.4   28.0    32.0   36.3   36.3   34.7   42.6   56.9   48.4    57.7   40.2     
Exchange rate (Rp/USD) 9,595 10,400 8,950 8,570 8,948 9,713 9,169 9,140 10,950 9,400 9,484    
Government
Budget Def/Surplus  (%GDP) -2.7 -1.7 -1.3 -1.7 -1.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.1 -0.1 -1.6 -1.3
Market
Stock mkt index 416 392 425 692 1,000 1,163 1,806 2,746 1,355   2,534 1,253    
Source: Bank Indonesia. Various years. Economic Report on Indonesia and Monetary Policy Reviews. %-yoy denotes percentage change 
year on year. 
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The inflation rate was also increased in 2008 as a result of soaring energy and 
global food prices. This induced higher inflation rates, both in developing and 
developed countries. Pressures stemming from a higher global oil price that 
peaked more than $140 per barrel subsequently forced the government to raise 
its subsidized fuel prices, by an average of 28.7%, in May 2008 (Economic 
Report on Indonesia, 2008). On one hand, this succeeded in maintaining the 
confidence of investor in Indonesian fiscal sustainability. But on the other 
hand, it triggered a sharp increase in inflation. In 2009, the inflation rate was 
significantly reduced due to the decline international commodity prices as a 
result of the global economic slowdown and also slower growth of domestic 
demand (Economic Report on Indonesia, 2009).  
Indonesia‘s exports are mainly in primary and manufactured products. The 
manufacturing products are including electronic equipment, textiles and textiles 
products. These products are mainly shipped to Japanese and US markets.  
However, since 2007, Indonesia‘s exports to China and India have expanded. 
This made China Indonesia‘s fifth largest export market, displacing Singapore 
and Korea. Nevertheless, Japan, the United States and the Euro zone remain 
Indonesia‘s most important export destinations. The slowing of economic 
growth in the major export destinations had negative effects on Indonesia‘s 
exports. However, the increased in intra-trade activities between Asian 
countries has helped Indonesia to maintain its export (Economic Report on 
Indonesia, 2009). 
Indonesia‘s imports have been dominated by raw materials especially nickel, 
iron and synthetic rubber, and capital goods, which together average over 90% 
of Indonesia‘s total imports. Since 2004, imports excluding oil and gas have 
steadily climbed, despite a temporary fall in the wake of the October 2005 fuel 
price hike that weakened domestic demand. Mid-2006 marked the onset of 
resurgent import growth, which peaked in mid-2008. Robust domestic demand 
spurred by the pace of domestic economic activity and soaring commodity 
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prices were the key factors in the rapid growth in imports excluding oil and gas 
during 2008-09 (Economic Report on Indonesia, 2009). 
The strong performance of Indonesia‘s balance of payment during the last 
seven years gave an opportunity to strengthen the country‘s foreign reserves. 
At the end of 2009, Indonesia‘s foreign reserves achieved approximately 
USD57.7 billion or equal to 5 month imports and interest payment on 
government‘s foreign borrowing. This has risen by 1.5 times from the reserves 
position of seven years ago.  In 2007, some of the reserves were used for earlier 
repayment of Indonesia‘s borrowing from the International Monetary Fund. 
The 2008 global financial crisis caused foreign capital outflow from 
Indonesia‘s capital markets. This resulted in a period of depreciation from 
September to October. Prior to that the rupiah had traded around Rp9.600 per 
US $ but then the fall of Indonesian Composite Stock Index by 54%, the 
increased yield on Government Securities to 20%, and the condition of excess 
demand in the foreign exchange market along with a falling current account 
surplus created pressure on Rupiah to depreciate.. In 2009, the exchange rate 
has been stabilized to Rp9,400 per USD  managed within a range of Rp8500-
9500 per USD (See table 2.2) (Economic Report on Indonesia, 2009). 
The deficit of fiscal position has been low and stable on an average of 1.3% to 
GDP. The Government shows firm disciplines in maintaining the budget deficit 
around 1%. Although it is manageable, the increase of oil prices and its 
subsequent impact in the rising of inflation and interest rates could still create 
problem for government debt service. The government‘s total debt to GDP 
ratio in December 2007 was 78.3% and domestic debts at 40% (mostly in the 
form of bonds held by banks).  
2.4.2.  The role of banks in macroeconomy 
The role of banks becomes more important in the Indonesian economy during 
2000-2009. The ratio of banks‘ total asset to GDP has increased from 74.9% in 
19 
 
2000 to 116.4% in 2009 (See table 2.5). As in other developing countries, 
Indonesia‘s capital markets are underdeveloped and they are still small in size. 
The total value of stock issuance to GDP is only 7.46% in 2009 (Bapepam 
Annual Report, 2009). 
Table 2.5 
Selected banking sector‘s balance sheet items (as % of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
Bank lending has increased rapidly with the average growth of 20% (y-o-y in 
nominal terms).  Lending is the dominant assets of banks. Most of lending is 
given in the form of working capital loans to companies. This followed in 
importance by consumer loans and investment loans, respectively. The 
consumer loans have increased considerably from only 2.9% in 2000 to 20.1% 
in 2009 due to expansion in the short term uncollateralized loans for purchasing 
consumer products. Mortgage lending remains low. Securities holding have 
been decreasing, mainly because of the maturing of bonds issued under the 
bank re-capitalisation programme.   
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Average 2000-
2009
Total assets 74.9 76.5 73.8 73.0 76.8 84.0 91.7 101.1 111.0 116.4 87.9
Certificates of Bank Indonesia 8.0 9.3 10.2 11.9 12.6 12.0 18.6 21.3 15.5 11.7 13.1
Securities 32.2 29.5 26.3 23.0 19.9 18.6 17.2 16.4 14.8 14.0 21.2
Total loans 20.4 21.9 24.6 28.2 33.8 39.7 42.9 51.0 62.8 66.5 39.2
Working capital loans 12.5 12.6 13.7 14.9 17.5 20.3 22.5 27.1 32.9 32.7 20.7
Consumer loans 2.9 4.1 5.3 7.1 9.1 11.8 12.3 14.4 17.6 20.1 10.5
Investment loans 5.0 5.3 5.6 6.1 7.2 7.7 8.2 9.5 12.3 13.7 8.0
Total deposits 50.1 55.5 55.5 57.0 58.1 64.4 69.7 76.9 84.2 87.9 65.9
Saving accounts 11.1 11.9 12.8 15.5 17.9 16.1 18.1 22.3 23.9 28.1 17.8
Demand deposits 11.5 13.1 13.0 14.2 14.8 16.1 18.3 20.6 20.7 18.7 16.1
Time deposits 27.6 30.5 29.6 27.3 25.4 32.3 33.3 33.9 39.6 41.1 32.1
This table presents selected balance sheet items of banking system as a percentage of gross domestic product. Certificate Bank Indonesia refers to Bank Indonesia's 
short term bills (T-bills). Source: Bank Indonesia.Various years. Indonesian banking statistics and Economic Report on Indonesia. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Timeline of Indonesia‘s banking policies and regulations, 1988-
2008 
Date Banking Policies and Regulations 
1988 In October 1988, the Indonesian government announced a second 
financial liberalization after 1983. Specifically, it: (1) liberalized the 
entry of private banks; (2) liberalized the entry of foreign banks 
through joint ventures; and (3) eased requirements for the opening of 
branches for all banks. 
 
1991 The introduction of prudential regulations‘ guidance in February 
1991. The new regulations included: (1) a requirement that all banks 
should meet a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 8% by the end of 1993; 
(2) the introduction of new ratio-based standards of soundness and a 
point-rating system for all banks; and (3) the granting to the central 
bank of the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders to any bank 
defying its guidance. 
 
1992 The new Banking Act (Act No. 7 of 1992) was enacted to replace the 
Banking Act of 1967. It provided for the implementation of prudential 
regulations, administrative sanctions against noncompliant banks, 
criminal penalties for bank managers and employees, a ―legal lending 
limit‖ restricting intra-group lending, and a division of roles between 
the central bank and the Ministry of Finance for supervising unsound 
banks. 
 
1998 Amendment of the Banking Act No. 7 of 1992 (Act No. 10 of 1998) 
the central bank was given all powers from the issuance and 
revocation of banking licenses to the imposition of administrative 
sanctions.  
 
Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA) was set up to 
administer the government's blanket guarantee program, to supervise, 
manage and restructure distress banks, and to manage the 
government‘s assets in banks under restructuring status, and to 
optimize the recovery rate of asset disposals of distressed banks 
(Presidential Decree No 27 of Year 1998).  
 
1999 The new Central Bank Act (Act No. 23 of 1999) was enacted, 
replacing the Central Bank Act of 1968. The new Act explicitly states 
that the central bank is ―an independent national institution, which is 
free from intervention of the Government. 
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2000 Banking policy focused on bank recapitalization.  
 
2001 Banking policies and regulations are aimed to restructure banking 
sector by issuing regulations on the procedure of banking 
restructuring at IBRA, increased bank‘s transparency, improved 
capital and implemented principles of knowing your customers. 
 
2002 Regulations were focused on improving the quality of assets 
especially loans. This was including the prudential principles in 
buying restructured loans from IBRA. 
 
2003 Implemented regulations on fit and proper test for banks ‗board of 
commissioner and board of director, implementing risk management, 
establishing internal audit and the estimation of capital by including 
market risk factors and on net open position. 
2004 Amendment of the Central Bank Act of 1999 (Act No. 3 of 2004). 
The amendment established a relationship of checks and balances 
among the president, House of Representatives and central bank. The 
2004‘s Law provided the newly-empowered parliament with more say 
over the selection of the central bank board, aligning the political 
oversight of the central bank with Indonesia‘s new democratic 
political system. 
 
Deposit insurance law was enacted in September (Act No. 24 of 
2004). This law aims to provide bank depositors with a greater level 
of confidence, while limiting the central bank‘s financial exposure to 
future bank runs. The law created a self-funding deposit insurance 
system under an independent authority that covers deposits under 
Rp100 million.  
 
Indonesian Banking Architecture (IBA) Programme was launched. 
This was a further major structural reform of the Indonesian banking 
sector after the crisis.  
 
2005 Regulations were focused on the transparency and prudential 
procedures for new products sold in banks or via banks for example 
securities and mutual funds products. The prudential regulations on 
legal lending limit and capital. 
 
Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation (LPS) started to operate on 
22 September 2005 
 
2006 January Policy Package was launched: 
 to adjust the maximum legal lending limit (LLL) and risk 
weighted assets in the capital calculation, and the quality 
assessment of productive assets. 
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 to facilitate bank mergers and acquisitions based on the principles 
of honest brokering.  
  
2007 Providing more incentive for bank consolidation and the 
implementation of single presence policies to synergize banks‘ 
operation with the same owner. 
 
2008 Focused to avoid crisis and to balance between strengthening the 
banks‘ capital and loan growth. In avoiding the potential spill over of 
the crisis, BI issued policy to enhance banking liquidity and limit 
derivatives only for hedging purposes. 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia. Various years. Economic Report on Indonesia. DIAI.2005.Annual Report. 
 
Appendix 2: Indonesian Banking Architecture 
Bank Indonesia launched a major structural reform of the Indonesian banking 
sector in 2004 –known as the Indonesian banking architecture (IBA).  It was 
executed through a number of work programs (Economic Report on Indonesia, 
2004): 
1. Reinforcing the structure of the national banking system 
This program was aimed to strengthen bank capacity for business and risk 
management and the expansion of the scale of business in order to support 
increased capacity for bank credit expansion.  By 2019, the programs are 
expected to improve the structure of the banking system.  This structure is 
envisaged as follows: 
 Two or three banks likely to emerge as international banks. These banks 
possess capacity and ability to operate on an international scale and 
having total capital exceeding Rp50 Trillion 
 Up to 5 national banks. These banks have a broad scope of business and 
operating nationwide with total capital between Rp10 Trillion (USD1 
Billion) and Rp50 trillion (USD 5 Billion). 
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 30 to 50 specialized banks with operations focused on particular 
business segments according to the capability and competence of each 
bank.  These banks will have capital of Rp100 billion (USD 10 Million) 
up to Rp10 trillion (USD 1 Billion). 
 Rural Banks are the banks operate in rural area, and banks with limited 
scope of business, having capital of less than Rp100 billion (USD 10 
Million). 
2. Improvement in the quality of banking regulation 
This program was aimed at improving the effectiveness of regulation 
conducted by Bank Indonesia and achieving compliance with regulatory 
standards based on international best practices (the 25 Basle Core Principles 
for Effective Banking Supervision). 
3. Improvement of the supervisory function 
This program aims to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of bank 
supervision conducted by BI.  This objective is conducted by improving the 
competency of bank examiners, improving coordination among supervisory 
agencies, development of risk-based supervision, more effective 
enforcement, and consolidation of the banking sector organization within 
Bank Indonesia. 
4. Quality improvements in bank management and operations 
This program is focused on improving good corporate governance, quality 
of risk management, and the operational capabilities of management. 
5. Development of banking infrastructure  
This program is aimed at developing supporting infrastructure for effective 
banking operations, such as a credit bureau, domestic credit rating agency, 
and a credit guarantee scheme. 
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6. Improvement of customer protection 
This program is aimed at empowering customers through the establishment 
of a mechanism for customer complaints, establishment of an independent 
mediation agency, improved transparency of information on banking 
products, and education to customers. 
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Chapter 3 Competition in Indonesian Provincial 
Banking Deposit Market 
3.1. Introduction 
Bank concentration and competition has been widely studied by banking 
economists. This has been motivated by concern over high levels of 
concentration and lack of competition in many of these markets, by the facts 
that banks play a crucial intermediary role and by the importance of branches 
network in a country‘s banking market. In this chapter, we set out market 
power model, efficient-structure hypothesis model, and the new empirical 
industrial organization (NEIO) model and estimate the models using 
Indonesian provincial banking data from 2001-2008.   
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) will follow model develop by 
Berger and Hannan (1989) and the test for efficient-structure hypothesis model 
uses modification of Berger (1995) model. The NEIO model is that suggested 
by Panzar and Rosse (1987). In this study we use a dynamic model of Panzar 
and Rosse (PR) based on the model developed by Goddard and Wilson (2009). 
They suggested that the long run equilibrium effect of PR of fixed effects 
models was mainly characterised by disequilibrium conditions. This finding 
necessitated the use of a dynamic estimator to be applied to a dynamic revenue 
equation for market power inferences. 
We find that traditional SCP model does not reveal much evidence of 
relationship between concentration and price. The concentration ratio of three 
largest banks (CR3) in the results do not carry negative sign as expected to 
explain the relationship that higher market concentration will lead to lower 
deposit prices. PR modelling however clearly suggests imperfect competition.  
The weakness of PR modelling is that it does not tell us much about the sources 
of imperfect competition and so what might be done to change matters. 
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However estimations using the ES specification is an informative accompany 
tool. This reveals that the geography of Indonesia has modest impact on 
competition (with the implication that developments that help overcome 
geographical barriers, e.g. new banking technologies) can usefully promote 
competition in Indonesian deposit markets. 
The chapter is structured as follows: the remainder of this section will describe 
the provincial banking market focussing on deposit markets. Section 3.2 
illustrates the structure and distribution of pricing and return of banking in 
Indonesia‘s provincial banking markets. Section 3.3 presents a review of 
literature, the theory of competition, methods of competition measurement and 
the result of empirical studies. The data and the empirical model are discussed 
in Section 3.4. The regression results are reported in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 
concludes. 
 
3.2. Provincial Banking Markets 
As described in the introduction (Section 1.3), there are considerable 
differences between the provinces of Indonesia in terms of population density, 
economic growth and geography. Banks with strong financial capability and 
good networking technology can expand their branches to compete in several 
provinces. These banks then compete with single province banks (provincial 
government owned banks and private banks head quartered in the provincial 
areas).  
During 2000-08, the number of bank branches has increased by 28 per cent to 
824 offices (see table 3.1).  
For the purposes of this chapter, the provincial banking markets have been sub-
divided into three groups. Group 1 is ―Metropolitan Area‖ that has the largest 
population density and number of banks per head of population. It consists of 
Jakarta, Banten and West Java provinces.  Group 2 (―Java and Sumatra‖) 
27 
 
consists of the reminded of the Java and Sumatra islands i.e. excluding Jakarta, 
Banten and West Java. This area has a moderate population density and 
number of banks per head of population. Finally, Group 3 (―the Periphery‖) 
contains Kalimantan island, Sulawesi island, Maluku island, Papua island and 
the other smaller provinces. This area has the lowest population density and 
number of bank‘s offices per head of population.  
Table 3.1 
Number of banks‘ offices in provincial markets 
 
 
Table 3.1 reports the number of bank offices in provincial markets. The banks 
in the metropolitan area hold more assets than other areas. Thus while 
Metropolitan accounts for only 2 in 8 branches, it accounts for more than 60 
percent of assets, loans and deposits.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Banks 144 141 138 134 131 130 130 124
2. Provincial Office: 645 672 699 730 764 795 837 824
A. Metropolitan Area 173 177 178 185 188 189 189 182
B. Java & Sumatra 281 293 311 323 333 350 375 371
C. The periphery 191 202 210 222 243 256 273 271
This table presents the number of bank offices at provincial level. This office is the coordinator office of bank branches in a provincial 
area that submits the financial reports to the regulator. Metropolitan area consists of three provinces: Jakarta, Banten and West Java. 
Java and Sumatra is a group of other provinces located in the island of Java and Sumatra i.e. excluding Jakarta, Banten and West Java. 
The periphery is the provinces with the lowest population density and number of banks' offices per head of population . Bank 
Indonesia. Various years. Unpublished.
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Table 3.2 
Provincial banking assets and liabilities 
 
 
Table 3.2 reports the assets and liabilities, by provincial group. The largest 
demand deposit market was Metropolitan (62.7%) followed by Java and 
Sumatra (30.6%), and the Periphery (6.7%). For saving account, the largest is 
Java and Sumatra (47.8%), Metropolitan (39.8%) and the Periphery (12.4%). In 
time deposits market, the largest is metropolitan (69.1%), java and Sumatra 
(26.9%) and the Periphery (4.1%).  
Table 3.3 
Distribution of the pricing of bank deposits 
End of December 2008 (in %) 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 reports the statistics for annual interest rates on deposits by type of 
deposits and geographical locations. The data show that Metropolitan market 
offers the lowest and the highest rates for time deposits and saving accounts 
and the highest rates for demand deposits.  
Provincial Groups
2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008
Metropolitan 761.1 1,587.4 188.8 800.7 119.8 270.0 67.2 198.4 286.4 569.5
(73.1) (68.7) (66.7) (61.2) (74.8) (62.7) (43.5) (39.8) (74.3) (69.1)
Java and Sumatra 227.0 584.6 71.4 409.6 33.4 131.8 71.4 238.5 85.8 221.5
(21.8) (25.3) (25.2) (31.3) (20.8) (30.6) (46.3) (47.8) (22.3) (26.9)
The Periphery 53.1 138.6 22.7 97.2 7.0 28.8 15.7 61.6 13.1 33.7
(5.1) (6.0) (8.0) (7.4) (4.4) (6.7) (10.2) (12.4) (3.4) (4.1)
Total 1,041.1 2,310.6 282.9 1,307.5 160.2 430.6 154.3 498.5 385.3 824.7
This table presents market share of Indonesia's provincial groups' markets in December 2000 and 2008. Demand deposit is a flexible 
deposit with very small interest rates. Saving accounts are an instant access that the customers can withdraw their money instantly by 
using ATM cards. Time deposits are deposit with fixed time and interest rates. See Section 3.2 for explanation of different provincial 
groups. Source: Bank Indonesia. 2000 and 2008. Indonesian Banking Statistics. 
(unit trillion Rupiah)
Assets (% of total) Loans (% of total)
Demand Deposits 
(% of total)
Saving Accounts 
(% of total)
Time Deposits 
(% of total)
Min Mean Median Max Min Mean Median Max Min Mean Median Max
National 4.94 10.10 10.68 17.39 0.21 2.65  2.59  8.91 0.00 3.93 4.01  9.14
Metropolitan 4.94 10.72 11.08 17.39 0.33 3.38 2.90  8.91 0.00 4.13 4.18  9.14
Java and Sumatra 6.61 10.36 10.74 16.01 0.21 2.66 2.53  6.49 1.00 4.13 4.12  8.41
The Periphery 6.74 9.79 10.57 15.28 0.55 2.52 2.50  5.70 1.27 3.74 4.00  6.66
Time Deposits Demand Deposits Saving Accounts
This table shows the distribution of deposits interest rates based on types and provincial groups. National is the 
country's deposit market. See section 3.2 for explanation about different provincial groups. Source: Bank 
Indonesia. 2008. Unpublished. 
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The metropolitan area has the highest average of deposit rates compared to 
other provincial groups. Some banks in Metropolitan area offer higher time 
deposit rates and demand deposit rates than other provincial groups. 
Table 3.4 
Bank deposits spreads against 1-month Certificate of Bank Indonesia‘s rate 
 
 
Table 3.4 reports the spreads of average bank deposit rates against the market 
rate (1 month Certificate of Bank Indonesia‘s bills minus deposit rates).  These 
spreads can be interpreted as measures of the gross revenue or return to deposit 
taking activity, because the Certificate of Bank Indonesia rate measures the risk 
free income that can be obtained from investment of deposits. Later this 
chapter uses these spreads as a dependent variable measuring returns on deposit 
taking. The spreads have been decreasing since 2001 in all provincial markets. 
For example the spread of time deposit in Metropolitan area in 2001 was 2.29% 
while in 2008 fell to 0.02% (See table 3.4). This may imply that the markets 
become more competitive.  
Deposit markets in Metropolitan area and Java and Sumatra are appear more 
competitive than in The Periphery. In 2008, the return of time deposit in 
Metropolitan and Java and Sumatra were 0.02% and 0.31% respectively while 
in the Periphery was 0.67.  
 
 
Time 
deposits
Demand 
deposits
Saving 
Accounts
Time 
deposits
Demand 
deposits
Saving 
Accounts
Time 
deposits
Demand 
deposits
Saving 
Accounts
Metropolitan 2.29 11.46 8.97 1.20 9.03 7.87 0.02 7.55 6.65
Java and Sumatra 2.31 12.12 8.11 1.33 9.36 7.53 0.31 8.11 6.64
The Periphery 2.27 12.64 8.03 1.73 9.52 7.77 0.67 8.20 6.92
2001 2005 2008
Spread (%)
Spread is the 1-month Bank Indonesia Certificate interest rates minus deposit rates. Provincial groups refer to definition on  
Section 3.2. Source: Bank Indonesia. 2001, 2005 and 2008. Unpublished.  
Provincial Groups
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3.3. Literature Review 
3.3.1. Theory of Competition 
Structural concepts of competition emerged during the nineteenth century. The 
pioneers were Jevons (1871), Marshall (1890, 1919), Edgeworth (1881), Clark 
(1899), and Knight (1921), who contributed to the development of the standard 
models of perfect competition and monopoly (see Hay and Morris, 1991, for a 
review). In this modern economic theory, a market is said to be purely 
competitive if it has a large number of firms selling a homogenous commodity, 
and the market share of each individual firms is so small that no individual firm 
finds itself able to influence the commodity‘s price by changing the quantity of 
output it sells. To make competition in economic theory not only ―pure‖ but 
also ―perfect‖, several additional structural conditions are added: free entry and 
exit, perfect information, and no transaction costs (Scherer and Ross, 1990). 
Violations of the major structural preconditions for pure competition lead to a 
rich variety of market structures. Table 3.5 presents six major types of market 
structure, using the two-way classification based on the number of sellers and 
the nature of the product. The difference between homogeneity and 
differentiation in this classification implies the degree of substitutability among 
competing seller‘s products. In contrast to the pure competition concept, the 
monopoly concept assumes a market with only one seller with complete control 
over price. 
However, most markets are neither purely competitive nor monopolistic but 
fall somewhere in between. Chamberlin (1933) made a very important 
theoretical advance by developing new theories of monopolistic competition 
and oligopoly (Cournot, 1838 and Bertrand, 1883, systematically analyze 
behaviour under oligopoly, see Hay and Morris, 1991). The concept of 
monopolistic competition is characterised by a large number of sellers (and 
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buyers), easy entry, and a differentiated product. The oligopoly theory assumes 
a market structure where a relatively small number of sellers control the 
market. 
Table 3.5 
Major types of market structure 
 
 
Under the theory of monopolistic competition, although a large number of 
sellers may supply a single market, each firm‘s product has some unique 
characteristics, which allow the firm some discretion over price and the ability 
to pursue a policy at least somewhat different from their competitors. Under 
oligopoly theory, firms realise their actions are interdependent because the 
fewness of firms in the market. The nature of competition under oligopoly 
ranges from active price competition to implicit or explicit forms of collusion 
(Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2001). 
Pure monopolist, oligopolists, and monopolistic competitors share a common 
feature, that is, under given demand conditions, each can increase the quantity 
of output it sells only by reducing its price. Therefore, all three types of market 
structure possess some degree of power over price, which is called monopoly 
power or market power (Scherer and Ross, 1990). 
 
 
 
No of firms Entry conditions Product differentiation
Perfect competition Many Free entry Identical products (homogeneity)
Imperfect competition:
a. Monopolistic competition Many Free entry Some differentiation
b. Oligopoly Few Barriers to entry Some differentiation/homogeneity
Monopoly One No entry Complete differentiation
Source: Lipczynski, Wilson and Goddard (2009)
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3.3.2. Market Power and Efficiency Hypothesis  
3.3.2.1. The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm 
To describe the relationship between market structure and the performance of 
firms, Mason (1939, 1949), and Bain (1951, 1956, 1959) developed the 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. According to this approach, 
the structure of a market influences the conduct of the firms operating in the 
markets, which in turn influences the performance of those firms. For example, 
a perfectly competitive market structure leads to efficient economic 
performance with price equal to marginal cost, inefficient firms driven from the 
market, and long-run economic profits equal to zero. In contrast, a 
monopolistic market structure results in poor economic performance with price 
exceeding marginal cost, inefficient firms surviving in the long run, and 
economic profits greater than zero. 
Under this approach, the finding of a positive relationship between firm 
profitability and the market structure elements is predicted by two hypotheses: 
traditional structure conduct performance (SCP) and relative market power 
(RMP). The traditional SCP hypothesis proposes that banks are able to extract 
monopolistic rents in more concentrated markets by their ability to offer lower 
deposit rates and charge higher loan rates in these markets. The RMP 
hypothesis asserts that only firms with large market shares and well 
differentiated products are able to exercise market power in pricing these 
products and earn supernormal profits (Shepherd, 1982; Smirlock, 1985 
regards it as the product differentiation hypothesis). The difference between 
SCP and RMP is that in the latter, market power does not occur solely in 
concentrated markets. Generally, the MP hypothesis suggests that antitrust or 
regulatory action may help improve efficiency by bringing prices closer to 
marginal costs. 
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3.3.2.2. The Chicago School Approach and Efficient Structure  
             Hypothesis 
 
Although the SCP paradigm was highly influential, it has been subject to 
criticism for a number of different reasons. The SCP paradigm draws heavily 
on microeconomic theory and the neoclassical theory of the firm. However, the 
theory does not always specify precisely the relationship between structure, 
conduct and performance variables. In the empirical studies, the SCP paradigm 
often finds associations in the anticipated direction between structure, conduct 
and performance variables. However, such relationships are often only weakly 
statistical significant.  
Following the Chicago school approach, two major efficient structure (ES) 
hypotheses have been generated; the X-efficiency version of the efficient 
structure (ESX) hypothesis and the scale efficiency version of the efficient 
structure (ESS) hypothesis. 
Under the X-efficiency hypothesis (ESX), the firms with superior management 
or production processes operate at lower costs and subsequently reap higher 
profits. The resulting higher market shares may also lead to higher market 
concentration (See Demsetz, 1973, 1974; Peltzman 1977). The scale-efficiency 
hypothesis (ESS) states that firms have similar production and management 
technology but operate at different levels of economies of scale. Firms 
operating at optimal economies of scale will have the lowest costs and the 
resulting higher profits will lead to higher market concentrations. Both versions 
of the efficient-structure-hypothesis provide an alternative explanation for the 
positive relationship between profit and market structure (See Lambson 1987). 
In short the efficient structure hypothesis suggests that the market power 
hypothesis might not be supported even if the significantly positive relationship 
between market structure and profitability exists. Instead, they hypothesise that 
both market concentration and/or large market share are the results of banks 
34 
 
with superior efficiency. Thus, the efficient-structure hypothesis has a different 
policy implication antitrust or regulatory actions are likely to be 
counterproductive. 
3.3.3. NEIO model: Panzar and Rosse (PR)  
The criticism about SCP paradigm led to the realization that a number of 
conduct and performance variables have feedback effects on structure, and that 
causality within SCP is two-way and not just a one way process, guided 
eventually to a shift away from the presumption that structure is the most 
important determinant of the level of competition. Instead, some economists 
argued that the strategies (conduct) of individual firms were equally, if not 
more, important (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Theories that focus primarily on 
strategy and conduct are subsumed under the general heading of the new 
empirical industrial organisation (Schmalensee, 1982). According to this 
approach, firms are not seen as passive entities. Instead they are active decision 
makers, capable of implementing a wide range of diverse strategies. A key 
aspect is also the used of firm-level data to make inferences about supply and 
demand.  
The Rosse and Panzar (1977) model further developed by Panzar and Rosse 
(1982, 1987) and abbreviated here to the PR model, uses firm (or bank)-level 
data. It investigates the extent to which a change in factor input prices is 
reflected in (equilibrium) revenues. Under perfect competition, an increase in 
input prices raises total revenues by the same amount as the rise in costs. Under 
a monopoly, an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce 
equilibrium output, and consequently reduce total revenues. The PR model also 
provides a measure ("H-statistic") between 0 and 1 of the degree of 
competitiveness of the industry, with less than O being collusive (joint 
monopoly) competition, less than 1 being monopolistic competition/collusive 
oligopoly, and 1 being perfect competition/contestable market. It can be shown, 
if the bank faces a demand with constant elasticity and a Cobb-Douglas 
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technology, that the magnitude of H can be interpreted as an inverse measure of 
the degree of monopoly power, or alternatively, as we do, as a measure of the 
degree of competition.  
The advantage of the PR model is that because it uses bank-level data it allows 
for bank-specific differences in production function. It also allows one to study 
differences between types of banks (e.g., large versus small, foreign versus 
domestic). Its drawback is that it assumes that the banking industry is in long-
run equilibrium; however, a separate test exists to determine whether this 
condition is satisfied. As we have access to bank-level information and as we 
want to study differences among banks, we apply the PR model to our 
provincial Indonesian data. 
Dynamic Panzar and Rosse approach  
A dynamic Panzar Rosse model has been developed by Goddard and Wilson 
(2009). Their approach is motivated by criticism of static Panzar and Rosse, 
that it can cause a downward bias of the estimated coefficients (Church and 
Ware, 2000 and Shaffer, 2001).  
The absence of any dynamic effects in a fixed effect model means that 
specifications of this type may also be criticized from the perspective of time-
series econometrics. If revenue is actually dependent on the past revenue, then 
the misspecification of the equation results in a pattern of autocorrelation in the 
disturbance terms. This creates difficulties for either fixed effects (FE) or 
random effects (RE) estimation. With small T and auto correlated disturbances, 
the FE and RE estimators are severely downward biased, creating the potential 
for seriously misleading inferences to be drawn concerning the nature or 
intensity of competition.  
Another criticism was by Brozen (1971) who argued that the relevant micro 
theory identifies market equilibrium relationships between variables such as 
concentration and profitability, however, there is no certainty that a profit 
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figure observed at any moment in time is an equilibrium value. In banking 
literature, Goddard et.al (2004) finds that convergence towards long run 
equilibrium is less than instantaneous. 
The reason for using a dynamic approach is to resolve these problems and 
obtain unbiased estimates to calculate H-statistic.  Although the micro theory 
underlying the Panzar-Rosse test is based on a static equilibrium framework, in 
practice the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium might well be less than 
instantaneous, and markets might be out of equilibrium either occasionally, or 
frequently, or always. As a result, the estimation of the H-statistic may have a 
misspecification bias in the revenue equation. Misspecification bias arises in 
the case where there is partial, not instantaneous, adjustment towards 
equilibrium in response to input price shocks. Partial adjustment necessitates 
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable among the covariates of the 
revenue equation. The latter should have a dynamic structure, and the static 
version (without a lagged dependent variable), widely used in the previous 
literature, is misspecified. This is also the reason to use Generalised Method of 
Moment (GMM) estimator. 
 
3.3.4. Review of Empirical Works 
This subsection presents empirical studies of competition in deposit markets. 
We do not discuss empirical studies of competition in other banking markets 
such as consumer or corporate lending. 
3.3.4.1. Structure conduct performance (SCP) empirical studies  
There are many studies, at least going back to Berger and Hannan (1989), 
investigating the impact of bank market concentration on bank deposit rates. 
Table 3.6 summarizes the findings of this literature. Studies employ both three 
bank concentration ratio (CR3) and the HHI as concentration measures. 
Overall, most papers find a negative impact of an increase in concentration on 
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time and savings deposit rates, the effects vary across samples and 
specifications.  
Table 3.6 
Empirical studies in SCP approach 
 
Study Period/ 
Obs 
Dependent 
Variable 
Countries Results 
Berger and Hannan (1989) 1983-85/ 
3500-4000  
Deposit rates: 
MMDA, 
Super NOW, 
4 type of CDs. 
US Banks in the most 
concentrated local 
markets pay MMDA 
rates that range from 25 
to 100 basis points less 
than those paid in the 
least concentrated 
markets, 
Calem and Carlino (1991) 1985/ 
444/466 
MMDA, 3 
&6-mo CD 
rates 
US Between 12-42 basis 
point 
Radecki (1998) 1996-1997/ 
390  
Deposit rates: 
saving, NOW 
and time 
deposit 
US An increase of 20 
percentage points in the 
three-firm concentration 
level causes savings 
account rates to fall on 
the order of 20 to 30 
basis points. 
Corvoisier and Gropp 
(2002) 
1993-96/ 
246 
Margin 
between 
money market 
minus deposit 
rates 
EU 
Countries 
Demand deposit: 
increased by 100-200 bp. 
On the other hand, 
saving and time deposit 
decreased by 100-200 
bps in a more 
concentrated market. 
Hannan and Prager (2004) 1996 and  
19 99/ 
6,141/5,209 
Saving, NOW 
and time 
deposit  rates 
US MSA: Saving: 5 bp, 
Time deposit: 3 bp and 
demand: 10 bp. 
State level: saving: -33, 
time dep: -6bp and 
demand dep: -4bp 
 
3.3.4.2. Efficient-structure hypothesis (ES) empirical studies  
As discussed in the previous section, an important critique of SCP model is the 
fact that it considers market power to be the only explanation for differences in 
market share. The efficient-structure hypothesis (ES) has been developed as an 
important alternative explanation.  
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Table 3.7 
Empirical studies in ES approach 
 
The efficiency-structure hypothesis attributes differences in performance to 
differences in efficiency (Berger (1995), Goldberg and Rai (1996)). According 
to the Efficiency hypothesis, both high market share and good performance 
result from high efficiency.  
Berger (1995) uses the US‘s banking data from 1980 to 1990 and develops a 
series of tests to incorporate efficiency directly into the model to resolve the 
conflict between structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and efficient-structure 
hypothesis (ES). Four testable hypotheses are specified, SCP, relative market 
power hypothesis (RMP), efficient structure hypothesis using X-inefficiency 
(ESX) and efficient structure hypothesis using scale efficiency (ESS). He finds 
that the empirical results indicate some limited support for two of the four 
Study Period/ 
Obs 
Variables Country Results 
Berger (1995) 1980-90/ 
1,928  
Dep. Var: ROA,  
Variables: X-
efficiency,  Scale-
efficiency. 
US Partial support to 
X-efficiency.  
Goldberg and Rai (1996) 1988-91/ 
303 
Dep.Var: ROA, 
ROE and NIM 
Variables: CR3, X-
efficiency, wage, 
total assets, total 
liabilities to total 
asset ratio, per 
capita income and 
time dummies 
11 
European 
countries 
Find evidence to 
support the 
Efficient-structure 
hypothesis for 
banks located in 
countries with low 
concentration of 
banks. 
Berger and Hannan 
(1998) 
1988/ 
5,263 
Dep.Var: Cost 
efficiency. 
Variable: HHI 
 
US Banks in more 
concentrated 
markets exhibit 
lower cost 
efficiency. 
Bos (2004) 1992-98/ 
351 
Dep.var: ROA. 
Variables: CR3, 
MS, HHI, loan to 
asset, liquid assets 
to total assets, 
operating expenses 
over operating 
income, total 
deposits 
The 
Netherlands 
Cournot model 
with the modified 
Efficiency 
hypothesis has the 
highest fit and is 
the only 
specification 
where all the 
control variables 
also carry the 
expected sign. 
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hypotheses, although the importance of these theories may be questioned. The 
data provide partial support for the X-efficiency version of the ES hypothesis 
(ESX). X-efficiency or superior management of resources is consistently 
associated with higher profits, when controlling for the effects of the other 
three hypotheses, as required under the hypothesis. However, support for the 
other necessary condition of ESX that X-efficiency is positively related to 
concentration or market share so that it can explain the positive profit-structure 
relationship, is much weaker. The data also provide some support for the 
relative-market power hypothesis (RMP).  
The relationship between market structure and performance has been studied 
extensively for American banking. In contrast, relatively little work has been 
done to investigate this relationship for European banking and emerging 
markets. Goldberg and Rai (1996) study the traditional structure-performance 
hypothesis (SCP) and the efficient-structure hypothesis using European 
banking data. They do not find a positive and significant relationship between 
concentration and profitability for a sample of banks across 11 European 
countries over a four year period, 1988-91. However, they find evidence to 
support one of the two versions of the efficient-structure hypothesis for banks 
located in countries with low concentration of banks. 
Bos (2004) uses data from the Netherlands‘ banking and applies the modified 
Efficiency hypothesis. Comparing with SCP and Cournot model, he finds that 
the ES has the highest fit and the only specification where all the control 
variables also carry the expected sign. Evidence from the Cournot model 
suggests that he cannot reject the existence of market power, although its 
impact on performance may be small.  
Turning into emerging markets, the existing banking competition studies 
provide no direct insights in these markets. The primary focus has been on the 
US followed by Europe. There are few such studies in emerging markets and 
that none of them find positive significant relationship between market 
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structure and bank performance (See Mohieldin (2000) and Perera et al. 
(2007)). There are few SCP studies of emerging economies that are easily 
accessible e.g. via internet. Amongst these none of them find support to SCP 
model. 
3.3.4.3. Estimates of the Panzar and Rosse model 
Many previous studies have examined the competitive structure of the banking 
industry in various countries by using the H-statistics. A summary of previous 
P-R studies on banking is presented in Table 3.8. Overall, the previous 
empirical estimations of P-R model for developed countries show varying 
results.  
Table 3.8 
Panzar and Rosse‘s empirical studies in developed markets 
 
Study Period Dependent 
Variable 
Countries Results 
Nathan and Neave (1989) 1982-84 Total revenue 
less provision 
Canada Monopolistic competition 
Hstat: 0.45 – 1.058 
Vesala (1995) 1985-92 Total interest 
revenue or loan 
interest  
Finland MC (except 1989-90) 
Hstat: 0.182 – 1.381 
Molyneux      et  al. 
(1996) 
1986-88 Total revenue 
less provision 
Japan Monopoly 
H-stat: -0.00039 – 0.4226 
De Bandt and Davis 
(2000) 
1992-96 Interest income 
or total income 
France, German and 
Italy 
MC(large banks in all and 
small bank in Italy)  
Hstat: -0.004 – 0.729 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) 1988-98 Total interest 
revenue to total 
asset 
23 EU and non EU MC(all, competition weaker 
in small markets and 
stronger in international 
markets). Hstat:  
Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) 
1994-
2001 
Interest revenue 
to total assets 
50 industrialized and 
developing 
Monopolistic competition 
Hstat: 0.60-0.80 
Weill (2004) 1994-99 Total revenue 12 EU MC(decreased over the 
period). Hstat: 0.439-0.734 
Casu and 
Girardone(2005) 
1997-
2003 
Total revenue 
to total assets 
EU Monopolistic competition 
Hstat: 0 – 0.94 
Bikker etal (2006) 1986-
2005 
interest income 
to total assets  
101 countries Monopolistic competition is 
the most common. 
Hstat: 0.504 
De Rozas(2007) 1986-
2005 
Net income to 
total asset 
Spain Monopolistic competition 
Hstat: 0.55-0.79 
Matthews et al.(2007) 1980-
2004 
Revenue UK Monopolistic competition 
H-stat: 0.46-0.78 
Goddard and Wilson 
(2009) 
1998-
2004 
Revenue France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the UK 
and the US  
Monopolistic competition 
H-stat: 0.32 
MC=monopolistic competition; MO=monopoly; PC=perfect competition 
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Vesala (1995) conducts an empirical analysis of Finnish banking sector after 
deregulation in the mid 1980s. Concern about characterisation of bank‘s 
pricing behaviour and measurement of the level of price competition and its 
evolution over time. He analyses the nature and level of oligopolistic 
competition and finds that the H-stat value is always positive and support the 
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition model (except 1989 and 1990 when 
the data are consistent even with perfect competition). H-stats using interest 
revenue as dependent variable are within range of 0.182 – 1.381, while using 
loan interest revenue are in the range of 0.171 – 1.460 
De Rozas (2007) assess the level of competition prevailing in the Spanish 
banking system. The estimation outcome reveals a gradual rising path for the 
H-statistic, thus suggesting a more competitive environment among larger 
banks. This finding runs counter to the widespread hypothesis which states that 
concentration impairs competition. In addition, a noteworthy increase in the 
degree of competition is identified at the turn of the eighties, when several 
liberalization-oriented policy measures came into force. 
Matthews et al. (2007) report an empirical assessment of competitive 
conditions among the major British banks, during a period of major structural 
change. Speciﬁcally, estimates of the Rosse–Panzar H-statistic are reported for 
a panel of 12 banks for the period 1980–2004. The sample banks correspond 
closely to the major British banking groups‘ speciﬁed by the British Banking 
Association. The robustness of the results of the Rosse–Panzar methodology is 
tested by estimating the ratio of Lerner indices obtained from interest rate 
setting equations. The results conﬁrm the consensus ﬁnding that competition in 
British banking is characterised by the theoretical model of monopolistic 
competition. There is evidence that the intensity of competition in the core 
market for bank lending remained approximately unchanged throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. However, competition appears to have become less intense in 
the non-core (off-balance sheet) business of British banks. 
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In the emerging markets, a number of studies of banking competitive structure 
by employing Panzar and Rosse approach have been conducted since 2002. 
Though there exist studies on banking in emerging markets in Asia, these 
literatures focus mostly on China and India. As far as, we are aware, there are 
no studies using Indonesian banks‘ data.  
A summary of previous PR studies on banking in emerging markets is 
presented in Table 3.9. The results of previous empirical estimations of PR 
model show that most banking markets are characterised by monopolistic 
competition. 
Table 3.9 
Panzar and Rosse‘s empirical studies in emerging markets 
 
Study Period Dependent 
Variable 
Countries Results 
Gelos and Roldos (2002) 1994-99 Interest revenue 
to total assets 
8 European and Latin 
American 
(MC except  Argentina and 
Hungary (near PC)) 
Hstat: 0.47-0.97 
Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) 
1994-
2001 
Interest revenue 
to total assets 
50 industrialized and 
developing 
Monopolistic competition 
Hstat: 0.60-0.80 
 
Drakos and Konstantinou 
(2005) 
1992-
2000 
Total income Central Eastern 
European and former 
Soviet Union  
Monopolistic competition 
Hstat: 0.294-0.323 
Bikker et al. (2006) 1986-
2005 
Interest income 
or interest 
income to total 
assets  
101 countries Monopolistic competition is 
the most common. 
Hstat: 0.504 
Yildirim and  Philippatos 
(2007) 
1992-99 Total interest 
revenue (or 
total  revenue) 
to total assets 
14 Central and South 
East European and the 
Russian Federation 
MC(Lithuania, Macedonia); 
PC(Latvia); Neither MC nor 
PC(other) 
Hstat: 0.19-0.75 
Yildirim and Philippatos 
(2007) 
1993-
2000 
Total revenue 
to total assets 
11 Latin American Monopolistic competition 
Hstat: 0.62-0.83 
Zhu (2008) 1992-
2006 
Total interest 
revenue to total 
asset 
 
15 CEE and 7 Central 
and South American 
Monopolistic competition 
H-stat: 0.39-0.42 
Delis (2009) 1996-
2006 
Total revenue 22 Central and Eastern 
European  
Monopolistic competition 
Hstat: 0.110 – 0.205 
Dalley and Matthews 
(2009)  
1998-
2007 
Total revenue Jamaica Monopolistic competition 
Hstat: 0.24 – 0.40 
MC=monopolistic competition; MO=monopoly; PC=perfect competition 
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The first study of PR in emerging market is conducted by Gelos and Roldos 
(2002). They examine the evolution of market structure in emerging market 
banking systems during the 1990s. While significant bank consolidation has 
been taking place in these countries, reflected in a sharp decline in the number 
of banks, this process has not systematically been associated with increased 
concentration as measured by standard indices. The econometric estimates 
based on Panzar-Rosse (1987) methodology suggest that, overall; markets have 
not become less competitive in a sample of eight European and Latin American 
countries. They conclude that lowering barriers to entry, by doing such things 
allowing increased participation of foreign banks, appears to have prevented a 
decline in competitive pressures associated with consolidation. They report H-
stat in the early period ranging from 0.50-0.84 and H-stats in the later period 
ranging from: 0.47-0.97.  
There is only one study using emerging market data and dynamic model. Daley 
& Matthews (2009) employ the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
dynamic panel estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and find 
that the Jamaican banking market reflected a monopolistic competition over the 
period 1998 to 2007. 
 
3.4. Data and Methodology 
3.4.1. Data 
We use unconsolidated annual bank accounts data obtained from Bank 
Indonesia statistics for the years 2001-2008. This data is compiled by each 
bank‘s main branch in every province and reports on the banking services 
provided in the provincial markets. We eliminated observations with missing 
data on any of the variables, and we applied rules to exclude outliers based on 
the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles of the distributions of the dependent variable in the 
revenue equation. We also eliminated banks for which fewer than 2 bank-year 
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observations were available for the estimation. After cleaning the data, we have 
5,966 annual observations on 133 banks. 
Table  3.10 
Definitions of Variables 
 
 
Variables Description
Dependent Variables
Time deposit rate r Time deposit interest rates paid by a bank in a provincial 
banking market
Demand deposit rate r Demand deposit interest rates paid by a bank in a provincial 
banking market
Saving account rate r Saving account interest rates paid by a bank in a provincial 
banking market
Log total revenue rev Interest and non-interest income
Log operating revenue rev Interest income
Input prices
Log labour price P1 Personnel costs/total assets
Log physical capital price
P2 Total depreciation and other capital expenses/total fixed assets
Log wholesale funding price P3 Interbank money market funding interest rates
Concentration ratio (%)
CR of time deposits CR3 Concentration of a top three time deposit provincial banking 
market
CR of demand deposits CR3 Concentration of a top three demand deposit provincial banking 
market
CR of saving accounts CR3 Concentration of a top three saving account provincial banking 
market
Market share(%)
Market share of time deposits MS Bank's share of time deposit market in provincial banking 
market.
Market share of demand deposits MS Bank's share of demand deposit market in provincial banking 
market.
Market share of saving accounts MS Bank's share of saving account market in provincial banking 
market.
Bank specific variables (%)
Operating costs to operating 
income ratio
CTI Operating costs divided by operating income.
Total loans to total assets ratio X Total loans (investment, consumer and working capital loans 
divided by total assets.
Total deposits to total asset ratio X Total deposits (time deposits, demand deposits, saving 
accounts) divided by total assets.
Geographical variables
Number of bank per population X The number of bank branches divided by the number of 
100,000 populations.
Population density X The number of population divided by the area in a province
Provincial GDP growth X Annual GDP growth of a province.
The table presents the summary statistics of basic variables used in the competition estimations. In the SCP, 
efficient-structure hypothesis (ES) and dynamic NEIO (Panzar and Rosse). The input costs variables are: price of 
labour, price of fixed asset, price of funds. All financial values are inflation-adjusted to the base year 2000. 
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Table 3.10 presents the definition of variables used in the SCP, EH and PR 
estimations. The variables are divided into six groups: dependent variables, 
input prices, concentration ratio, market share, bank specific variables and 
geographical variables. 
 
Table  3.11 
Data description 
 
 
 
Table 3.11 shows the descriptive statistics of basic variables used in the cost 
efficiency estimations. As performance measure in the SCP model we use each 
bank‘s average deposit rates: time deposit, demand deposit, and saving account 
rates (See Appendix 1 for more detail about types of deposits). As a 
performance measurement in the ES models, there is a wide range of indices 
used in the literature. No agreement exists as to which measures are superior. 
Performance measures range from purely ﬁnancial measures such as proﬁts, 
Variables No of 
observations
Mean
Standard 
deviation
Minimum
1
st 
Quartile
2
nd 
Quartile
3
rd 
Quartile
Maximum
Dependent Variables
Time deposit rate 5,956 9.96 3.41 0.00 7.20 9.53 12.26 82.80
Demand deposit rate 5,956 3.67 2.15 0.00 2.39 3.30 4.71 51.00
Saving account rate 5,956 5.55 2.88 0.00 3.92 5.00 6.84 63.19
Log total revenue 5,966 10.61 2.04 0.00 9.47 10.58 11.83 17.42
Log operating revenue 5,964 10.13 2.21 0.00 8.93 10.15 11.47 17.26
Input prices
Log labour cost 5,966 8.39 1.81 0.00 7.19 8.19 9.50 14.82
Log fixed asset cost 5,966 6.90 1.67 0.00 5.83 6.72 7.90 13.56
Log wholesale funding cost 5,966 2.34 0.27 2.01 2.08 2.28 2.55 2.87
Concentration ratio(CR)
CR of time deposits (%) 5,966 46.36 13.81 23.10 34.48 44.90 55.26 100.00
CR of demand deposits (%) 5,966 55.77 20.55 20.14 38.76 53.37 75.00 100.00
CR of saving accounts (%) 5,966 54.90 10.89 24.33 48.10 55.16 60.42 100.00
Market share
Market share of time deposits (%) 5,966 4.41 7.54 0.00 0.29 1.30 5.14 62.92
Market share of demand deposits (%) 5,966 4.40 11.13 0.00 0.07 0.53 2.71 95.18
Market share of saving accounts (%) 5,966 4.41 7.83 0.00 0.08 0.93 4.38 74.54
Bank specific variables
Operating costs to operating income ratio (%) 5,956 20.72 17.05 1.58 11.74 16.18 22.39 100.00
Total loans to total assets ratio (%) 5,966 65.23 38.01 0.00 25.48 85.76 100.00 100.00
Total deposits to total asset ratio (%) 5,966 3.04 3.47 0.00 0.60 1.51 4.48 45.13
Geographical variables
Number of bank per population 5,966 7.93 8.18 0.00 3.40 5.07 7.83 36.08
Population density 5,966 2,242 4,533 0.00 76 213 1,026 13,845
Provincial GDP growth 5,705 11.39 1.35 7.51 10.37 11.49 12.61 13.25
The table presents the summary statistics of variables used in the competition estimations. In the SCP, efficient-structure hypothesis and dynamic 
NEIO (panzar and rosse). The input costs variables are: cost of labor proxied by cost of labour, cost of fixed asset, cost of funds, proxied by the 
wholesale funding rate. All financial values are inflation-adjusted to the base year 2000. Number of bank per population is the number of banks against 
100.000 population and population density is the population over the area of province. Source: Bank Indonesia. Various years. Unpublished; The data 
for population density and provincial GDP growth were from BPS-Statistics Indonesia, various years. Trends of the selected socio-economic indicators 
of Indonesia.
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return on equity (ROE), and return on assets (ROA) to more eclectic measures 
such as market share stability, expenses and the number of bank employees. In 
this study, the difference between 1-month Bank Indonesia Certificate interest 
rate and deposit rates is used to get an appropriate measure for the potential 
profit received by banks from their various deposit products. 
To measure the degree of bank concentration in the provincial markets using 
both the SCP and the efficient-structure hypothesis (ES) models, we use the 
―three banks‖ concentration ratio (CR3) based on deposits. CR3 that is deﬁned 
as the proportion of deposit attributed to the top three ﬁrms in the industry. The 
CR3 ratio has been decreasing steadily over the entire period, especially in 
Metropolitan. We use a market share variable, also based on deposits. 
For all models, a range of standard control variables are included (see 
Molyneux et al. (1997) for discussion). The number of control variables 
included is purposely restricted to avoid high correlation between different 
control variables. For each speciﬁcation we checked whether including 
respectively excluding those altered sign or signiﬁcance of the other variables. 
On this basis, the set of explanatory variables used below is robust and the 
variables are not highly correlated. For comparison purposes, we report the 
same set of control variables for all estimations, even if for some speciﬁcations 
control variables are insigniﬁcant. 
To control for risk, we used loan over assets that are associated with increased 
risk if we have higher the ratio of loan to assets. We expect the ratio to carry a 
positive sign, reﬂecting a higher return to a more risky position. However, it is 
not really clear on how the risk variable should affect deposit rates.  
We use the natural logarithm of total deposit as a proxy for total demand in 
each province. It is measured in millions of rupiahs and in constant prices. It is 
expected to carry a negative sign if there is potential competition from both 
existing competitors and possible entrants. On the other hand, if the market is 
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less contestable, an increase in its size leads to a positive expected effect on 
performance.  
Lacking a reasonable measure of transportation cost per unit of distance for 
each market, we employ the number of banks per 100,000 population 
(population per square km) as a crude proxy for average transportation costs, 
based on the notion that it is more difficult to travel a given distance in more 
densely populated areas (Metropolitan Area) than in less densely populated 
areas (the Periphery). We expect it to have a negative sign.  
We use population density as a proxy for market demand and expect a negative 
sign. This is because in more densely populated areas, competition should 
increase and decrease the return. We also use provincial gross domestic product 
growth to control the level of economic environment as we anticipated higher 
economic development proxies for market demand. 
Time dummies are also introduced to account for the interest rate cycle, 
changes in minimum balance requirements, and other time-specific factors. 
In the ES‘s estimation, we also include a cost variable; the ratio of total 
operating cost over total operating income. It is expected to have a negative 
coefficient, since the increase of cost deposit will lower bank‘s revenue. 
Finally, we use a time trend to capture the change of market power over the 
years and expect to have a negative sign where the increased competition will 
decrease market power and revenues. 
3.4.2. The application of production technology for the PR model 
In applying the PR model, it is important to clearly define the production 
activity of the banks since they are not exactly comparable to other types of 
firms. In the literature, there are two main approaches to measure the flow of 
services provided by banks.
2
 Under the production approach, banks treated as 
                                              
2
 As discussed in Colwell and Davis (1992)  
48 
 
firm which employ capital and labour to produce services for both deposit and 
loan account holders. Outputs are measured by the number of deposit and loan 
transaction processed over a given time period. Total costs include operating 
expenses only. Output is treated as a flow, showing the given amount of output 
produced per unit of time. However, such detailed transaction flow data are not 
generally available. The numbers of deposit and loan account services are 
sometimes used instead. In this event, output is treated as a stock, i.e. a given 
amount of output at one point in time. 
Under the intermediation approach, banks are treated as financial 
intermediaries between borrowers and depositors rather than producers of loan 
and deposit services. Outputs are measured by the value of loans and 
investments. Total costs include operating costs plus interest costs. Output is 
also treated as a stock. However, neither of these approaches captures all the 
functions performed by banking institutions (Heffernan, 1996). 
Following Berger and Humphrey (1997), the intermediation approach is 
adopted in this study, with some modification to capture the dual roles of banks 
as (1) providing transaction services and (2) intermediating funds from 
depositors to borrowers. As a result, bank deposits have been treated as inputs 
as well as outputs at the same time. Bank deposits not only have input 
characteristics, because they are paid for in part by interest payments, and the 
funds raised provide the bank with the raw material of investible funds, but 
they also have output characteristics, since they are associated with a 
substantial amount of liquidity, safe keeping, and payments services provided 
to depositors. 
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3.5. Model Specification 
This subsection will present the different models used to tests market power 
model (SCP), efficient-structure hypothesis (ES) and new empirical industrial 
organization model (PR). 
3.5.1. Market-power and efficient-structure hypothesis 
The next two sub-sections will examine market power hypothesis using price-
concentration model and efficient structure hypothesis employing the modified 
Berger (1995) model.  
3.5.1.1. Market-power hypothesis: structure-conduct-performance model 
We will employ price-concentration model and will use different type of 
deposit prices following the standard approach by Berger and Hannan (1989): 
                                                                            (3.1) 
 
where 
       : the interest paid at time t on time deposit rate or demand deposit  
  rate or saving account rate by bank i located in the local  
  banking market j 
        : a measure of concentration in local market j at time t using  
  Concentration Ratio of top three banks based on deposits. 
       : denotes a vector of control variables that may differ across  
   banks, provincial markets, or time periods. These control  
   variables include factors exogenous to the bank that may affect  
   prices through market conditions or cost considerations. 
        : error term 
Coefficients are represented by   ,    and   , while      denotes the error term. 
Since the prices employed here (deposit interest rates) are paid to consumers 
rather than by consumers, this hypothesis implies a negative price-
concentration relationship, or   <0.  
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The usual form of the efficient-structure hypothesis, however, maintains that 
because of the dominance of efficient firms in concentrated markets, 
production in such markets is more efficient on average. To the extent that 
greater efficiency is reflected in a lower marginal cost of producing output of a 
given quality, firms in concentrated markets should find it in their interests to 
offer consumers more favourable prices, higher quality, or both. Put into the 
context of our banking application, if banks in concentrated markets are more 
efficient on average in gathering deposit funds and transforming them into 
profitable investments, the marginal dollar of deposits should have more value 
to them. Thus they should, if anything, bid more for deposits, implying a 
positive price-concentration relationship, or,    ≥O.  
 
3.5.1.2. Efficient-structure hypothesis 
We would like to test the market by estimating reduced forms that include 
direct measures of efficiency and nest for the two hypotheses. Our main 
equation is a modification of Berger (1995) model: 
                                                            (3.2) 
          : the 1 month Certificate of Bank Indonesia minus deposits  
 interest rates paid by bank i at time   t in the local banking  
 market j  
       : concentration ratio of top three banks in local market j at time t  
        : a measure of market share in local market j at time t  
         : the cost efficiency ratio (operating cost to operating  
  income ratio of bank i at  time t in the local banking market j). 
         : vector of control variables that may differ across banks and  
  provinces  
          : error term 
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Under the efficient-structure hypothesis, causation is expected to run from 
efficiency to profits and prices and then to market structure. Hence, the 
expected signs of the coefficients in the estimation of Eq. (3.2) are as follows: 
    ,     , and      More efficient firms will have higher return and 
the signs of the coefficients of CTIi should be negative.  
A necessary condition for the efficient-structure hypothesis to hold is that 
efficiency affects market structure. The following two equations are also tested 
to ensure that the necessary conditions hold: 
                         (3.3) 
                          (3.4) 
The unconditional relationship between market structure and efficiency will 
establish that efficient firms will gain market shares and will also be 
responsible for higher market concentration. Thus, the coefficients of CTIit are 
positive in equations (3.3) and (3.4).  
This chapter applies the above methodology to test the efficient-structure 
paradigm for Indonesian banks over a nine-year period. It differs from the 
Berger (1995) methodology in that it uses different measures of efficiencies 
and a different mean of revenue. The efficiency measure in this chapter is cost 
to income ratio. We will also use cost efficiency from the stochastic frontier 
approach estimation on translog cost function for robustness check. 
 
3.5.2. Modified Panzar and Rosse Model 
We estimate the revenue equation using the fixed effects generalized method of 
moments as in Goddard and Wilson (2009):  
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                                                     (3.5) 
where i=1, …, N and t=1, …, T. N denotes the number of banks, T the total 
number of time periods (quarterly); rev denotes total revenue, P denotes input 
prices namely: labor prices, physical capital prices, and wholesale funding 
prices. DEP denotes total deposits.    denotes time dummy variables from 
2000 to 2009,    denotes individual bank effect and     denotes error term. 
The lagged value of this variable is included on the right hand side to capture 
persistence in total revenue and also potentially mean-reverting dynamics in 
total revenue (i.e., the tendency of the total revenue to return to some 
equilibrium value).  
We use the general method of moments (GMM) developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). They design both 1-step estimation and 2-step estimation. The 
difference between them consists in the specification of an individual specific 
weighting matrix. The 2-step estimation uses the 1-step‘s residuals, so it is 
more efficient. 
Finally, the H-statistics is calculated from the estimates based on the result 
from equation 3.5:  
      
   
     
         (3.6). 
3.6. Empirical Results 
This section presents the results for baseline models and robustness checks. 
The baseline models consist of the tests for market powers and efficient-
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structure hypothesis and the new empirical industrial organisation model 
(NEIO). 
3.6.1. Baseline Model Results 
This subsection presents regressions results using structure-conduct-
performance, efficient-structure-hypothesis and Panzar and Rosse models. 
3.6.1.1. Structure-conduct-performance model 
Table 3.12a  
Regression result of SCP: price-concentration model (time deposits) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
CR3 0.018 0.015 0.077 0.002 0.016 0.167 0.015 0.173
Number of banks -1.299 0.000 1.149 0.110 -1.103 0.021 -2.635 0.000
Population density 0.001 0.872 0.024 0.136 -0.002 0.955 0.237 0.015
Time deposit 1.502 0.000 -0.217 0.840 1.357 0.000 1.857 0.000
Total assets -1.513 0.000 -1.645 0.000 -1.515 0.000 -1.618 0.000
Market share 0.037 0.131 0.212 0.734 -0.033 0.493 0.026 0.540
Metropolitan -0.204 0.507
Java and Sumatra -0.342 0.018
Year 2002 -1.286 0.000 -1.524 0.000 -1.487 0.000 -1.393 0.000
Year 2003 -6.547 0.000 -7.521 0.000 -6.851 0.000 -6.430 0.000
Year 2004 -6.075 0.000 -7.446 0.000 -6.525 0.000 -5.813 0.000
Year 2005 -0.722 0.001 -0.678 0.262 -0.626 0.057 -0.828 0.009
Year 2006 -3.158 0.000 -2.272 0.000 -3.017 0.000 -3.462 0.000
Year 2007 -4.407 0.000 -3.964 0.000 -4.479 0.000 -4.280 0.000
Constant 18.884 0.000 33.804 0.086 20.450 0.000 19.545 0.000
R-squared 0.898 0.994 0.914 0.899
Number of obs 264 24 104 136
This table presents the result of OLS regressions for SCP model (similar to Hannan and Berger, 1989). The 
dependent variable is time deposit rates. CR3 is the concentration ratio of top three banks time deposit; Log 
number of banks; Population density is the number of populations over each km-square provincial areas 
(1000/sq km); Log of time deposits; Log of total assets; Market share of time deposits in each provinces; 
Dummy metropolitan, dummy Java and Sumatra, and dummy time from 2002 to 2007. 
All Metropolitan Java and Sumatra The Periphery
Dependent variable: Time deposit interest rates
Time deposits
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Table 3.12b  
Regression result of SCP: price-concentration model (demand deposits) 
 
Table 3.12c  
Regression result of SCP: price-concentration model (saving accounts) 
 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
CR3 -0.012 0.000 0.008 0.591 -0.015 0.000 -0.014 0.000
Number of banks 0.056 0.699 1.787 0.005 -0.483 0.113 -0.266 0.358
Population density 0.004 0.156 0.002 0.716 0.011 0.596 0.171 0.005
Demand deposits 0.380 0.000 1.248 0.055 0.719 0.000 0.238 0.042
Total assets -0.709 0.000 -1.737 0.000 -0.782 0.000 -0.560 0.000
Market share 0.027 0.032 0.996 0.022 0.027 0.350 0.005 0.777
Metropolitan 0.318 0.103
Java and Sumatra -0.069 0.468
Year 2002 1.003 0.000 -0.033 0.898 0.669 0.002 1.301 0.000
Year 2003 -0.572 0.000 -2.028 0.000 -1.015 0.000 -0.111 0.578
Year 2004 -0.982 0.000 -2.126 0.000 -1.368 0.000 -0.714 0.000
Year 2005 -0.371 0.008 -0.210 0.503 -0.294 0.137 -0.424 0.033
Year 2006 -0.565 0.000 -0.095 0.756 -0.695 0.001 -0.519 0.012
Year 2007 -0.838 0.000 -0.715 0.014 -0.920 0.000 -0.712 0.001
Constant 10.471 0.000 6.238 0.350 9.527 0.000 10.637 0.000
R-squared 0.677 0.952 0.755 0.696
Number of obs 264 24 104 136
This table presents the result of OLS regressions for SCP model (similar to Hannan and Berger, 1989). The 
dependent variable is demand deposits rates. CR3 is the concentration ratio of top three banks demand 
deposits; Log number of banks; Population density is the number of populations over each km-square 
provincial areas (1000/sq km); Log of demand deposits; Log of total assets; Market share of demand deposits 
in each provinces; Dummy metropolitan, dummy Java and Sumatra, and dummy time from 2002 to 2007. 
Demand deposit 
Dependent variable: Demand deposit interest rates
All Metropolitan Java and Sumatra The Periphery
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
CR3 -0.001 0.937 -0.093 0.071 0.028 0.011 -0.002 0.834
Number of banks -2.198 0.000 3.534 0.001 -2.492 0.000 -3.316 0.000
Population density 0.008 0.043 0.076 0.016 -0.056 0.081 0.284 0.002
Saving accounts 2.271 0.000 -3.479 0.246 2.433 0.000 2.542 0.000
Total assets -1.846 0.000 -3.693 0.000 -1.833 0.000 -1.986 0.000
Market share 0.026 0.209 -0.317 0.778 -0.102 0.037 -0.002 0.944
Metropolitan 0.127 0.661
Java and Sumatra -0.094 0.497
Year 2002 1.028 0.000 0.529 0.147 0.604 0.062 1.042 0.001
Year 2003 -2.633 0.000 -5.044 0.000 -3.321 0.000 -2.391 0.000
Year 2004 -3.166 0.000 -6.483 0.000 -3.680 0.000 -3.020 0.000
Year 2005 -0.959 0.000 -1.451 0.070 -0.778 0.011 -1.095 0.000
Year 2006 -1.363 0.000 -1.178 0.040 -1.069 0.001 -1.668 0.000
Year 2007 -1.657 0.000 -1.627 0.004 -1.554 0.000 -1.573 0.000
Constant 12.490 0.000 103.833 0.050 10.536 0.000 14.186 0.000
R-squared 0.834 0.983 0.869 0.860
Number of obs 264 24 104 136
This table presents the result of OLS regressions for SCP model (similar to Hannan and Berger, 1989). The 
dependent variable is saving account rates. CR3 is the concentration ratio of top three banks saving 
accounts; Log number of banks; Population density is the number of populations over each km-square 
provincial areas (1000/sq km); Log of saving account; Log of total assets; Market share of saving accounts in 
each provinces; Dummy metropolitan, dummy Java and Sumatra, and dummy time from 2002 to 2007. 
Saving accounts
Dependent variable: Saving account interest rates
All Metropolitan Java and Sumatra The Periphery
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The results are reported in table 3.12a, 3.12b and 3.12c for the three types of 
deposits offered in Indonesian banking markets. Each tables present as 
regressors CR3 and seven control variables (number of banks, population 
density, time deposit, total assets, market share, metropolitan, and Java and 
Sumatra). Fixed-effects time dummies (Year 2002 to Year 2007) are also 
included to account for the influence of the interest rate cycle, and other 
possible changes in the deposits market over the sample period. 
The estimated coefficients of the concentration variable for all three types of 
deposits are mostly significant but have different signs. The coefficients are 
negative and significant for demand deposits for Java and Sumatra and the 
periphery. In the contrary to the SCP, some of them are positive for time 
deposit for metropolitan and saving account for the periphery. 
For example, look at saving accounts, in Java and Sumatra and the periphery, 
the concentration variable (CR3) coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. With saving account rates and CR3 expressed in 
percentage points, the coefficient of 0.015 implies a 1.13% decrease in saving 
account deposit rates moving from the least concentrated market in the sample 
(CR3 = 25) to the most concentrated market in the sample (CR3 = 100), (0.015 
(25 - 100)= 1.13). 
The finding that banks in more concentrated markets pay less saving account 
rates is consistent with the implications of the structure-performance 
hypothesis, but the fact that there are more positive significant or insignificant 
coefficients are the prediction of the usual form of the efficient-structure 
hypothesis. Thus, while both efficiency and market structure effects may play 
roles in explaining profitability, the results presented here suggest the 
dominance of the efficient-structure hypothesis over structure-performance 
hypothesis in determining time deposit rates in metropolitan and saving 
account rates in the periphery. 
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3.6.1.2. Efficient-structure hypothesis 
Table 3.13a-c present the results of the efficient-structure hypothesis. They 
confirm that there is a role of efficient-structure variable. Consistent with 
expectations, the cost ratio proxied by operating costs over operating income is 
negative and significant in the metropolitan and Java and Sumatra. 
Table 3.13a  
Regression result of efficient-structure hypothesis (Time deposits) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
CR3 -0.065 0.026 0.096 0.540 -0.172 0.002 -0.009 0.841
MS 1.115 0.026 2.744 0.161 1.147 0.200 -0.422 0.508
CTI -0.698 0.000 -1.670 0.000 -0.756 0.028 0.152 0.538
Loan to asset 0.002 0.092 0.002 0.171 0.002 0.356 0.004 0.016
Size of deposit -0.128 0.000 -0.238 0.000 -0.095 0.009 -0.071 0.030
Population density 0.004 0.000 -0.006 0.221 -0.018 0.248 -0.001 0.956
Number of banks 
per population 0.032 0.496 0.693 0.032 0.040 0.573 -0.153 0.087
GDP growth -0.016 0.000 -0.016 0.000 -0.023 0.000 -0.025 0.000
Time trends -0.183 0.000 -0.151 0.015 -0.219 0.000 -0.136 0.000
Constanta 3.417 0.000 3.079 0.004 3.967 0.000 2.641 0.000
R squared 0.052 0.097 0.044 0.049
Number of obs 5,609 1,453 2,445 1,711
Time deposits
Dep. Variable: The difference between 1 month CBI rate and time deposit rates
All Metropolitan Java and Sumatra The Periphery
This table present the result of OLS regressions for efficient-structure hypothesis model (similar to 
Berger, 1995). The dependent variables are the difference between 1-month CBI rate and time deposit 
rates. CR3 is the concentration ratio of top three banks time deposits; MS is the market share of time 
deposits in each provinces; CTI is the cost to income ratio; Loan to assets ratio is to describe banks' risk. 
; Size is the log of bank time deposits; Population density is the number of populations over each km-
square provincial areas (1000/sq km). Number of banks per population is the ratio number of banks per 
100,000 population.  GDP growth denotes the growth of the provincial gross domestic product and Time 
trend.    
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Table 3.13b  
Regression result of efficient-structure hypothesis (Demand deposits) 
 
Table 3.13c  
Regression result of efficient-structure hypothesis (Saving accounts) 
 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
CR3 -0.110 0.000 0.509 0.000 -0.065 0.078 -0.359 0.000
MS -0.245 0.561 3.690 0.042 -0.413 0.529 -0.385 0.542
CTI 1.636 0.000 1.237 0.042 2.396 0.000 1.806 0.000
Loan to asset 0.015 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.021 0.000
Size of deposit -0.051 0.020 -0.122 0.004 -0.006 0.859 -0.087 0.057
Population density 0.001 0.316 -0.042 0.000 -0.019 0.324 -0.132 0.001
Number of banks 
per population 0.206 0.001 2.809 0.000 0.202 0.016 0.114 0.439
GDP growth -0.025 0.000 -0.022 0.000 -0.028 0.000 -0.051 0.000
Time trends -0.413 0.000 -0.271 0.000 -0.511 0.000 -0.380 0.000
Constanta 8.900 0.000 3.156 0.006 8.087 0.000 10.955 0.000
R squared 0.104 0.116 0.112 0.149
Number of obs 5,377 1,419 2,329 1,629
This table present the result of OLS regressions for efficient-structure hypothesis model (similar to 
Berger, 1995). The dependent variables are the difference between 1-month CBI rate and demand deposit 
rates. CR3 is the concentration ratio of top three banks demand deposits; MS is the market share of 
demand deposits in each provinces; CTI is the cost to income ratio; Loan to assets ratio is to describe 
banks' risk. ; Size is the log of bank demand deposits; Population density is the number of populations 
over each km-square provincial areas (1000/sq km). Number of banks per population is the ratio number of 
banks per 100,000 population.  GDP growth denotes the growth of the provincial gross domestic product 
and Time trend.    
Demand deposits
Dep. Variable: The difference between 1 month CBI rate and demand deposit rates
All Metropolitan Java and Sumatra The Periphery
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
CR3 -0.076 0.044 0.686 0.009 -0.288 0.000 0.119 0.046
MS 1.332 0.038 2.353 0.194 2.604 0.021 -0.921 0.342
CTI 0.591 0.012 0.932 0.098 0.766 0.048 0.956 0.009
Loan to asset 0.008 0.000 0.003 0.132 0.014 0.000 0.012 0.000
Size of deposit 0.002 0.929 -0.055 0.127 -0.015 0.692 0.104 0.034
Population density 0.005 0.000 -0.003 0.610 0.030 0.079 -0.015 0.662
Number of banks 
per population 0.011 0.848 -0.127 0.755 0.039 0.646 0.219 0.109
GDP growth -0.017 0.000 -0.017 0.000 -0.025 0.000 -0.026 0.001
Time trends -0.001 0.955 0.029 0.464 -0.107 0.003 0.031 0.387
Constanta 5.077 0.000 2.486 0.059 6.198 0.000 2.585 0.000
R squared 0.026 0.037 0.039 0.046
Number of obs 5405 1317 2383 1705
This table present the result of OLS regressions for efficient-structure hypothesis model (similar to 
Berger, 1995). The dependent variables are the difference between 1-month CBI rate and saving accounts 
rates. CR3 is the concentration ratio of top three banks saving accounts; MS is the market share of saving 
accounts in each provinces; CTI is the cost to income ratio; Loan to assets ratio is to describe banks' risk. 
; Size is the log of bank saving account; Population density is the number of populations over each km-
square provincial areas (1000/sq km). Number of banks per population is the ratio number of banks per 
100,000 population.  GDP growth denotes the growth of the provincial gross domestic product and Time 
trend.    
Saving accounts
Dep. Variable: The difference between 1 month CBI rate and saving account rates
All Metropolitan Java and Sumatra The Periphery
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The coefficient of CR3 continues to vary widely. It is positive and statistically 
significant in three cases: metropolitan area demand deposits and saving 
accounts, and saving accounts in the periphery). It is also negative and 
statistically significant in those market groupings (Java and Sumatra in all 
forms of deposits and the periphery is demand deposits). Thus there is support 
for efficient-structure hypothesis for time deposit markets in metropolitan and 
Java and Sumatra. 
The coefficient for market share is mostly positive and insignificant except for 
demand deposits in metropolitan and saving accounts in Java and Sumatra. The 
coefficients for market share are mostly insignificant. This would seem to be 
evidence in favor of the existence of efficient-structure hypothesis. Taken as 
such, these results may suggest that there is evidence of some market power on 
the Indonesian provincial banking markets. 
Loan to asset ratio that represents risk carries expected, positive and significant 
coefficients in time deposit market in the periphery, all groups in demand 
deposit markets and in Java and Sumatra and the periphery for saving accounts. 
The variable represents the size of the deposit market is mostly negative and 
significant. The strongest result is in time deposits markets in metropolitan and 
Java and Sumatra. The only insignificant results are for saving accounts in 
metropolitan and Java and Sumatra.  
The coefficients of the population density are only significant and have 
negative sign in demand deposit market in metropolitan and the periphery. This 
may suggest that in that area, where there are many banks population density 
tends to increase bank competition and narrow interest rate spreads and 
revenue.  
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The coefficients on the number of banks per population variable are mainly 
insignificant. The only negative and significant results are in demand deposits 
markets in metropolitan and the periphery‘s areas. 
The coefficients of the growth of provincial gross domestic products are 
negative and highly significant for all products and in all provincial areas. This 
suggests that the increase of economic activity in the provincial area is 
associated with less demand for deposits and have a lower rate of return. 
Finally, the time trend has the expected negative significant coefficients for 
most types of deposits in various markets. The revenue of banks has been 
decreasing as a result of increased competition over the years.  
Table 3.14 
Tests for efficient-structure hypothesis  
 
 
To test whether the efficient-structure hypothesis is held we estimate equation 
3.3 and 3.4. In table 3.14, we present the results that the relationship between 
cost to income ratio with CR3 and market share are positive. 
3.6.1.3. Dynamic Panzar and Rosse 
Although most previous studies generally employ OLS estimation 
methodology, this paper applies panel data regression methodology using the 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Cost to income 0.486 0.000 0.563 0.001 0.437 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.061 0.000
Loan to asset ratio 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.744 0.000 0.000
Deposits -0.060 0.000 -0.103 0.000 -0.032 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.018 0.000
Population density -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.129 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Banks per population 0.278 0.000 0.290 0.000 -0.093 0.000 0.002 0.140 0.004 0.094 0.002 0.140
GDP growth -0.024 0.000 -0.035 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.404 -0.001 0.000
Time trend -0.297 0.000 0.161 0.000 -0.090 0.000 0.000 0.270 -0.001 0.100 0.000 0.239
Constant 6.331 0.000 5.179 0.000 6.196 0.000 -0.024 0.000 -0.131 0.000 -0.094 0.000
R-squared 0.42 0.20 0.14 0.28 0.28 0.40
Number of obs 5,377 5,377 5,405 5,377 5,377 5,405
Model 1 Model 2
This table presents the results of tests on efficient-structure hypothesis based on equation 3.3 and 3.4. In Model 1, Depedent variable is 
Concentration ratio. We use CR3 based on deposits. While in Model 2, the dependent variable is market shares. Banks per population is the number 
of banks in the provinces divided by 100,000 numbers of population. Population density is the number of population divided by area (1000/sq km ). 
GDP growth is the provincial GDP growth annually.
Dependent variable: Concentration Ratios Dependent variable: Market shares
Time deposits Demand deposits Saving accountTime deposits Demand deposits Saving account
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Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
3
 estimator, to allow for departing 
from assumed product market equilibrium conditions. Table 3.15 presents the 
results based on different groups of provinces.    
Table 3.15 
Panzar and Rosse estimation‘s results using GMM estimator  
 
 
 
The estimation results for the total revenue equation using GMM estimation is 
based on equation (3.2). Using a significant level of 5%, we are able to reject 
H0:H=1 in favour of H1:H<1 or the perfectly competitive banking market for 
Indonesia over the sample period using the model for  metropolitan, Java and 
Sumatra and the periphery (at 5% level of significance). We also can reject 
H0:H=0 using the two-step model. Therefore, based on the GMM estimator 
using total income as the dependent variable, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic for 
                                              
3
 Other estimation using Fixed Effect Model confirm the good fit of the models. The estimated 
regression equations explain 86%-93% in the total revenue equation and 5-7% of the variability in the 
ROA equation. H-statistics in the competitive equation for Java and Sumatra (0.47) is larger than The 
Periphery (0.39). It is also consistent with the study by Claessens and Laeven (2004) on Indonesia and 
studies on other developing countries that find H-statistics between zero and one and monopolistic 
competition (Perera et al., 2006,). 
Metropolitan Area
Variables
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Lagged total revenue -0.022 0.000 -0.319 0.000 0.012 0.000 -0.006 0.848
Fixed asset cost 0.050 0.000 0.107 0.002 0.100 0.000 0.030 0.000
Labor cost 0.304 0.000 0.184 0.007 0.180 0.000 0.218 0.000
Wholesale funding cost 0.102 0.000 0.113 0.120 0.336 0.003 0.274 0.042
Total Deposit 0.695 0.000 0.429 0.000 0.706 0.000 0.892 0.000
Time 0.124 0.000 -0.213 0.000 0.155 0.000 -0.019 0.719
Number of obs 4,366     323        1,111     1,172     
Number of banks 132        54         55         41         
H-stat 0.45 0.31 0.62 0.52
F-statistics for H=0 7379.6 0.000 11.91 0.000 31.02 0.000 10.15 0.000
F-statistics for H=1 11430.3 0.000 61.09 0.000 11.27 0.000 8.75 0.000
AR(2) p-value 0.655 0.664 0.753 0.542
Sargan -Hansen, p-value 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
This table shows the result of Panzar-Rosse (1987) using Two steps Generalized Method of Moment (Arellano Bond, 1991) with 
robust standard errors. The dependent variable is total revenue. The set of explanatory variables are fixed asset cost, labor cost, 
wholesale funding cost, bank's deposit market. All variables are in logarithmic value. AR(2) is the p-value for the test for 2nd-
order autocorrelation in the residuals. Sargan is the p-value for the Sargan test for the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions. Hansen J the p-value for the Hansen test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Metropolitan area is 
Jakarta, Banten and West Java that is most populated and active banking market. Java and Sumatra is provinces in Java and 
Sumatra islands excluding Jakarta, Banten and West Java. The Periphery is other provinces that are less populated and less 
active banking markets (See section 3.2 for further details).
All Java & Sumatra The Periphery
Dependent Variable: Total revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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the two-step model suggests that the Indonesian banking market as a whole was 
characterised by monopolistic competition or collusive oligopoly between 2001 
and 2008.  
The estimated H-statistic lies between zero and one for all groups. H-statistics 
for all is 0.45. For Metropolitan area, Java and Sumatra and the Periphery, the 
H-statistics are 0.31, 0.62 and 0.52, respectively. The H statistics suggest that 
the provincial banking markets were in monopolistic competition. The 
relatively low values for H-statistics indicate relatively high market power. 
There are some differences between the estimation results for the Metropolitan 
Area, Java and Sumatra and the Periphery provinces. The mean estimated H-
statistic is higher for the Java and Sumatra followed by Metropolitan Area and 
the Periphery. Although monopolistic competition or this is could also be a 
―collusive oligopoly‖ appears to be the predominant model in most cases, 
competitive conditions in the banking sectors of Java and Sumatra lean higher 
than do those of Metropolitan area and the Periphery provinces. 
The estimation results reported in table 3.14 follow a similar pattern to those 
reported by Claessens and Laeven (2004) who find that the estimated average 
of H-statistic for the emerging market in their study is 0.67. This attributes to 
the existence of entry barriers, regulatory restriction and legal impediments  
In general the models explain the relationship between input prices and total 
revenue. Moreover, the regressions specifications fit well and pass diagnostic 
tests against auto correlation which is applied to the differenced residuals and 
over identifying instruments at the 5% level of significance. Autocorrelation 
indicates that the lags of the dependent variable and any other variables used as 
instruments are strictly exogenous and thus good instruments.  In addition to, 
the results from over-identifying restrictions test find that the instruments, as a 
group, are appearing exogenous.  The Sargan-Hansen J statistic, which is the 
minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is also robust. 
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3.6.2. Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of the base results, we re-run regressions for both 
dynamic Panzar and Rosse model and the efficient-structure hypothesis model.   
3.6.2.1. Dynamic Panzar and Rosse 
These checks are conducted further to investigate the accuracy of the model 
and its main empirical result.  One concern is to modify our estimation method 
to quantify the degree of market power in the banking industry by considering 
other variables in the demand function, as shown in model: (1) population 
density, since both of them may influence the demand for banking services and 
(2) the ratio of number of banks per 100, 000 populations. Using this 
alternative specification does not alter our findings. 
Second, to investigate estimation biases, we consider whether there is structural 
breaks that may influence the results. For this purpose, we use a set of time 
dummy variables from 2001-08 to check whether there are significant 
structural break during the period.  We employ total revenue as the dependent 
variable. The results are consistent with the results reported for the combined 
sample (see table 3.15). The input prices parameters are positive and 
significant. The time dummies are also significant (see column 2). 
Third, to consider the accuracy of the model using alternative dependent 
variable, the total revenue is changed with total operating income. The result is 
presented in column 3. Using this specification, our main findings are not 
altered. 
Finally, Model 4 and 5 are the reduced sample based on the implementation of 
Indonesian Banking Architecture in 2004. A Chow test for parameter stability 
confirms the suggestion that the banking market has undergone a structural 
change. In the reduced sample, the results are also consistent with the baseline 
model. Most of the prices in Model 4 are relatively higher compared to the 
preferred model. The prices are still positive and significant except for fixed 
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assets and securities. This is probably because the banks had more investment 
in the physical capital during 2000-2004. The securities variable is insignificant 
is because the decrease of securities holdings from 2000 to 2009 (See table 2.5) 
had caused lower prices to analyse and administer the securities.    
The results of robustness checks support the PR model. All coefficients in the 
models are positive and significant as the baseline model except wholesale 
funding coefficient in model 2 and model 3. The additional variables are also 
significant in affecting bank‘s revenue. Banks that operate in denser area have 
lower total revenue by 0.6%. However, the increased number of banks will 
raise banks‘ revenue by 0.4%. 
Table 3.16 
The result of robustness checks (Dynamic PR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Lagged total revenue -0.022 0.000 -0.024 0.000 -0.098 0.000 0.030 0.000 -0.069 0.000
Fixed asset cost 0.048 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.013 0.000
Labor cost 0.307 0.000 0.286 0.000 0.476 0.000 0.621 0.000 0.289 0.000
Wholesale funding cost 0.079 0.000 -2.650 0.000 -0.141 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.181 0.000
Total Deposit 0.694 0.000 0.706 0.000 0.562 0.000 0.777 0.000 0.624 0.000
Time 0.127 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.081 0.000
Population density -0.006 0.000
Number of banks per 
population
0.004 0.000
Year 2002 -1.701 0.000
Year 2003 -2.073 0.000
Year 2004 -1.075 0.000
Year 2005 0.475 0.000
Year 2006 -1.625 0.000
Year 2007 -1.305 0.000
Number of obs 4,354     4,366     4,359     1573 2566
Number of banks 132        132        132        128 129
Chow stability  test χ² (9) 120,000       0.000
AR(2) p-value 0.691 0.633 0.364 0.142 0.303
Sargan -Hansen, p-value 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Model 4 Model 5
Sub sample: 2001-04 Sub sample: 2005-08
Dep. Var: Total revenue Dep. Var: Total revenue
This table shows the result of Panzar-Rosse (1987) using two-\steps Generalized Method of Moment (Arellano Bond, 1991) with robust standard errors. 
The dependent variable in Model 1 and 2 is total revenue. While in Model 3, the dependent variable is total interest income. The set of explanatory 
variables are fixed asset cost, labor cost, wholesale funding cost, bank's deposit market, time dummies, population density and number of banks per 
100,000 population.  Model 4 and 5 are reduced sample  estimations. The cut off period is in 2004 when Indonesian banking architecture was launched.  
The cut off date is  AR(2) is the p-value for the test for 2nd-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Sargan-Hansen  test for the validity of the over-
identifying restrictions. We use Chow stability test for panel data in model 4 and 5. 
All sample
Dep Variable: Total revenue
Dep Variable: 
Total interest 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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3.6.2.2. Efficiency-structure hypothesis 
Table 3.17 
The result of robustness checks for ES 
 
The robustness checks are conducted by changing concentration and efficiency 
indicator. In the first model, we replace the cost to income ratio that is used in 
baseline model with cost efficiency (refer to Chapter 4). The cost efficiency is 
derived from a stochastic cost frontier as developed by Battese and Coelli 
(1995) which assumes that the error terms are distributed half-normal (for 
Berger, 1995). The result is relatively similar to the baseline model. The sign of 
the cost efficiency is different because costs to income ratio measures cost 
against income while cost efficiency is the efficiency of total assets i.e. an 
increase of efficiency lowers costs. The other control variables are comparable. 
For the second set of robustness checks, the three-bank concentration ratio is 
changed with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on deposits. HHI is 
defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all banking organizations 
operating in an area. We calculated the HHI for provincial markets using 
branch deposits data collected from 20001-2008. The results also show 
consistent power with the reported results for the baseline model (see table 
3.15). The concentration index parameter is negative and significant for time 
deposits and demand deposits. Other explanatory variables are also consistent. 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Concentration indicator -0.020 0.516 -0.099 0.000 -0.077 0.049 -0.107 0.048 -0.176 0.000 -0.072 0.412
MS 0.176 0.791 -0.384 0.373 0.789 0.265 1.062 0.033 -0.181 0.668 1.129 0.080
Efficiency indicator 3.178 0.000 1.534 0.000 2.411 0.000 -0.702 0.000 1.598 0.000 0.583 0.013
Loan to asset ratio 0.001 0.122 0.013 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.106 0.015 0.000 0.008 0.000
Size of deposits -0.068 0.000 -0.082 0.000 -0.013 0.555 -0.125 0.000 -0.052 0.017 0.007 0.750
Population density 0.002 0.059 0.001 0.612 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.607 0.005 0.001
Number of banks per 
population
0.022 0.637 0.227 0.000 0.029 0.633 0.021 0.650 0.171 0.008 0.015 0.801
GDP growth -0.015 0.000 -0.024 0.000 -0.018 0.000 -0.016 0.000 -0.026 0.000 -0.017 0.000
Time trend -0.110 0.000 -0.364 0.000 0.054 0.013 -0.176 0.000 -0.418 0.000 0.004 0.842
Constanta 1.307 0.000 8.765 0.000 4.538 0.000 3.211 0.000 8.844 0.000 4.721 0.000
R-squared 0.071 0.100 0.031 0.052 0.105 0.026
Number of obs 5,366 5,144 5,163 5,609 5,377 5,405
Dep. Var; The difference between CBI rate and deposit ratesDep. Var: The difference between CBI rate and deposit rates
Model 2: Herfindahl-Hirschmann IndexModel 1: Cost efficiency
This table presents the results of robustness checks using two different models. In Model 1, cost to income ratio is replaced with cost efficiency from 
estimation using SFA approach in Chapter 4. While in Model 2, the concentration indicator is changed from the Concentration Ratio of Top three banks to 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. MS denotes market share.  Size of deposit is the log of deposits. Population density is the number of population divided by 
area (1000/sq km ).
Time deposits Demand deposits Saving accountsTime deposits Demand deposits Saving accounts
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3.7. Conclusions 
This chapter tests the structure-performance hypotheses for banks located in 
Indonesia‘s provincial markets. Two hypotheses are specified one is related to 
the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and the other is related to 
efficient-structure hypothesis (ES). We also estimate Panzar and Rosse model 
to infer the characteristics of provincial markets. Using Indonesian data from, a 
total of 5,966 observations across 33 Indonesian provincial areas were usable 
covering the period 2001-2008. The sample was also divided between banks 
located in Indonesia‘s provincial areas metropolitan, Java and Sumatra and the 
periphery.  
As has been the case for most previous structure-performance studies, the 
results using the SCP specification are not very robust. This study does not 
support SCP hypothesis and find supports for the ES hypothesis for the banks 
located in the provincial markets. This finding is also consistent to other studies 
that have examined the structure-performance relationship for emerging 
markets. Both Mohieldin (2000) and Perera (2007) find evidence that there is 
no significance relationship between market structure and bank‘s performance 
in Egypt and South Asia respectively. 
When PR approach is used, as done in other studies, it reveals much evidence 
of imperfect competition in Indonesian provincial markets. The estimated 
values of H-statistics for the sample period 2001-2008 are positive ranging 
between 0.31 - 0.62 which is consistent with the study by Claessens and 
Laeven (2004). We find that the market in Java and Sumatra is more 
competitive than metropolitan and the periphery. H-statistic of metropolitan 
and the periphery are 0.31 and 0.52 respectively while Java and Sumatra is 
0.62. 
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However, the weakness of PR modelling is that it does not tell us much about 
the sources of imperfect competition, what can be done to change matters. The 
estimation using ES hypothesis specification does not also reveal significant 
influence of the geography of Indonesia. There are only few significant results 
are found. Population density variable is negative and significant in demand 
deposit markets in metropolitan and the periphery. The other variable is the 
number of banks per population that is positive and significant in time deposit 
markets in metropolitan and demand deposit markets in metropolitan and Java 
and Sumatra. 
Although there is a modest impact of the geography of Indonesia on the level 
of competition, the development that help overcome geographical barriers, e.g. 
new banking technologies may usefully promote competition in Indonesian 
deposit markets. 
The evidence for the efficiency hypothesis suggests policy makers should not 
interfere with deposit and loan rate setting in the banking markets. Mergers 
should be encouraged if they improve relative efficiency, but discouraged if all 
they do is increase concentration and market power. 
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Appendix 
Main characteristics of Indonesian bank deposits  
 
 Demand deposit Saving account Time deposit 
Minimum 
initial 
deposit 
Rp1.000.000 (USD100). Rp50.000(USD2)   Most banks apply: 
Rp5.000.000,-(USD500). 
Some large banks 
differentiate: Java Island 
resident Rp10.000.000,- 
(USD1000) and outside Java 
islands. 
 Rp5.000.000,-(USD500). 
Return Small interest income 
called ―current account 
service benefit‖ paid on 
credit balances 
maintained  
Interest income is quoted 
at the discretion of 
individual banks. 
Fixed deposit rates. 
The rates for fixed deposits 
for period exceeding 12 
months are negotiable.  
Withdrawal  At any time by means of 
a cheque, ‗bilyet giro‘, 
other payment order, or 
by transfers 
At any time by Debit Card 
functioning as ATM Card 
as long as there is amount 
in the account. 
At the end of the fixed term. 
No interest will be paid on 
any one month fixed deposit 
which is uplifted before 
maturity. 
Fee Service fee of 0.5% per 
annum for average 
deposit balance of over 
Rp1.000.000 a month 
Transfer fee Rp5000 
(USD0.5) to other accounts 
in the same banks and 
Rp10.000 (USD1) in other 
banks and maintenance fee 
Rp20.000 (USD2) 
No fee 
Other 
feature 
 Large banks usually launch 
prize-drawing program 
with big prizes including 
luxurious cars and 
motorbikes etc. 
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Chapter 4 Efficiency of Foreign Bank in Indonesia 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the efficiency of Indonesian banks in particular the 
impact of foreign ownership efficiency in Indonesian banking. The translog 
cost function model is estimated using stochastic frontier method developed by 
Battese and Coelli (1995) on data for the period from September 2000 from 
2009. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 provides the introduction. 
Section 4.2 reviews related literature. Section 3 presents the model that will be 
used in the estimation. Section 4 describes data. Section 5 presents empirical 
result and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the research by providing 
some recommendations.  
 
4.2. Literature Review 
There are many studies on bank efficiency (See e.g. Berger and Humphrey 
(1997); Goddard et al. (2001); Fethi and Pasiousras (2010)). This section will 
review some of main articles in this field. It is divided into three sub-sections 
namely theory of efficiency, efficiency measurement methods, and empirical 
studies. 
 
4.2.1. Theory of Production and Technical Efficiency 
Efﬁciency can be viewed as consisting of two separate components: technical 
efﬁciency, which arises when, given the chosen inputs, output is maximized or 
minimizing inputs for a given set of outputs; and allocative efﬁciency, which 
arises from optimal input choices given prices and output.  
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The literature on cost functions and the calculation of efﬁciency measures 
begins with Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957). Farrell suggested that one could 
usefully analyze technical efﬁciency as deviations from an idealized frontier 
isoquant.  
This approach leads naturally into an econometric approach in which the 
inefficiency is identiﬁed with disturbances in a regression model. Usually, 
technical efficiency is measured either as a ratio of observed to maximum 
potential outputs obtainable from the given inputs, or as a ratio of minimum 
potential to observed inputs required to produce the given outputs. Cost 
efficiency is obtained by comparing observed and optimum cost, profit, or any 
other economic goal, subject to the appropriate constraints on quantities and 
prices. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the meaning of economic efficiency. In a simple case of 
two inputs (X1, X2) and a single output (Q). The efficiency isoquant is labelled 
YY, which shows the minimum potential inputs required to produce the given 
output by assuming perfect divisibility. A price ratio is represented by the slope 
of the isocost line, WW. The technically and allocative efficient input point is 
X*, given output and the observed input price vector. 
With the input vector XA normalized to length one, the Debreu-Farrell measure 
of technical efﬁciency would be  , but in economic terms, this measure clearly 
understates the degree of inefficiency. By scaling back both inputs by the 
proportion  , the producer could reach the isoquant and thus achieve technical 
efﬁciency, but by reallocating production more for input X1 and less of X2, the 
same output could be produced at even lower cost. Thus, producer A is both 
technically inefficient and allocative inefficient. The overall efﬁciency or 
economic efﬁciency of producer A is only  . Empirically decomposing overall 
inefficiency, 1 −  , into its components, technical inefficiency, (1 −  ), and 
allocative inefficiency, ( −  ), is an ongoing issue in the empirical literature on 
efﬁciency estimation (Greene, 2008). 
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Figure 4.1 Technical and allocative efficiency with two factor inputs 
 
Source: Greene (2008). 
 
4.2.2. Review of Efficiency Measurement Methods 
This sub section explains the use of stochastic frontier analysis, a parametric 
estimation technique. First it is useful to distinguish between non parametric 
and parametric approaches and the reason why we choose to adopt the 
parametric approach. (See Molyneux et al. (2006) and Lovell et al. (2008) for a 
comprehensive survey).  
4.2.2.1. Non Parametric Approach 
The most popular non parametric method is data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
DEA is a linear programming technique developed by Charnes, Cooper, and 
Rhodes (1978) and then developed by Banker et al. (1984). A related non 
parametric method is Free Disposal Hull approach (FDH) that was originally 
intended for use in the public sector and non-profit institutions where typical 
economic behavioral objectives such as cost minimization or profit 
maximization, may not apply.  
X1
X2
XA
W
W
Y
Y
bXA
X*
aXA
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A potential problem of self identifiers and near-self identifiers may arise when 
DEA is applied. Under the radial form of DEA, input and output mixes are held 
constant. This potential problem can be minimized by applying a cost based 
DEA approach. By applying this method, any input can be compared by 
combining input prices and quantities and comparing total costs, rather than 
having to compare firms in every input dimension as in the radial forms of 
DEA (Bauer et. al, 1998). 
The Free Disposal Hull approach (FDH) is a special case of DEA, where, 
instead of convexity, free disposability of inputs and outputs is assumed. 
Because the FDH frontier is either congruent with or interior to the DEA 
frontier, FDH will typically generate larger estimates of average efficiency 
compared to DEA (Tulkens, 1993). Both approaches permit efficiency to vary 
over time and make no prior assumption regarding the form of the distribution 
of inefficiencies across observations (except that the best-practice firms are 
100% efficient). 
The main advantages of non parametric methods can be summarized: (1) they 
allow efficiency to vary over time; (2) they do not require explicit specification 
of a functional form and so impose very little structure on the shape of the 
efficient frontier. The main drawback of the non parametric method is that they 
usually do not permit for random error, errors that can arise due to 
measurement problems associated with inaccurate accounting data, good or bad 
luck which temporarily raises or lowers inputs or outputs, or specification error 
such as excluded inputs and outputs and imposing the piecewise linear shape 
on the frontier. If there is any random error in a bank that is not in the estimated 
frontier, it will be mistakenly included in that bank‘s measured efficiency. 
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4.2.2.2. Parametric Approach 
Another widely used technique to measure efficiency is the parametric 
approach. There are three main parametric methods namely: stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA), distribution free approach (DFA) and thick frontier approach 
(TFA). The SFA developed by two main lines of research by Aigner, Lovell, 
and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), who proposed 
the stochastic frontier models that applied researchers now use to combine the 
underlying theoretical propositions with a practical econometric framework. 
SFA specifies a functional form for the cost relationship among inputs, outputs, 
and other factors, and allows for random error. In the SFA, the inefficiency and 
random error components of the composite error term are disentangled by 
making explicit assumption about their distributions. 
The inefficiency term is assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution, usually 
the half normal, while the random error term is assumed to follow a symmetric 
distribution, usually the standard normal. The logic behind these assumptions is 
that the inefficiency cannot reduce costs, and so must be drawn from a 
truncated distribution, whereas random error can both increase and decrease 
costs, and so can be drawn from a symmetric distribution. Thus, the 
inefficiency results depend critically on the skewness of the data. Any 
inefficiency components that are more or less symmetrically distributed will be 
measured as random error and vice versa. Moreover, as in other econometric 
models both the inefficiency and the errors are assumed to be orthogonal to all 
of the independent variables specified in the estimating equation. 
DFA was pioneered by Berger (1993). It requires panel data, and based on a 
translog system of cost and input cost equations to generate estimates of cost 
inefficiency for each producers in each time period. The approach assumes the 
efficiency differences are stable over time, while random error averages out 
over time.  
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A disadvantage of DFA is the requirement that cost efficiency is time invariant, 
and this assumption becomes less tenable as time increases. However, DFA 
also has two distinct virtues. First, being based on a sequence of time separate 
cross sectional regressions, it allows the structure of production technology to 
vary flexibly through time. Second, it does not impose a distributional 
assumption on the inefficiency term and it does not need to follow any of the 
specific distributions. 
The Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) was introduced by Berger and Humphrey 
(1991). It also specifies a functional form and like DFA, does not impose 
distributional assumptions.  However, it assumes that inefficiency differs 
between the highest and lowest performance quartiles and that random error 
exists within these quartiles. This approach has two disadvantages: (1) the 
measured inefficiency is sensitive to the assumptions about which fluctuations 
are random and which represents inefficiency differences. If inefficiency 
follow a thin-tailed distribution and tend to be small, while random error 
follows a thick-tailed distribution and tend to large, then TFA may mistake one 
for the other. (2) TFA gives an estimate of inefficiency differences between the 
highest and lowest quartile to indicate the general level of overall inefficiency, 
but does not provide exact point estimates on inefficiency for individual banks 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
After comparing between non parametric and parametric, the conclusion is that 
the advantage of parametric methods is that they allow for random error. It 
makes the measurement or specification error less likely to be misidentified as 
inefficiency. Moreover, the methods will always rank the efficiencies of the 
banks in the same order as their cost function residuals, independent of the 
specific distributional assumptions imposed. Bank with lower costs for a given 
set of independent variables will always be ranked as more efficient because 
the conditional mean or mode of the inefficiency term is always increasing in 
the size of the residual. The disadvantage of this method is that they have to 
impose more structure on the shape of the frontier by specifying a particular 
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functional form. If the functional form is misspecified, measured efficiency 
may be confounded with the specification errors. 
Estimating technical efficiency requires only input and output data, while 
measuring economic efficiency also requires price data. As a result DEA only 
focused on technical efficiency. On the other hand, all parametric techniques 
have examined economic efficiency. Among them, SFA is the most popular. 
The studies by Bauer et al. (1998), Isik and Hassan (2002) compared estimates 
using both the non parametric and parametric approaches. The parametric 
approach was found to yield higher efficiency values than the non parametric 
approach. Another study by Resti (1997) found little difference between the 
techniques. This result is consistent with the difference between two methods 
i.e. the non parametric approach does not allow for a random error owing to 
luck, data problem, or other measurement errors, while the parametric approach 
does. Casu et al. (2004) compare productivity growth estimates obtained 
through parametric and non-parametric approaches. They find that the 
differences are not as large as in the efficiency studies. Their study does not 
yield noticeably different results in terms of identifying the components of the 
productivity growth of EU banks during the period. The studies by Bauer et. al 
(1993), Allen and Rai (1996), Berger and Mester (1997) and Clark and Siems 
(2002) compared estimates using two or more of the parametric approaches, 
but the result were mixed.  
A comparison between DEA and SFA in banking has been offered by Ferrier 
and Lovell (1990), Eisenbeis et al. (1997), Resti (1997), and Huang and Wang 
(2002). The first three studies reported fairly close average efficiencies 
generated by the two approaches, while the latter suggests that the congruency 
between the results of the two methodologies is rather limited. Resti (1997) and 
Eisenbeis et al. (1997) found very high rank-order correlations between DEA 
and SFA, whereas Ferrier and Lovell (1990) found rank-order correlation of 
only 0.02 (not significantly different from zero). Also,  Huang and Wang 
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(2002), using a panel of Taiwanese commercial banks, report that parametric 
and non-parametric methods are generally contradictory in ranking the sample 
banks based on their estimated efficiency scores. In contrast, Eisenbeis et al. 
(1997) found that while the calculated programming inefficiency scores 
derived from the DEA approach are two to three times larger than those 
estimated using a stochastic frontier, the correlation of the rankings of banks 
based on their efficiencies under the two methods is also relatively high. The 
inconclusive evidence of these studies clearly calls for additional research on 
this issue.  
4.2.3. Review of Empirical Studies 
This subsection present surveys and empirical studies in efficiency model. 
Berger (2007) surveyed 100 bank efficiency studies. Most of the studies on 
banking efficiency focus on the banks of developed economies. More recently 
some efficiency studies have been conducted for developing economies (e.g. 
Lensik et al. 2007).  
Table 4.1 summarizes the results of studies from both the developing countries 
and from the developed countries. 
There have been many studies examined the impact of bank ownership on 
efficiency in emerging markets. However, the results of the empirical studies 
have been mixed. Nikiel and Opiela (2002), Weill (2003), Fries and Taci 
(2005) reported that foreign owned banks have higher efficiency than domestic 
banks in the emerging markets or in cross countries studies. 
On the other hand, Green et al. (2002) and Lensik et al. (2007) indicated that 
the domestic banks are more efficient than foreign banks.  They also argue that 
the negative relationship between foreign ownership and less efficient are less 
pronounced in the countries with good corporate governance. In addition, 
Chatapong (2005) found that foreign and domestic banks have similar unit cost 
of production although operating in different focused area. 
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Table 4. 1 
Summary of foreign bank studies on efficiency 
 
Authors Country/Period/Obs. Techniques Efficiency Results (%) Empirical findings 
Nikiel and Opiela (2002) Poland 1997–2000; 301. SFA Cost efficiency Foreign bank: 69.95 
Domestic bank: 55.41 
Foreign banks are more cost efficient and less profit 
efficient than other bank 
Unite and Sullivan 
(2003) 
Philippines; 1990-1998; 
350. 
Random 
Effects 
Model 
  Foreign competition compels domestic banks to be more 
efficient and to become less dependent on relationship-
based banking practices. 
Weill (2003)  Czech Republic and 
Poland; 1997; 47 banks. 
SUR Cost efficiency Foreign bank: 70.4 
Domestic bank: 62 
Foreign banks are more cost efficient than domestic banks. 
This advantage does not result from differences in the 
scale of operations or the structure of activities 
Green et al. (2004) 
 
9 CEE; 1995–1999; 1365. SUR 
 
Economic of 
scale/scope 
 Foreign banks are not more efficient than domestic banks. 
Little evidence of foreign ownership does not significantly 
reducing banks costs  
Bonin et al. (2005)  
 
11 European transition 
nations, 1996–2000; 435. 
SFA  Technical 
inefficiency 
Mean efficiency: 78.6 Foreign-owned banks (branch) are more cost efficient than 
domestic banks. 
Chantapong (2005) Thailand; 1995-2003 
(yearly data); 23 banks. 
 Cost efficiency Foreign bank: 17.69 
Domestic bank: 12.29 
Domestic banks‘ cost efficiency has improved after 
foreign acquisition.  
Fries and Taci (2005) 
 
15 European transition 
nations 
1994–2001; 1897 
SFA  Cost efficiency Privatised foreign: 79 
Privatised domestic: 
76.3 
Privatised banks with majority foreign ownership are the 
most efficient and those with domestic ownership are the 
least 
Khumbakar and Wang 
(2005) 
China; 1993-2002 
 
SFA Technical 
efficiency 
Joint equity banks: 
0.90 
Wholly state owned 
banks: 0.47 
Joint-equity banks are more efficient than wholly state-
owned banks. Both banks are found to be operating 
slightly below their optimal size 
Fu and Heffernan (2007) China; 1985-2002 (yearly) 
 
SFA X-efficiency mean scale 
inefficiency for the 
whole sample period is 
0.068 
X-efficiency declined significantly and the joint stock 
banks became relatively more X-efficient than domestic 
banks. 
Lensink et.al. (2007) 105 countries; 1998-2003; 
7804. 
SFA Cost efficiency  Foreign ownership negatively affects bank efficiency. 
However in countries with good governance this negative 
effect is less pronounced. 
Tahir etal. (2010) Malaysia, 2000-2006; 147 SFA Cost efficiency Foreign bank: 75.5% 
Domestic bank: 88.2% 
Foreign bank is more cost efficient than domestic bank 
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Of the studies that have investigated the relationship between efficiency and 
ownership of banks, some have focused on comparing the differences between 
foreign-owned banks and domestic-owned banks. There are several possible 
efficiency disadvantages for foreign-owned banks relative to domestically 
owned institutions.  Foreign-owned banks are sometimes located at significant 
distances from their organization headquarters, which may be associated with 
organizational diseconomies to operating or monitoring from a distance. Other 
possible efficiency disadvantages for foreign-owned banks are differences in 
the economic environment of the nation of operations from those in the 
headquarters nation of the foreign-owned bank. Differences in language, 
culture, currency, and regulatory/supervisory structures, and so forth may 
increase the costs of management, impede the flow of information, or reduce 
efficiency in other ways. According to Berger (2007) the efficiency advantages 
of foreign owned banks relative to domestically owned banks may tend to 
outweigh the disadvantages on average in many nations.  
Chen, Skully, and Brown (2005) find that in China, the big four banks (the 
Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank 
and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) outperformed medium-sized 
joint-stock banks in terms of cost efficiency. While, Khumbakar and Wang 
(2005) and Fu and Heffernan (2007) find that the four banks are less cost 
efficient than the joint-stock bank during the period. Unite and Sullivan (2003) 
report that foreign banks in the Philippines generated cost efficiency gains but 
did not produce significant economic benefits. 
There are two possible explanations for the differences in efficiency between 
domestic and foreign banks. One is the multinational presence will allow the 
foreign banks to serve corporate customers in multiple nations and can still 
serve domestic customers since they have established the local relationship in 
the banks. Second, foreign owned banks from developed nations may also have 
comparative advantages in the use of managerial expertise and experience, 
access to capital, market power over suppliers etc. 
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4.3. Data and Methodology 
The estimation of bank efficiency implies the explicit definition and 
measurement of banks‘ inputs and outputs. Two main approaches are generally 
used to measure the flow of services provided by banks.  Under the production 
approach banks are treated as firms that employ capital and labour to produce 
different types of deposit and loan accounts. Thus, their outputs are measured 
by the number of deposits and loan accounts or by the number of transactions 
performed on each type of product, whereas total costs are the operating costs 
used to produce these products. In the intermediation approach, banks are 
considered as an intermediary between depositors and borrowers, rather than 
producers of loan and deposit account services. As a result, the values of loans 
and other assets are defined as bank outputs, while liabilities (deposits, capital 
and labour) are inputs to the production process. It follows that operating costs 
and financial expenses (interest on deposits) are the relevant components of 
total costs. Following Humphrey and Berger (1997), the intermediation 
approach is adopted in this study. 
 
4.3.1. Data 
This study uses quarterly data from September 2000 to 2009 taken from banks‘ 
financial statements collected by Bank Indonesia. These data are better than 
publicly available data because the data have been reviewed by Bank 
Indonesia, the banking supervisor.
4 
    
                                              
4
 Regulatory data has not been widely used in foreign banks studies.  A few studies in the US and 
Thailand employed annual regulatory data. DeYoung and Nolle (1996) and Chang et al. (1998) use 
Call Report to study the efficiency of banks in the US. Researchers conducted by Leightner and Lovell 
(1998) and Chantapong (2005) employing annual aggregate data from the Bank of Thailand and the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand. This study will be the first using quarterly data from the Bank of 
Indonesia, the bank‘s supervisory agency. 
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In this study, we use domestic banks
5
 and joint venture bank‘s data. We 
exclude foreign branch banks, three banks that only have one observation and 
other bank because it is more a trade financing company than a bank.
6
 502 
observations (i.e. 12.3%) have been removed from the matched data set to 
obtain a clean data set for further analysis. Of 502 observations, 205 (5%) is 
due to error and 297 (7.3%) is foreign branches data that we exclude from the 
analysis. The cleaned data set is 4,308 observations over the period 2000-2009 
based on information of about 119 numbers of banks (92%) in Indonesia.  
Table 4.2 Variables used in cost efficiency estimations 
 
Table 4.2 gives definitions of all variables specified in the cost function as well 
as their sample means and standard deviations.  The variable input prices (w1, 
w2 and w3) include the price of labour, the price of physical capital and the 
price of deposit.  Expenditures on these inputs comprise the vast majority of all 
banking costs. The variable outputs, y, include total loan and total securities. 
                                              
5
 The definition of domestic banks includes banks that are owned 100% by the government of 
Indonesia, Indonesian citizen or company based on Indonesian legal entity. This also includes banks 
owned by the local government which are operating in 27 provinces in Indonesia.  Now, there are 31 
state-owned banks including 26 regional-government-owned banks. While, the foreign bank 
subsidiaries are the banks owned minimum 51% by foreign investor in cooperation with Indonesian 
partner. This is including joint stock banks formed before the Asian crisis.  
6
 This bank receives fund from the government and provides trade loan for international trade 
businesses. The distinct asset and liability structure creates incomparable data with other commercial 
banks. 
Variables Description No of 
observations
Mean Standard 
deviation
Min 1
st 
Quartile
2
nd 
Quartile
3
rd 
Quartile
Max
Dependent Variables
Total costs Operating and financial cost 4,308 11.46 1.88 6.43 10.17 11.26 12.55 17.62
Input prices (%):
The price of labor (w1) Total personnel expenses/total assets 4,308 9.56 1.75 5.05 8.35 9.30 10.55 15.53
The price of physical capital 
(w2)
Total depreciation and other capital 
expenses/total fixed assets
4,308 8.03 1.83 1.54 6.77 7.79 9.02 13.75
The price of deposit (w3) Total interest expenses/total funds(time 
deposits, demand deposits and saving 
accounts)
4,308 10.66 1.91 3.90 9.39 10.49 11.77 16.87
Output Quantities (%):
Total Loans (y1) The value of aggregate loans/total assets 4,308 51.56 19.57 0.00 37.28 53.10 67.39 99.71
Total Securities (y2) The value of aggregate securities(short 
term securities and bonds)/total assets
4,308 7.76 12.04 1.00 1.00 1.50 9.34 78.89
Control variables (%):
Non-performing loan ratio The value of aggregate non performing 
loans/total loans
4,308 5.78 8.52 0.01 1.55 3.11 5.84 91.14
Equity capital ratio The value of the total aggregate 
equities/total assets
4,308 13.92 10.81 -1.99 7.90 11.16 16.35 93.33
The table presents the summary statistics of basic variables used in the cost efficiency estimation. In the translog-based estimations of cost efficiency, the 
dependent variable is total costs. Output variables considered are total loans, and total securities. The input price variables are: price of labor, the price of physical 
capital, and the price of deposits. The output are normalised by total assets. Control variables are non performing loan ratio and equity capital ratio. All financial 
values are inflation-adjusted to the base year 2000. Source: Bank Indonesia. Various years. Unpublished.
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The reason of including the total securities is that after the crises, holding of 
securities especially government bond and Bank Indonesia certificate (like T-
bills in the US) significantly increased. 
The next figures compare average cost, profitability and risk of four groups of 
banks: state owned banks, private domestic owned banks, old foreign owned 
banks and new foreign banks.  Old foreign banks are banks majority owned by 
foreigners that were established before the crisis. While the new foreign banks 
are the banks majority owned by foreign owners and were established after the 
crisis and as a result of foreign acquisitions.    
Figure 4.2  
Cost to income ratio 
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The figure shows cost to income ratio of different type of banks. Cost to income ratio is defined as operating 
expenses to operating income. Operating expenses are cost of deposits.  Operating income are including loan 
revenue, and securities investment revenues. State-owned banks  (SO) refer to banks wholly owned  by the 
Government of Indonesia, Domestic owned banks (DO) refer to the bank whose private domestic ownership is 
greater than 50% of total ownership, New foreign banks (NFB) refer to new acquired banks (after  2000) by 
foreign owners and they hold more than 50% of total ownership, Old foreign banks (OFB) refer to bank whose 
foreign ownership is greater than 50% and established or acquired by foreign investor before  2000. Source: Bank 
Indonesia. Various years. Indonesian banking statistics.
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Figure 4.2 shows that the cost to income ratio of most of banks (except old 
foreign banks) follows the movement of market interest rates. In general the 
interest rates have a decreasing trend. The increased interest rates at the end of 
2003 and 2005 were due to increase in global and domestic oil prices. It was 
negatively impact on banks‘ costs. 
During the period, domestic private owned banks have the highest cost to 
income ratio compared to other types of banks. Its average from September 
2009 to September 2009 was 51.4%. However, at the beginning of period, the 
highest cost to income ratio was state-owned bank with 58.2%. While at the 
end of September 2009, the lowest cost to income ratio was old foreign banks 
with 25.8%.   
The relatively stable costs to income ratio of old foreign banks are because they 
have different business models. Those banks were established to conduct 
correspondent banking especially serving corporate clients for international 
trading. This makes those banks relatively small and has mean by the cost to 
income ratio efficient compared to other type of banks. 
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Figure 4.3  
Return on Asset 
 
 
The profitability ratio, proxied by return on assets (ROA), of banks in 
Indonesia has been relatively stable over the period in the range of 1-3%. The 
fluctuations are influenced by the movement of interest rates.  
State-owned banks and domestic owned banks have negative ROA 
immediately after the Indonesian financial crisis in 1997-1998. State-owned 
banks were affected severely by the default of their corporate loans debtors 
especially those had unhedged foreign exchange exposures.  
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The figure shows Return on Asset ratio of different type of banks. State-owned banks (SO) refer to banks wholly 
owned  by the Government of Indonesia, Domestic owned banks (DO) refer to the banks whose private domestic 
ownership is greater than 50% of total ownership, New foreign banks (NFB) refer to new acquired banks (after  
2000) by foreign owners and they hold more than 50% of total ownership, Old foreign banks refer to banks 
whose foreign ownership is greater than 50% and established or acquired by foreign investors before  2000. 
Source: Bank Indonesia. Various years. Indonesian banking statistics.
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Figure 4.4   
Non-performing loan ratio 
 
 
Asset quality condition has been improving. The most improved banks are the 
old foreign banks mainly because of loans of Japanese banks operating in 
Indonesia. After series of bank‘s closures and merger, non performing loan was 
decreased. In 2008, the NPL ratio of the old foreign banks was 2.3% which was 
better than domestic banks at 3.8%. 
Other banks that still have problem with NPL are state owned banks. The NPL 
has climbed back up again since 2005. The bank has restructured and written 
off some loans that caused its banks revenue decreases. Meanwhile the asset 
quality of new foreign bank was initially the lowest and after acquisition has 
slightly increased. 
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The figure shows non performing loan ratio of different type of banks. Non -performing 
loan ratio is defined as total non performing loan to total loans. Domestic owned bank 
refers to the bank whose private domestic ownership is greater than 50% of total 
ownership, New foreign bank refers to new acquired banks (after Year 2000) by foreign 
owner and the foreign owner holds more than 50% of total ownership, Old foreign bank 
refers to bank whose foreign ownership is greater than 50% and established or acquired by 
foreign investor before Year 2000. Source: Bank Indonesia. Various years. Indonesian 
banking statistics.
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Some of the newly acquired banks namely Bank Permata and Bank Niaga that 
had high NPLs at 45.15% and 27.9% respectively might contribute to the 
increased of the foreign bank‘s NPL. In February 2008, NPL of Bank Permata 
was 4.4% and Bank Niaga was 3.88%.  
These summary statistics suggest that in Indonesia domestic and foreign banks 
indeed responded differently to the current financial and economic situations. 
The next section explores whether the patterns in evidence in the graphical 
examination are confirmed by more rigorous econometric analysis. 
 
4.3.2. The implementation of SFA 
Efficiency measures the extent to which a bank‘s costs approximate the costs of 
the ―best practice‖ or at least cost bank, producing an identical output bundle 
under the same conditions. In the SFA employed here, the measure is derived 
from a cost function:  
                                                                          (4.1) 
where    = total costs;    =the input prices;    =the output quantities; 
   =   +    ;    is an inefficiency factor that may raise costs above the best 
practice level and    is the random error that incorporates measurement error 
and chance that may give banks high or low costs occasionally 
The inefficiency factor     incorporates both technical inefficiencies from using 
too much of the inputs to produce the same outputs,    , and allocative 
inefficiency from failing to react optimally to relative prices of inputs    . The 
standard assumption is that the efficiency and random error terms can be 
multiplicatively separated from the remainder of the cost function. After taking 
logs of both sides of equation 4.1, the cost function can be depicted as: 
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           (4.2) 
    is cost function frontier intercept common to all producers in period t. 
            is the intercept for bank i in the period t. X denotes the bank‘s 
characteristics.   
Lee and Schmidt (1993) proposed formulation in which     in the above 
equation 4.2 is specified as  
                                                                  (4.3) 
where the function      is specified as a set of time dummy variables   . Once 
   and    are estimated                   , where T is the panel length, 
   are positive firm effects assumed to follow a half-normal distribution, i.e.,    
~ N(0,   
 ), and are independent from    , and   is a parameter to be estimated. 
Given the exponential specification of    , the parameterisation in the above 
equation implies that  the  time  path  of  technical  efficiency  is  monotonic,  
in  the  sense  that  technical efficiency  increases,  is  constant  and  decreases  
when     is  greater,  equal  and  less  than zero,  respectively.  It  should  be  
noted  that    is  assumed  to  be  identical  for  all  banks, leaving    to capture 
efficiency differences. 
The maximum likelihood estimation of the cost function (equation 4.1) 
generates estimates  of  all  parameters  of  the  frontier  cost  function  as  well  
as  estimates  of  the unknown  parameters  ,   and  .  After  solving  the  
maximum  likelihood  problem, aggregate  residuals     can  be  derived  by  
substituting  the  estimated  parameter  vector   into the cost function.  
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Battese and Coelli (1992) show that an estimate of firm-specific efficiency is 
given by: 
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(4.5) 
 
    denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution.      can be interpreted as the cost ratio of a fully efficient bank to 
the observed unit, i.e.             
          
                      
Efficiency theoretically falls in the interval (0,1], and equals one for a best 
practice bank within the observed data. A value of 0.75, on the other hand, 
indicates that the bank could reduce its costs by 25 percent, given the output 
produced operating under the same conditions. The limitation of this definition 
is that the estimated efficiency is only a relative measure against the best 
practice bank within the sample; the best practice bank itself may not be 
efficient when compared to banks outside the sample. Refer back to figure 4.1 
TE is same as  . 
4.3.3. Model Specification 
Consistent with most bank efficiency literature, this study adopts a translog 
functional form.
7 
The model is estimated using panel data. Following Battese 
                                              
7
 Other method is the Fourier-Flexible (FF) specification. The choice in this chapter was motivated by 
the fact that the FF specification requires more degree of freedoms. In addition, although formal 
statistical tests indicated that the coefficients on the Fourier terms are jointly significant, Berger and 
Mester (1997) argue that the improvement obtained through the use of the FF specification is 
insignificant from an economic viewpoint. The average improvement in goodness of fit is relatively 
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and Coelli (1995), Berger and Mester (1997), Khumbakar and Lovell (2000), 
and Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (2008), we write equation 4.2. as : 
                   
 
   
 
 
 
                 
 
   
 
   
           
 
   
 
 
     
 
   
            
 
   
                   
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4.6) 
 
where, 
 
        = natural logarithm of total costs (operating and non operating costs) 
divided by deposit price (w3),  
       = natural logarithm of the ith input prices (i.e. labour costs over total 
assets, fixed asset costs over total fixed assets) divided by deposit price (w3) 
        = natural logarithm of bank outputs (total loans over total assets and 
total securities over total assets), 
T = time trend from September 2000 to September 2009; Tt = t for t = 1,…, L 
(L= 37 quarters), 
              are coefficients to be estimated with maximum likelihood 
estimator. 
Following common practice, the standard symmetry restrictions apply to this 
function. In addition, the total cost and input price terms are normalised by the 
                                                                                                                                 
small, meaning both functional forms yield basically the same average level and dispersion of 
measured efficiency, and both rank the individual banks in almost the same order. 
Wheelock and Wilson (2001) also argue that the FF specification raises several unresolved statistical 
problems, including whether to augment the underlying translog function with trigonometric terms or 
orthogonal polynomials, and how many terms should be included for estimations. Furthermore 
Altunbas and Chakravarty (2001) indicate that the predictive ability of the FF form is worse than the 
translog form. Finally, several studies use the stochastic frontier approach for both the translog and the 
Fourier specification of the cost function and reach similar conclusions (Berger and Mester, 1997; 
Vander Venner, 2002). 
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last input price, w3, which imposing linear homogeneity restrictions on the 
model. 
                                           
     
 
   
       
 
   
             
  
      
 
   
             
  (4.7) 
 
Many studies normalised the total costs and output quantities relative to the 
bank‘s equity capital to control for scale biases in estimations (e.g. Berger and 
Mester, 1997; DeYoung and Hasan, 1998; Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux, and Seth, 
2000; Mertens and Urga, 2001). Since the costs of the largest banks are much 
larger than those of the smallest banks, large banks would have random errors 
with much larger variances without the normalization. Furthermore, cost 
inefficiency term in cost functions is derived from the composite residuals, 
which might make the variance of the cost efficiencies dependent on bank size 
without normalization. Similarly, the normalization of the output quantities 
keeps these variables from being skewed for the large banks, so that all the 
variables are of nearly the same order magnitude. 
However the capitalization and provisioning regulations in Indonesian banks 
were tightened considerably during the sample period. In particular, state 
owned banks were severely undercapitalized in the earlier years, and, over 
time, were required to meet capitalization standard in line with international 
norms. Thus normalizing by equity capital would conflate these institutional 
changes with changes with behaviour, and overstate their costs in the early 
years. For this reason, this thesis follows Hardy and Patti (2001) who 
normalized these variables using total asset rather than total equity. All of the 
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output quantities are specified as ratios of the total assets, z, to control for scale 
biases in the estimation of the cost efficiency in Indonesia‘s banking sector. 
 
4.4. Empirical Results 
4.4.1. Baseline and Preferred Model Results 
The estimation results of the cost function for the baseline and preferred model 
are given in Table 4.3. The different between the models is that the baseline 
(equation 4.6) includes only outputs and input prices while in the preferred 
model, we include non performing loans, dummy joint venture (old foreign 
banks) and time dummies. These variables are significant and they can make 
the model is more easily interpreted. Non-performing loans is one of important 
variable since the problem loans can increase bank costs. Dummy joint venture 
banks in included because joint venture banks have different business model 
than other commercial banks. They mainly conduct trade finance business for 
the customers from their home countries.  
Both estimations reveal significant parameters. The coefficients for the two 
models are very similar but total loans now have significant estimate. As the 
input coefficients given in log form it can be interpreted as input elasticities of 
the output, the input elasticity of the price of labor of about 0.50%, cost of 
fixed assets of 0.23% and all of the variables have positive relationship with the 
total cost. This also indicates that the main contributor for total cost in 
Indonesian banking market derives from the increased of price of labor. 
In the output front, loans have a highly significant and positive coefficient 
while securities have a positive sign and insignificance. These conditions are 
true for Indonesian banks since the increase in loans will require banks to 
enhance monitoring by hiring more resources to perform the job. Meanwhile 
increased securities reduce the cost of banks. This makes sense, most of the 
banks invest in government bonds and certificate of Bank Indonesia (bills) 
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which are safe investment thus demand less monitoring. The ratio of securities 
to total GDP in Indonesian banks has been decreasing in the last ten years from 
32.2% to 14% in 2009 (See table 2.5).  
Finally, time trend is significantly negative coefficient showing that the total 
cost of Indonesian banking is decreasing over time. From 2001 to 2009, the 
decrease is approximately 8% and the yearly average decrease in total cost is 
around 2%.  
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Table 4.3   
Stochastic frontier regression results: Baseline and Preferred Models 
 
 
Independent Variables: Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Price of labor 0.453 0.000 0.504 0.000
Price of physical capitak 0.272 0.000 0.228 0.000
Total loans 0.057 0.080 0.095 0.004
Total securities 0.028 0.282 0.023 0.370
Price of labor*price of labor 0.144 0.000 0.144 0.000
Price of labor*Price of physical capital 0.013 0.289 0.018 0.138
Price of physical capital*Price of physical capital 0.064 0.000 0.058 0.000
Price of labor*total loans 0.013 0.235 0.001 0.928
Price of labor*total securities 0.017 0.003 0.016 0.004
Price of physical capital*total loan 0.005 0.672 0.013 0.305
Price of physical capital*total securities 0.002 0.713 0.002 0.711
Total loans*total loans -0.003 0.759 -0.009 0.329
Total loans*total securities -0.002 0.692 -0.003 0.588
Total securities*total securities 0.013 0.034 0.015 0.011
Time trend -0.003 0.001
Old foreign banks 0.599 0.000
Non performing loan ratio 0.022 0.000
Year 2001 -0.021 0.083
Year 2002 -0.066 0.000
Year 2003 -0.083 0.000
Year 2004 -0.045 0.021
Year 2005 -0.087 0.000
Year 2006 -0.117 0.000
Year 2007 -0.112 0.000
Year 2008 -0.114 0.000
Year 2009 -0.101 0.003
Constant 3.179 0.000 2.289 0.000
/mu 1.520 0.000 0.868 0.000
/eta 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
/lnsigma2 -2.149 0.000 -2.814 0.000
/ilgtgamma 1.381 0.000 0.491 0.001
sigma2 0.117 0.060
gamma 0.799 0.620
sigma_u2 0.093 0.037
sigma_v2 0.023 0.023
Log likelihood 1,656 0.000 1,769.7 0.000
Test H0: w1+w2=1 61.6 0.000 59.3 0.000
Test H0: w1w1+w2w2=0 71.0 0.000 69.5 0.000
No of observations 4,304 4,304
No of banks 129 129
Preferred Model
Dep. Var: Total costs
The table presents the result of translog cost function Indonesian banking during the period of 2000-2009 
using stochastic frontier approach.  The error term distribution is time varying followed Battese-Coelli 
(1995). The dependent variable, total costs is the total of operating and financial costs. The regressors are 
the price of labor is personnel cost over total assets,  and the price of physical capital is depreciation costs 
to total fixed asset. Ouput considered are total loans and total securities. Non performing loan is the ratio 
of non performing loan over total loans. Dummy old foreign banks is the dummy for banks that are majority 
owned by foreign investors and established before 2000.  Time dummy variable and time trend. The 
dependent variable and input prices variables are divided by the price of deposit to satisfy linear 
homogeity in input prices. 
Baseline Model
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4.4.2. Robustness Checks 
We further investigate the accuracy of the model and its empirical result by 
employing additional control variables including capital structure and reduce 
sample. In the first set of robustness checks, we follow study by Fries and Taci 
(2005) and Mester (2010) that if a bank were to substitute debt for some of its 
capital, its accounting (cash flow) costs could rise, making the less-capitalised 
bank appear to be more costly than a well capitalized bank. To solve this 
problem, the capital ratio can be included as a control variable in the baseline 
model. The resulting cost function captures the relationship of cash flow cost to 
the capital ratio, and the (negative) derivative of cost with respect to capital 
ratio. The second check is to include the non-performing loans ratio as a risk 
indicator and the capital structure in preferred model. These variables can play 
role as control variables. The aim of this test is to ensure the accuracy of the 
model if we consider other factors may influence the bank‘s efficiency. The 
reason to control for capital and non performing loan is because Indonesian 
banking system is characterized by high credit risk and high capitalised banks. 
Finally, we divide the sample into two time periods and estimate using 
preferred model. Group 1 is from September 2000 to December 2004 and the 
second group is from March 2005 to September 2009. The cut period in 
December 2004 chosen because this was the year BI began the implementation 
of a new regulatory framework the Indonesian Banking Architecture (IBA).  
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Table 4.4 Robustness checks  
 
 
Dep Var: Total Costs
Independent Variables: Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Price of labor 0.478 0.000 0.522 0.000 0.414 0.000 0.743 0.000
Price of physical capitak 0.265 0.000 0.222 0.000 0.094 0.308 0.006 0.952
Total loans 0.053 0.105 0.087 0.008 0.167 0.004 0.260 0.010
Total securities 0.066 0.014 0.057 0.031 0.060 0.094 0.066 0.168
Price of labor*price of labor 0.137 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.277 0.000
Price of labor*Price of physical capital 0.021 0.103 0.024 0.056 -0.015 0.323 -0.062 0.008
Price of physical capital*Price of physical capital0.060 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.047 0.015 0.136 0.000
Price of labor*total loans 0.011 0.319 0.000 0.984 -0.002 0.930 -0.086 0.001
Price of labor*total securities 0.017 0.004 0.015 0.009 0.007 0.429 0.033 0.000
Price of physical capital*total loan 0.006 0.642 0.014 0.275 0.037 0.045 0.111 0.000
Price of physical capital*total securities 0.004 0.487 0.005 0.387 -0.013 0.094 0.001 0.882
Total loans*total loans 0.000 0.988 -0.005 0.555 -0.018 0.203 -0.007 0.805
Total loans*total securities -0.008 0.122 -0.007 0.143 0.007 0.272 0.018 0.079
Total securities*total securities 0.006 0.324 0.009 0.136 0.006 0.547 0.029 0.002
Time trend -0.003 0.001
Old foreign banks 0.606 0.000 0.625 0.000 0.447 0.000
Non performing loan ratio 0.019 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.936
Total capital to total asset ratio -0.017 0.019 -0.016 0.029
Year 2001 -0.016 0.198 -0.006 0.606 -0.146 0.000
Year 2002 -0.064 0.000 -0.032 0.033 -0.125 0.000
Year 2003 -0.077 0.000 -0.035 0.053 -0.084 0.000
Year 2004 -0.038 0.052 0.024 0.300 -0.058 0.000
Year 2005 -0.078 0.000
Year 2006 -0.105 0.000
Year 2007 -0.099 0.000
Year 2008 -0.100 0.001
Year 2009 -0.088 0.010
Constant 3.212 0.000 2.341 0.000 2.237 0.000 1.820852 0.000
/mu 1.519 0.000 0.889 0.000 1.218 0.000 0.946 0.000
/eta 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.920 0.000 0.004
/lnsigma2 -2.138 0.000 -2.797 0.000 -2.551 0.000 -3.076 0.000
/ilgtgamma 1.417 0.000 0.541 0.000 1.022 0.000 0.586 0.000
sigma2 0.118 0.061 0.078 0.046
gamma 0.805 0.632 0.735 0.642
sigma_u2 0.095 0.039 0.057 0.030
sigma_v2 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.017
Log likelihood 1,667.5 0.000 1,772.0 0.000 892.7 0.000 1,145.1 0.000
Test H0: w1+w2=1 52.7 0.000 52.8 0.000 68.0 0.000 11.8 0.000
Test H0: w1w1+w2w2=0 61.9 0.000 61.8 0.000 39.1 0.000 83.6 0.000
Chow stability test χ² (17) 134.97 0.000
No of observations 4,244 4,244 2,188 2,116
No of banks 129 129 129 115
The table presents the robustness checks using data from 2000Q3-2009Q3 using stochastic frontier approach.   Model 1 is 
the baseline model with capital ratio.  Model 2-4 are based on the preferred model.  Model 2, capital ratio is added as a 
control variable. Model 3 uses data from 2000 to 2004. While in Model 4 is from 2005 to 2009. The data split is based on the 
implementation of Indonesian Banking Architecture in 2004. The dependent variable is total costs. The regressors are the 
price of labor is personnel cost over total assets and the price of physical capital is depreciation costs of fixed assets to total 
fixed assets; ouput considered are total loans and total securities. Dummy variable in model 1 is time trend. Dummy variables 
in model 2-4 are yearly time dummy and old foreign banks. All values are in real term deflated by inflation rate with base 
year in 2000. We use Chow stability test for panel data in model 3 and 4.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Capital Structure Risk and Capital 2000-04 2005-09
Baseline Preferred Preferred Preferred
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The results in Table 4.4 confirm consistent and stable parameters with the 
baseline and preferred models. The variables have similar coefficients and they 
are positively significant to the total costs. The main contributor for cost is the 
price of labor followed by price of fixed asset. Time trend shows that total 
costs decrease over the time.  
Model 1 shows that capital ratio is negative but not really significant. It shows 
that the higher the bank‘s capital the lower the cost. High bank capital means 
that the bank has fewer portfolios in the form of loans or the bank has mostly 
performing loans. Model 2 shows that the higher a bank‘s risk the higher bank 
cost. The capital ratio also shows negative and not really a significant result. 
Model 3 and 4 are the reduced sample based on the implementation of 
Indonesian Banking Architecture in 2004. A Chow test for parameter stability 
confirms the suggestion that the banking market has undergone a structural 
change. In the reduced sample, the results are also consistent with the preferred 
model. Most of the prices in Model 4 are relatively higher compared to the 
preferred model. The prices are still positive and significant except for fixed 
assets and securities. This is probably because the banks had more investment 
in the physical capital during 2000-2004. The securities variable is insignificant 
is because the decrease of securities holdings from 2000 to 2009 (See table 2.5) 
had caused lower prices to analyse and administer the securities.   
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Efficiency Score of Different Ownership 
Table 4.5 Cost efficiency estimates 
 
 
Year Mean
Std 
Deviation Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum No of obs
2000 0.43 0.05 0.35 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.52 11
2001 0.43 0.05 0.35 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.52 44
2002 0.45 0.04 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.53 36
2003 0.45 0.05 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.53 28
2004 0.47 0.05 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.54 20
2005 0.48 0.04 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.54 20
2006 0.49 0.04 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.55 20
2007 0.49 0.04 0.44 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.55 20
2008 0.50 0.04 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.56 20
2009 0.50 0.04 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.52 0.56 15
2000 0.37 0.08 0.19 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.61 28
2001 0.38 0.08 0.19 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.61 112
2002 0.38 0.07 0.20 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.62 116
2003 0.39 0.08 0.20 0.35 0.37 0.40 0.62 108
2004 0.39 0.08 0.21 0.35 0.37 0.41 0.62 108
2005 0.40 0.08 0.21 0.36 0.38 0.41 0.63 88
2006 0.39 0.07 0.22 0.36 0.38 0.41 0.63 84
2007 0.40 0.07 0.22 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.64 76
2008 0.40 0.08 0.23 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.64 64
2009 0.42 0.07 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.65 45
2000
2001
2002 0.41 0.07 0.36 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.45 8
2003 0.44 0.05 0.36 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.48 16
2004 0.42 0.04 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.46 0.48 28
2005 0.45 0.07 0.38 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.60 40
2006 0.45 0.07 0.36 0.40 0.45 0.48 0.61 44
2007 0.43 0.07 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.48 0.61 64
2008 0.44 0.07 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.48 0.62 64
2009 0.44 0.07 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.49 0.62 48
2000 0.42 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.34 0.41 0.92 21
2001 0.43 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.92 84
2002 0.36 0.11 0.24 0.28 0.34 0.40 0.67 72
2003 0.36 0.10 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.67 64
2004 0.37 0.10 0.26 0.31 0.35 0.40 0.68 64
2005 0.37 0.10 0.26 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.68 64
2006 0.36 0.06 0.27 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.44 60
2007 0.36 0.06 0.27 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.45 60
2008 0.36 0.07 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.41 0.45 60
2009 0.37 0.07 0.23 0.31 0.38 0.42 0.46 45
Old 
Foreign 
Banks
This table shows the descriptive statistics of cost efficiency by ownership. State-owned banks refer to the bank wholly 
owned by the government; Domestic private owned banks refer to those banks whose private domestic ownership is 
greater than 50% of total ownership. New foreign banks  refer to those banks whose foreign ownership is greater than 
50% of total ownership since 2000, and old foreign banks refer to those banks whose foreign ownership is greater than 
50% of total ownership before 2000. The cost efficiency is estimated using preferred model (translog cost function of 
two outputs, three inputs, non performing loan ratio, dummy old foreign bank and yearly time dummies).
New 
Foreign 
Banks
State-
owned 
Banks
Domestic 
private 
owned 
banks
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Table 4.5 reports the descriptive statistics for the cost efficiency estimates of 
the different type of banks operating in Indonesia‘s domestic market. The 
estimation is performed based on the preferred model.  
The perfectly cost efficient bank is the old foreign banks that exhibits a cost 
efficiency estimate equal to 92%. This means that this bank has costs 8.0% 
higher than the frontier. The lowest cost efficient is domestic private owned 
banks by 27.5%. In general, the highest cost efficiency score is the state-owned 
banks, followed by new foreign banks, domestic private owned banks and old 
foreign banks.  
Although state owned banks have higher cost efficiency scores, the average of 
cost efficiency and the standard deviation of other type of banks are only 
slightly different. The Kruskal-Wallis test confirms that the cost efficiency of 
different types of banks is all statistically significant different. The null 
hypothesis that all five types of banks are equal is rejected at the 1% level (Chi-
squared= 514.4 with 3 degrees of freedom). 
Table 4.6 Cost efficiency of the new foreign banks 
 
Finally, table 4.6 shows the results of individual banks‘ cost efficiency change 
from September 2000 to 2009. These scores are calculated based on the results 
No
Type of banks before acquisition
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 % change
1 State-owned banks 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.51 3.76
2 State-owned banks 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 3.35
3 State-owned banks 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 4.54
4 State-owned banks 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 3.83
5 State-owned banks 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49 4.29
6 State-owned banks 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 2.65
7 Domestic private owned banks 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.58
8 Domestic private owned banks 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 3.29
9 Domestic private owned banks 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49 2.69
10 Domestic private owned banks 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 1.35
11 Domestic private owned banks 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 1.63
12 Domestic private owned banks 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 1.66
13 Domestic private owned banks 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 1.66
14 Domestic private owned banks 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.40 2.81
15 Domestic private owned banks 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 2.23
16 Domestic private owned banks 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 2.17
17 Domestic private owned banks 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 1.08
The table presents average cost efficiency of seventeen new foreign banks. The banks are distinguished based on types of ownership before foreign acquisitions. State 
owned bank refers to the banks wholly owned by the government including some banks recapitalised after the crisis in 1998. Domestic private owned bank refers to 
banks that were owned by domestic private owners before the acquisitions. The grey square indicated the year of the acquisition took place. % change is the change 
between one year before acquisitions and the year end of period. The bank in number 7 was merged after acquisition in 2007. 
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from the preferred model.  The cost efficiency of the banks improves slightly 
after the acquisitions. The average improvement of the cost efficiency of the 
seventeen banks one year before and at the end of period is 2.56%. The highest 
improvement is only 4.5% (See table 4.6). The second lowest improvement is 
merely 1.08%. The bank with lowest improvement was merged to other bank 
after acquired by foreign investor.   
The banks owned by the government before acquisition seems to have higher 
improvement than the banks that were previously owned by private domestic. 
This is mainly because the previously state-owned banks were acquired longer 
than the other banks were. In the future, the banks that hire more skilled 
workers and install better working environments will further increased in 
efficiency. 
 
4.5. Conclusions 
The extant research on Indonesian bank efficiency is very limited and 
background information on the Indonesian banking system is not widely 
known. 
The main goals of this paper are to try to fill in these gaps in the research 
literature in particular in order to help address issues of efficiency effect on 
foreign bank during Indonesian banking consolidation period. We analyze 
efficiency using quarterly panel observations over 2000-2009 on banks 
operating in Indonesian banking markets. We estimate a translog functional 
form and analyze the cost efficiency of Indonesian banks.  
The analysis suggests several conclusions about banking efficiency in 
Indonesia. First, the mean efficiency in Indonesia‘s banking sector was found 
to be in the range of 40-50%. It also means that, on average, all the sample 
banks would have increased their efficiency (through lower costs) by about 50-
60% had they been operating on the efficiency frontier. Second, foreign 
98 
 
ownership have positive effect on improved cost efficiency of the acquired 
banks both in terms of the average cost efficiency and its change over time. 
However, the change in efficiency effect over time is small. Third, it appears 
that state-owned banks have the best cost efficiency compared to other banks 
and although old foreign banks are able to maintain comparable efficiency to 
the new foreign banks, there is some evidence that old foreign banks‘ 
efficiency tend to worsen over the studied period.  
The major qualification of these conclusions is that efficiency is only a relative 
measure against the best practice bank within the sample.  
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Chapter 5 The Role of Banks in Monetary Policy 
Transmission in Indonesia 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the bank lending channel in Indonesia using monthly 
cross-sectional differences in micro-level data in the period from September 
2000 from 2009. Following Erhmann et al. (2003), the investigation concerns 
the response of bank lending to monetary shocks, together with the influence 
on this response of bank size, liquidity and capitalisation. This study uses two 
mean of the monetary policy stance, the one month Certificate of Bank 
Indonesia‘s interest rate and a constructed narrative index. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section 5.2 presents an 
overview of Indonesia‘s monetary development. Section 5.3 discusses literature 
review about theory of bank lending channel, review of empirical studies in 
general and emerging markets. Section 5.4 describes the data and estimation 
methodology. Section 5.5 explains the econometric specification and 
estimations. Section 5.6 presents the empirical results and robustness checks 
and Section 5.7 provides conclusion and policy implications.  
5.2. Monetary Policy Developments 
The major change in the conduct of monetary policy in Indonesia in the 
aftermath of the 1997–98‘s Asian crisis was act No 23 Year 1999 that gives 
Bank Indonesia full autonomy in formulating and implementing monetary 
policies. First, the objective of the central bank focuses on achieving and 
maintaining the stability of the Rupiah value. Second, the central bank has been 
given independence in conducting its monetary policy, while the government in 
coordination with the central bank will set the inflation target. The act demands 
Bank Indonesia to set target of inflation rate every year, and directs its 
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monetary policy to achieve such a target. This becomes the base of the 
implementation of inflation target framework. 
In 2000-2003, Bank Indonesia adopted base money as the operational target as 
well as an anchor to achieve the ultimate target. It also began monitoring 
various aggregates as well as interest rates. There were a number of 
shortcomings in the use of base money as the operating target, such as the 
difficulties in achieving the target and the poor signal it transmits to the market. 
Such a poor signal of monetary policy direction and targets fails to meet the 
need to guide maintain market expectations on future exchange rate and 
interest rate movements (Goeltom, 2008). 
Table 5.1 
Selected monetary indicators 
 
 
 
 
In 2005, the Inflation Targeting (IT) policy was officially launched as the new 
monetary policy framework. Under the IT framework, the inflation target 
represents the overriding monetary objective set by the Indonesian government 
after coordination with BI. The authorities have initially allowed the headline 
inflation to fluctuate between the ranges of 9 ± 1% in 2003, before gradually 
revising the headline inflation target downward to 4.5 ± 1% for 2008 (see table 
5.1). 
Year M2 M1 M0 BI-rate Loan
Target Outcome (%)
2000 5 9.35 747,027        162,185      125,615      14.31 254,730        
2001 6 12.55 844,054        177,731      127,795      17.63 294,000        
2002 10 10.03 883,908        191,939      138,250      13.12 357,711        
2003 9.0  (+/-1%) 5.16 944,366        213,784      728,787      8.31 439,156        
2004 5.5 (+/-1%) 6.40 1,033,877      245,946      785,261      7.43 545,511        
2005 6.0   (+/-1%) 17.11 1,202,762      271,140      929,343      12.75 692,917        
2006 8.0  (+/-1%) 6.60 1,382,493      347,013      1,032,865   9.75 802,796        
2007 6.0  (+/-1%) 6.59 1,649,662      450,055      1,196,119   8.00 993,479        
2008 5.0   (+/-1%) 11.06 1,895,839      456,787      1,435,772   9.25 1,201,388      
2009 4.5  (+/- 1%) 2.78 2,141,384      515,824      402,118      6.5 1,446,808      
CPI (%)
CPI is consumer price index. Money supply (M2, M1 and M0) and Loan is in billion of Rupiah. M0 is base 
money. M1 consist of currency and demand deposits. M2 consist of M1 plus time deposit, saving deposit. BI-
rate is determined by Bank Indonesia. Source: Bank Indonesia. Various years. Monetary Policy Review.
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There are two concerns facing Bank Indonesia in its efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of policy rate transmission to bank lending (Indonesia economic 
report 2009). The first is the excess liquidity in Indonesian banking. Bank 
Indonesia‘s researches showed that if excess banking liquidity is failed to be 
absorbed by the authority, it will in turn pose a potential pressure on monetary 
stability, inflation and exchange rate. They also argue that excess banking 
liquidity poses the potential problem to monetary policy transmission 
(Indonesia‘s economic report, 2009). 
The second is related to the normal and crisis economic condition.  In a normal 
situation or while the economy is expanding, the sensitivity of monetary policy 
against aggregate macroeconomic variables seems to work in accordance with 
a general concept. Meanwhile when opposite condition occurs such as during 
the global crisis a corrected response manifested in lending rate cut following 
the drop in BI Rate. The slow response in lending rate cut will later lead to the 
drop in credit extension while the existence of a financial constraint will further 
shrink intermediation. Bank‘s behaviour to hoard their liquidity caused an 
increase in non-performing loans due to the weakening condition of real sector.   
 
5.3. Literature Review 
Over the last decades, there has been a large economic literature on monetary 
policy transmission mechanisms. This section will discuss theory of bank 
lending channel, followed by a review of empirical studies in bank lending 
channel. 
There are differing theoretical perspectives on money transmission. Older 
views such as the basic Keynesian IS-LM framework suggest that policy-
makers control or directly influence the stock of bank deposits (broad money) 
and that this feeds through via ―money multiplier‖ into bank lending. Therefore 
the changes of bank deposits play a primary role. A variation on this, central 
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banks influence longer term interest rates and asset prices and this determines 
holdings of deposits. 
5.3.1. Classical interest rate or money view 
This view focuses on the liability side of bank balance sheet. The important 
role played by banks in this transmission mechanism arises from the reserve 
requirement constraint faced by banks. Thus, shifts in monetary policy that 
change the quantity of outside money (bank reserves and bank notes) result in a 
change in inside money in the form of the reservable deposit that can be created 
in the banking system. 
5.3.2. The broad credit channel 
The research in this area was motivated by the puzzle that monetary policy 
shocks that had relatively small effects on long-term real interest rates appeared 
to have substantial effects on aggregate demand. This literature attributes the 
amplification of the monetary policy shocks to frictions in the credit markets 
(See e.g. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1996; Bean, Larsen and Nikolov 
2002).   
It is predicated on credit market imperfections associated with moral hazard 
problem in principal agent relationship in a debt contract. Because of the 
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, external finance is an 
imperfect substitute for a firm‘s internal funds. 
The broad credit channel posits that an increase in interest rates associated with 
a tightening of monetary policy causes deterioration in firm health, in terms of 
net worth. A firm‘s net worth is adversely impacted as the lower cash flows 
emanating from the firm‘s assets are discounted using the higher interest rates 
associated with the tightening monetary policy. The deterioration in the 
collateral value of the firm‘s assets, in turn cause an increase in the external 
finance premium paid by the firm to get funding. This increase in the cost of 
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external funds for borrowers over and above the risk free interest rate then 
result in a reduction in aggregate demand. 
5.3.3. The bank lending channel 
The bank lending channel focuses not on borrowers, but on the effect of credit 
market imperfections on the intermediation function of banks. Bank lending 
channel is not actually an alternative view to the classical monetary 
transmission mechanism. It is just a set of features that intensify and extend 
traditional interest rate effects and is not a truly independent mechanism 
(Bernanke and Gertler 1995). 
In a simple world with three assets -money, bonds and loans- three condition 
must be satisfied for the bank lending channel to be operational in the 
transmission of monetary policy (See e.g. Bernanke and Blinder 1988; Kashyap 
and Stein 1994). First, prices must not adjust fully and instantaneous to a 
change in the money supply. That is, money is not neutral. Second, open 
market operations must affect the supply of bank loans. Third, loans and bonds 
must not be prefect substitutes as a source of credit for at least some borrowers. 
Because only the second and third conditions distinguish the bank lending 
channel from the classical view, and because substantial evidence exists that 
wages and prices are not perfectly flexible, that the first conditions holds will 
be assumed for this discussion. 
With respect to the second condition, open market operations reduce reserves. 
However, banks do have choice, and individual banks do differ with respect to 
how, and to what extent, they respond to this decline in reserves. If reduced 
reserves constraint their ability to issue deposits, then banks must either raise 
liabilities to replace the lost deposits, or reduce assets such as securities and 
loans. To the extent that banks do not regard other sources of funds as perfect 
substitutes for deposits, they will not fully replace the lost reservable deposits, 
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and thus must shrink their assets in order to keep total assets in line with their 
reduced volume of liabilities. 
Asymmetric information and credit market frictions will play an important role 
in determining how an individual bank will respond on the liability side of its 
balance sheet. Banks primarily use wholesale deposits, as the marginal source 
of funds during a period of monetary policy tightening. 
Given that some shrinkage in bank assets will occur, a bank must then decide 
on the distribution of that shrinkage across the various assets held in its 
portfolio. Because securities are relatively liquid, one would certainly expect 
banks to shrink their holdings of securities. However, to the extent that banks 
do not consider securities and loans to be perfect substitute in their asset 
portfolio, one would expect that at least part of the adjustment in assets would 
be composed of a shrinkage in the volume of their loan portfolio (even though 
initially the loan portfolio might temporarily grow from distress borrowing as 
loan customers access credit from previously established loan commitments 
and lines of credit (Morgan, 1988)). 
Asymmetric information and credit market frictions also play an important role 
in determining the extent to which firms consider bonds and non-bank 
intermediated loans as perfect substitutes for bank loans. To distinguish the 
broad credit channel from the bank lending channel, one must address the 
degree to which borrowers consider non-bank sources of credit as perfect 
substitutes for bank loans.  
Milne and Wood (2009) drop the assumption that reserves constrain the 
volume of deposits. They argue that as a result constraints on the wholesale 
funding of bank balance sheets attenuate rather than amplifies the transmission 
of monetary policy through what is called the ‗bank lending channel‘. They 
show (assuming that policy makers can influence interest rates) that the effect 
of such bank balance sheet constraints on monetary transmission is 
theoretically ambiguous, with the prior expectation, based on standard 
105 
 
theoretical models of household and corporate portfolios, that the bank lending 
channel attenuates monetary policy transmission. To test, they examine 
macroeconomic data for the G8 countries and find no evidence that banking 
sector deposits respond negatively and more than lending to tightening of 
monetary policy, as the accepted view of the bank lending channel requires. A 
similar analysis is provided by Disyatat 2010. 
The main conclusion for this review of the theoretical studies is that the theory 
is ambiguous about the role of banks in money transmission; the deposit story 
suggests that constrained banks (low liquidity and capital) will respond more to 
policy than unconstrained banks. This is because it cannot cover the loss of 
deposits by obtaining funds from market or wholesale funding. Other view 
suggest the opposite that constrained banks are unable to respond to interest 
rate changes and so respond less to policy than unconstrained bank. It becomes 
a matter for empirical investigation whether the effect is amplifies or attenuates 
and how large it is. 
 
5.3.4. Review of empirical studies 
In this section, we review the relevant empirical papers, measures of monetary 
policy and studies in developed and developing countries.  
5.3.4.1. Empirical studies in developed countries  
The earliest studies of the bank lending channel employed aggregate data, 
comparing the relationship between total bank loans versus total deposits and 
the economic variables in the context of vector auto regressions (see Bernanke 
and Blinder, 1992) or the relative forecasting power of the two aggregates with 
respect to output fluctuations (Ramey, 1993, Kim, 1999, among others). 
However, it is now widely agreed that testing with aggregate data can generate 
a misleading conclusion. First, the use of aggregate time series cannot resolve 
the well-known identification problem, i.e. to distinguish whether the credit 
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contraction which typically follows the monetary tightening is a result of a 
reduced supply by banks, as argued by the bank lending channel, or the fall in 
demand for bank loans stemming from a recession. Second, testing the relative 
importance of the bank lending versus the money view by comparing the 
information content of these two aggregates with respect to output would be 
misleading (Bernanke, 1993). Due to bank balance sheet constraints, aggregate 
money supply (liability side of banks) and aggregate bank loans (assets side of 
banks) by construction move together, even though they are not identical. Thus 
the relative forecasting power of these two aggregate variables provides little 
information about monetary transmissions. 
To identify the channel of monetary policy, recent studies (Kashyap and Stein, 
1995, 2000; Dale and Haldane, 1995, Kakes, 2000, for example) have used 
cross sectional data to determine whether there are distributional effects of 
monetary policy across lenders and borrowers, as predicted by the bank lending 
channel argument. On the lenders side, the lending view suggests that a 
monetary policy shock should constrain bank loan supply since banks cannot 
frictionless raise non-deposit funds to make up for a shortfall in their deposits. 
But this will depend on the ability of banks to insulate them from the shock. 
Small banks which have relatively limited access to non-deposit funds such as 
securities issues or foreign borrowings are expected to be more affected by the 
monetary shock and to tend to cut their loan supplies immediately following 
the shock. On the borrower side, small firms that have limited access to 
external finance should be more sensitive to a monetary shock (Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1994). 
Erhmann et al. (2003) use data for banks based in the euro area. They find that 
factors such as the size or the degree of capitalisation of a bank are generally 
not important for the way bank adjust its lending to interest rate changes. Their 
result is opposed to findings for the USA (Kashyap and Stein, 2000 and Kishan 
and Opiela, 2000) where small and less capitalised banks show a 
disproportionately strong response to monetary policy.  
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Table 5.2 
Summary of monetary policy transmission studies in developed countries 
Author Data  Country Econometric 
technique 
Variables Results 
Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992) 
1959:1- 
1978:12 
US VAR The funds rate, the unemployment rate, the 
CPI, deposits, securities, and loans. 
Monetary policy works at least in part 
through bank loans as well as through bank 
deposits. 
Ramey (1993) 1954:1-
1991:12 
US IV  
&VECM 
Loans, securities, short-term debt, IPI, Ml, 
M2, CPI, the Fed Funds rate, Treasury bills 
rate, CP rate, and Boshen & Mills index. 
In most cases, the credit variables play an 
insignificant role in the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on output. 
Gertler and Glchrist 
(1994) 
1958:4-
1986:4 
US VAR Sales, inventories, and short-term debt, real 
GNP, inflation, and federal funds rate. 
Small firms account for a significantly 
disproportionate share of the 
manufacturing decline that follows 
tightening of monetary policy. 
Kashyap and Stein 
(1995) 
1976-
1992:Q2 
US OLS and IV Fed fund rate, core deposit, CPI, and GDP Loan and security portfolios of large and 
small banks respond differentially to a 
contraction in monetary policy. 
Dale and Haldane (1995) 1974:6 -
1992:10 
UK VAR interest and exchange rates, stock prices, 
money, credit, and prices 
The use of sectoral data facilitates the 
identification of distinct money and credit 
channels in the transmission of monetary 
policy.  
Kim (1999) 1965:3 
1997:5 
US, UK, 
Germany, Japan, 
France, Italy and 
Canada 
VAR Call money rate, M2, M1, CPI, industrial 
production, and the world export 
commodity price index in terms of domestic 
currency.  
Monetary policy shocks have significant 
effects on output in the short run.  
Kakes (2000) 1979:1-
1993:4 
Netherlands VECM Loans, interest rate on bank loans,  
long term interest rate, real GDP, bond 
holdings. 
High liquid bank is less responsive to the 
monetary policy shocks. 
Kishan and Opiela 
(2000) 
1980 to 
1995 
US Panel data Loans, the Fed funds rate, Bernanke- Mihov 
index, securities, time deposit 
Small banks and poorly capitalised banks 
reduce their loan supply more after a 
monetary contraction 
Erhmann et al. (2003) 2000-
2008 
Euro countries GMM Loans, nominal short-term interest rate, 
GDP, CPI, bank characteristics:  asset, 
liquidity and capital. 
Less liquid banks respond more to the 
change of monetary policy.  
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5.3.4.2. Empirical studies in developing countries  
The macroeconomic environment in emerging economies has been 
characterised by high risk in banking system, high inflation rate, fixed or 
managed floating exchange rate regime and the under develop capital markets. 
Hence transmission channels in emerging economies can be expected to differ 
from those in industrial countries. Much uncertainty surrounded the impact of 
monetary policy on prices and output and the channels through which they 
occurred (Mohanty and Turner, 2008). 
There are only a few studies of the role of banks in developing country‘s 
monetary transmission. Survey by Mohanty and Turner (2008) show that bank 
credit appears to have a significant influence on investment in emerging market 
economies. This finding does not change even after controlling for several 
demand factors (such as output, exports and the real interest rate), suggesting 
that the supply of bank credit does play a role in influencing fluctuations in 
investment spending. In addition, the relative impact of bank credit on 
investment varies across regions: the impact is stronger in Latin America and 
central and Eastern Europe than in Asia. 
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Table 5.3 
Summary of monetary policy transmission studies in developing countries 
 
Author Period  Country Econometric 
Technique 
Variables Results 
Agung et al. (2002) 1991:01-
2000:12 
Indonesia Panel data  Loans, SBI interest rate,  interbank 
rates, dummy capitalisation, deposits, 
real GDP, and total assets  
Low capitalised bank respond more to 
the shock in monetary policy especially 
during crisis.  
Zulverdi et al. (2006) 1996:01-
2004:03 
Indonesia Panel data Loan, SBI interest rate, deposit rate, 
NPL, CAR, risk weighted assets on 
loans (risk perception). 
Bank with higher risk perception will 
decrease bank loans during monetary 
policy change.  
Charoenseang and Manakit 
(2007) 
2000:06-
2006:07 
Thailand VAR Loan, repo rate,  private investment 
index, and core inflation rate 
Credit channel through commercial 
bank lending is a valid monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. 
Matousek and Sarantis 
(2007) 
1994-
2003 
Czech Rep, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovak Rep & Slovenia 
GMM Loans, nominal short-term interest rate, 
GDP, CPI, GDP growth rate, inflation. 
Bank characteristics:  asset, liquidity 
and capital. 
Small and low liquid banks respond 
more to changes in monetary policy 
Goeltom (2008) 1997-
1998 
and 
2000:01-
2005:03 
Indonesia Panel data  Loans, SBI interest rate,  inter-bank 
rates, dummy capitalisation, deposits, 
real GDP, and total assets  
In tight monetary policy, private and 
regional banks reduce lending by 
rationing credit while state banks and 
foreign banks by raising the interest 
rate. 
Boughrara, A. and 
Ghazouani, S. (2009) 
Annual 
data: 
1989-
2007 
Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia 
GMM Loan, nominal interest rate,  
annual growth rate of real GDP, annual 
inflation rate, growth rate of real GDP, 
size, liquidity, capitalization. 
Characteristics of banks that respond 
more to monetary policy change are 
different. In Jordan, small and weak 
capital banks.  In Tunisia, small banks. 
In Morocco, low liquid banks. In 
Egypt, high capital banks.  
Kassim, S. and Majid MSA 
(2009) 
1989:01-
2006:12 
Malaysia ARDL Loans, deposits, consumer price index, 
industrial production index and  real 
effective exchange rate.  
Bank deposits and loans play crucial 
roles in the monetary transmission 
process in the economy. 
Bayangos, V.B. (2010) 2001:Q1 
to  
2009:Q2 
The Philippines GMM Loan, lending rate, personal 
consumption, gross domestic capital 
formation, CPI, wholesale price index , 
labor force and long-run inflation 
expectations, CAR & NPL 
Bank capital has the most significant 
effects on bank credit. 
GMM=Generalised Method of Moments; ARDL=Autoregressive Distributed Lag. 
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Table 5.3 summarised literature review of monetary policy transmission in 
developing countries. It can be divided based on the study uses aggregate data 
and disaggregate data. The studies using aggregate data is mostly based on 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and employ time series regression e.g. vector 
auto regression (VAR) or Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL). Meanwhile, 
disaggregated data estimations are based on the studies of Kashap and Stein 
(1995 and 2000). 
We begin with the studies using aggregate data. Charoenseang and Manakit 
(2007) use Thailand data from June 2000 to July 2006. The vector auto 
regression model is estimated for analyzing interest rate channel and credit 
channel. The dependent variable is 14-day repurchase rates on lending rate, 
private investment index, private consumption index, commercial bank credit 
to private sector, private investment index and core inflation rate. They find 
that the transmission of monetary policy through the interest rates channel is 
weak. Nonetheless, the credit channel through the commercial bank lending is 
still a strong channel of monetary transmission in Thailand. Study by Kassim, 
S. and Majid MSA (2009) using Malaysian data also find that both bank 
deposits and loans play crucial roles in the monetary transmission process in 
the economy. Healthy and stable banking system is a pre-condition towards the 
overall economic stability. 
The study using disaggregates data find the existence of the bank lending 
channel on different bank characteristics. Capital is found to be important 
indicator for Asian countries, Jordan and Egypt. Meanwhile, size and liquidity 
are crucial in CEE countries and MENA countries. 
Study using Indonesian data finds that the classical interest rate channel works 
quite well in transmitting monetary policy, even though its magnitude has been 
affected by conditions in the banking system and overall higher uncertainty and 
risk factors. The finding is also confirmed the bank lending channel existence. 
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The estimation using aggregate data show that a monetary shock is able to 
affect bank lending with a lag due to the ability of banks to insulate the 
decrease in deposits by liquidating their securities holdings. Different than the 
result for Thailand, the empirical findings from disaggregated Indonesian data 
indicate that private domestic banks, banks with low capital, and lending to 
household are more sensitive to monetary shocks. (Agung, and Warjiyo, 2002; 
Zulverdi et al. 2006; Goeltom 2008). 
In the Philippines, Bayangos, V.B. (2010) uses quarterly data from 2001:Q1 to 
2009:Q2 find that bank credit channel matters in Philippine monetary 
transmission mechanism and bank capital has the most significant effects on 
bank credit. 
Other studies in Central and Eastern Europe using dynamic panel data from 8 
CEE countries from 1994 to 2003 also find evidence of a bank lending channel 
in all countries, through the strength of it varies across countries. Bank size and 
liquidity seem to play the most significant role in distinguishing banks‘ 
reactions to changes in monetary policy. This supports the working hypothesis 
that liquid and large banks respond less to monetary policy change. The 
strongest evidence is found for the Czech Republic and the Baltic states while 
the weakest evidence is found for Hungary. Matousek and Sarantis (2007).  
 
5.4. Data and Methodology 
5.4.1. Data 
In this study, we compile a monthly balance sheet and income statement data 
for all reporting Indonesian banks over the period September 2000-2009. 
Although the original data include 120 financial intermediaries, for most of our 
analysis we restrict our sample to the 113 commercial banks. The remaining 
financial intermediaries are excluded because we do not have information on 
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their changes in liquidity and loans. The sample restriction, however, should 
not be a big concern for two reasons. First, the excluded financial 
intermediaries only make up 1% of overall lending. Second, the excluded 
institutions were not providing loans or taking deposits.  
During 2000-2009, there are five mergers events in Indonesia.
8
 To mitigate 
potential problems associated with banks moving between categories due to 
mergers, we form a bank sample with merger adjustments. Our merger-
adjusted data is based on the methodology adopted by Peek and Rosengren 
(1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2002) in which merged banks are treated as a 
single bank for the 12-24 months before the merger takes place. This will allow 
us to implement the estimation using lagged dependent variable as the 
regressor. This gives us a sample of 12,317 observations and 113 banks. 
 
Table 5.4  
Descriptive statistics of variables used 
 
 
 
                                              
8
 The five bank mergers are Bank Century (merger of Bank CIC, Bank Danpac and Bank Pikko), Bank 
Artha Graha International (merger between Bank Artha Graha and Bank Inter Pacific), Bank CIMB 
Niaga (merger between Bank Niaga and Bank Lippo), and Bank Windu Kencana Internasional (merger 
between Bank Windu Kencana and Bank Multicor)  
Variables Description Obs Mean Standard Min Max
Deviation
Dependent Variables
Total loans Investment loans, consumer loans and 
working capital loans
12,317 13.76 1.97 7.24 19.07
Short term loans Working capital loans 12,299 12.91 2.12 1.79 18.43
Independent Variables
Certificate of Bank Indonesia rates 1-month certificate of Bank Indonesia 
interest rates
12,317 10.80 3.29 6.48 17.67
Narrative monetary policy measure Index based on the reading on Bank 
Indonesia's Open Market Policy 
decisions.
12,317 -0.02 1.03 -2.00 2.00
Loan to asset ratio Total loans divided by total assets 12,317 0.12 1.81 -5.01 6.05
Liquidity to asset ratio Total liquidity divided by total assets 12,317 0.32 0.17 0.01 0.95
Capital to asset ratio Total capital divided by total assets 12,317 0.14 0.11 -0.86 0.94
Real Gross Domestic Product GDP is inflation adjusted with inflation 
to the base 2000
12,317 13.43 0.42 12.80 14.19
Prices Consumer price index 12,317 9.22 3.61 2.71 18.38
This table shows the desriptive statistics of all data and basic variables used in estimation. Most of variables are in percentage 
except total loan in log forms and narrative measure of monetary policy in index value from -2 (very tight) to 2 (very loose). 
Liquidity is total liquid assets (cash, reserves and short term securities), Capital is total Tier 1+Tier 2 divided by total assets. 
Sources: Bank Indonesia. Various years. CBI rate, GDP, CPI are from Monetary Policy Review. Banking data is unpublished.
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Table 5.4 lists the dependent and independent variables employed in the 
empirical specifications as well as their descriptive statistics. The dependent 
variable we feature first is total loans for estimating baseline regression and we 
also look at total short term loans for robustness checks. As independent 
variables we include an array of macroeconomic conditions and bank 
characteristics.  
GDP growth,  GDP, is available only quarterly, while both the interest rate 
changes and the inflation rate are measured monthly. Hence, to be consistent 
with the other macroeconomic measures, we interpolate GDP growth for all 
intermediary months using cubic-spline. 
We use two measures for the changes in monetary conditions: the first is the 
change in the 1 month Certificate of Bank Indonesia interest rate, and the 
second is narrative index based on reading from Bank Indonesia‘s Open 
Market Committee decision in press release, quarterly review and annual 
report. The use of variations in the short-term interest rate as a measure that 
proxies the change in the stance of monetary policy is in line with the literature 
analyzing the credit channel at the micro level (Agung et al. (2001) also used a 
1-month CB interest rate for Indonesian study). The narrative index is 
constructed similar to the approach used in the study of Boschen-Mills (1995).  
We utilize the Certificate Bank Indonesia interest rates as our first measure of 
monetary policy. That the Bank Indonesia rate might be a good indicator of 
monetary policy since it has the strong positive correlation with the Bank 
Indonesia‘ policy rate. Agung (1998) argues that the money market interest rate 
(interbank money market) as the monetary policy variable by arguing that Bank 
Indonesia often indirectly targets the interbank interest rates and SBI rates 
which have been widely used as the benchmark by the market, in particular 
since the banks‘ holding of SBIs increased dramatically. The problem of using 
the SBI rates are the auction system has been changed few times although since 
2000 the auction system has not changed.  
114 
 
The 1-month Certificate Bank Indonesia rate is closely linked to Bank 
Indonesia‘s policy rate. 9 It makes the CBI rate a good proxy for monetary 
policy stance. However since 2008, the CBI rate has been higher than BI Policy 
rate. This is because the inflation rate has been decreasing but Bank Indonesia 
wants to absorb excess liquidity in the market. Bank Indonesia employs 
overnight FASBI to support the money market and to absorb bank‘s excess 
liquidity. It reduces the banks opportunity cost of holding deposits. This 
reflects the traditional view of bank lending channel not working properly since 
banks can obtain cheaper funds from the money market.   
Figure 5.1 The impact of money policy on bank funding 
 
1 month CBI rate is the end-of-period 1-month SBI interest rates published in Weekly Report 
of Bank Indonesia, Interbank is the overnight Indonesia‘s money market interest rates. Deposit 
is bank interest rates on its deposit customers and consumer price index. Source: Bank 
Indonesia‘s Monetary Statistics and National Statistic Bureau (various years). 
 
The 1 month CBI rate that is used as a proxy of monetary policy stance has 
been closely followed by deposit rate. Meanwhile the interbank rate has been 
                                              
9
 In Indonesian money market, there are five key interest rates namely Bank Indonesia policy rate as 
the monetary policy operational target, 1 month Certificate of Bank Indonesia rate, Interbank money 
market rate, Bank Indonesia facility rate and bank deposit rates. 
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lower than deposit rate. This gives banks an opportunity cost of holding 
deposits. The changes in monetary policy would significantly change the bank 
funding to interbank money which is cheaper. 
The other measure, the narrative index, measures routine monetary policy 
condition, relative to the previous month. For example, if interest rates in the 
previous month was equal or above the world rate, a more than 0.25 percentage 
rise (fall) in the Indonesian rate would be viewed as a tight (loose) monetary 
policy condition, and a policy action that does not substantively adjust the bank 
rate in relation to the world rate is considered neutral or passive. Effectively, 
we have five discrete scale -2, –1, 0, +1, and +2 corresponding to very tight, 
tight, neutral, loose and very loose monetary policy stance respectively. This 
categorisation mitigates the problem of lack of transition that is present in 
binary policy indices (Romer and Romer, 1989; Huang and Shen, 2001). 
Examples of the contractionary policy stance include all open market 
operations, which act to stimulate increases in short-term interest (or the Bank 
Indonesia policy rate – the 1 month Certificate Bank Indonesia) rates, increases 
in reserve requirements, and foreign exchange rationing. High nominal interest 
rate over and above the CPI inflation rate is considered restrictive; therefore 
those periods are indexed -2 or –1 depending on the magnitude of the increase. 
The expansionary policy measures include reduction in the 1 month CBI rates, 
reduction in the banks‘ reserve requirements, and the depreciation of the 
Rupiah per dollar rate. The neutral policy stance includes moral suasion or non 
reactionary towards the change of macroeconomic disequilibria. 
Based on the decision criteria, we can draw the graph of narrative index in 
Figure 5.2. We can see from the figure that the narrative index has quite similar 
path to the current benchmark – Certificate Bank Indonesia (CBI) 1 month rate. 
They have tight monetary policy periods during 2000-2001, 2005-2006 and 
2007-2008. It seems that we can use the narrative index for estimation. Finally, 
for the average inflation rate, we use consumer price index.  
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Figure 5.2 Measures of Monetary Policy -Narrative Index 
 
 
 
The composition of the pool of banks may change over time and different 
banks may have different behaviour in granting the loans to their borrowers. To 
control for these demand side effects, we include a broad set of bank 
characteristics in most specifications also bank fixed effects to control for time-
invariant unobservable bank characteristics, in robustness replaced by all-
encompassing bank -year and loan fixed effects to control for time-variant 
unobservable bank characteristics. We employ lagged values as economic and 
monetary conditions may determine the capital and liquidity ratios banks 
choose. 
The key bank balance-sheet variables we are interested are the bank‘s capital 
ratio as a measure of the bank‘s net worth and the liquidity ratio as a measure 
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of its liquidity position. The capital ratio is defined as the ratio of total Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital over total assets of the bank. The liquidity ratio is the ratio of 
liquid assets held by the bank (i.e., cash, reserves and short term securities) and 
the total assets of the bank. Given the skewness of its distribution we employ 
the natural logarithm of the ratio in all regressions.  
 
5.4.2. Model Specification 
In the following empirical approach, we combine size (total assets), liquidity 
(short term securities i.e certificate of Bank Indonesia) and capital (capital to 
asset ratio). We test empirically whether bank characteristics will have effect 
on the way bank respond to the change of monetary policy. The basic 
regression of full model is thus 
             
 
   
                      
 
   
              
 
   
           
 
   
                  
 
   
       
          
 
   
                   
 
   
      
                                                                                              
 
where i=1, …, N and t=1, …, T. N denotes the number of banks, T the total 
number of time periods (monthly); L denotes total loans, MPI denotes 
monetary policy measures i.e 1-month certificate of Bank Indonesia‘s interest 
rates or narrative index, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inf denotes inflation, x 
denotes bank characteristics: size, liquidity and capitalisation.    denotes 
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interaction between bank‘s characteristics and monetary policy measures or 
GDP or inflation, and finally      denotes error term. 
The specification is in growth rates. The reasons are two-fold: first, we are 
interested in capturing the differences in the reactions of banks to monetary 
shocks across bank characteristics, and second, the specification in growth rates 
is to circumvent unit root problem. 
The specification described by equation (5.1), estimated using the Generalized 
Method of Moments designed by Arellano and Bond (1991) (hereinafter 
―AB‖). We use this methodology because of the inclusion of lagged dependent 
variable as an explanatory variable
10
. The methodology also accounts for the 
possible endogeneity of some variables, as is probably the case with the bank 
characteristics. AB‘s methodology first differences the autoregressive model in 
order to eliminate the individual effect and ―optimally exploits‖ the moment 
conditions using the lagged values dated t-3 and earlier of the dependent 
variable and lagged values of the predetermined variables as instruments. This 
ensures efficiency and consistency in the hypothesis of large N and small T, 
and provided that the model is not subject to serial correlation in it ε and that 
the set of instrument variables used is valid (which is tested with the Sargan 
test). Should the disturbances not be serially correlated, it will be evidence of 
significant negative first-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals 
and no evidence of second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. 
AB designs both 1-step estimation and a 2-step estimation. The difference 
between them consists in the specification of an individual specific weighting 
matrix. The 2-step estimation uses the 1-step‘s residuals, so it is more efficient. 
                                              
10
 The presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors in a specification considering the 
individual effect brings about the situation of a right-hand regressor correlated with the error term. In 
this case, OLS estimation would be biased and inconsistent. The Within estimator would be biased of 
O(1/T) and its consistency depends on T being large; the random effect GLS estimator in a dynamic 
panel data model is also biased; the instrumental variable (IV) estimation assures consistency but not 
necessarily efficiency, since it does not use all the available moment conditions and it does not consider 
the differenced structure of the residuals. Also, an MLE approach would require strong assumptions on 
the initial conditions and the distribution of the individual effect. See Baltagi (2008) for a complete 
analysis. 
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The bank characteristics (x) are those motivated by the underlying theory of the 
bank lending channel are defined in the following way: 
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(5.4) 
 
where      represents total assets,      represents liquid assets, and       
represents total capital (Tier1+Tier2), The bank characteristics are normalized 
with respect to their average across all banks in the respective sample to 
eliminate possible trends.  
The parameters of interest are those in front of narrative indices and CBI rate 
(  ), which are meant to capture the direct overall impact of monetary policy 
changes on the growth in bank lending, and the coefficients in front of the 
interaction terms (  ), based on which we assess whether the considered bank 
characteristic makes any difference in the way banks react to monetary policy 
changes.  
The coefficient in front of the bank characteristic ( ) has also an illustrative 
role, describing whether there is a linear relationship between the growth rate 
of loans and the bank characteristic. Given that there is no prior analysis to 
address the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy changes at the micro 
level in Indonesia, for a preliminary insight into whether the growth rate of 
loans responds to monetary policy shocks and macroeconomic conditions we 
first estimate a ―baseline or benchmark model‖, which does not include the 
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bank characteristic (x) and the interaction between the bank characteristic and 
monetary policy measure.  
After conducting the estimation, we then test the null hypothesis of long run 
coefficients that the sum of the coefficient of the various lags of the indicated 
variable divided by one minus the sum of the coefficients on the lagged 
endogenous variable are zero. We also test the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are zero. Finally, we calculated the estimated standard error of the 
long run coefficients using the delta method.   
 
5.5. Empirical Results 
5.5.1. Baseline Model 
In this section we present regression result in table 5.5 and 5.6. The difference 
between the tables is in the choice of monetary policy measures. We report 
result using 1-month certificate Bank Indonesia rate in table 5.5 and using the 
narrative index in table 5.6.  In the tables, each column shows the results from 
one of the specifications-first models with one of the bank characteristics each, 
and then one model with all three characteristics simultaneously. We also 
present the long run coefficients of bank characteristics.  
In our model, the bank lending channel operates via the banks‘ characteristics, 
and our results show that there is a statistical significant relation between the 
banks‘ characteristics and loans in the interaction terms. Table 5.5 presents a 
complete list of coefficient estimates, standard error and associated p-values.  
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Table 5.5 
Monetary policy transmission, 3 lags GMM estimates and long run coefficients 
(1 month CBI rate) 
 
 
Variable
Explanatory variables Coeff Std error p-value Coeff Std error p-value Coeff Std error p-value Coeff Std error p-value
Lagged 1 loans -0.677 0.001 0.000 -0.519 0.001 0.000 -0.674 0.001 0.000 -0.509 0.002 0.000
Lagged 2 loans -0.451 0.001 0.000 -0.531 0.001 0.000 -0.442 0.001 0.000 -0.515 0.002 0.000
Lagged 3 loans -0.416 0.001 0.000 -0.476 0.001 0.000 -0.408 0.001 0.000 -0.452 0.003 0.000
Lagged 1 certificate BI int rate (CBI) 0.520 0.008 0.000 1.330 0.042 0.000 -0.093 0.014 0.000 -0.285 0.097 0.003
Lagged 2 certificate BI int rate CBI) 0.217 0.007 0.000 -0.434 0.034 0.000 -0.043 0.010 0.000 -0.058 0.057 0.307
Lagged 3 certificate BI int rate (CBI) 0.147 0.005 0.000 0.790 0.038 0.000 -0.039 0.009 0.000 -0.029 0.069 0.678
Long run coefficient CBI 0.347 0.005 0.000 0.667 0.028 0.000 -0.069 -0.008 0.000 -0.150 -0.070 0.031
Lagged 1 GDP 0.795 0.015 0.000 1.904 0.121 0.000 0.202 0.078 0.010 0.558 0.395 0.157
Lagged 2 GDP 0.438 0.021 0.000 -1.228 0.062 0.000 0.423 0.093 0.000 0.444 0.303 0.142
Lagged 3 GDP -0.099 0.017 0.000 0.406 0.193 0.000 0.427 0.060 0.000 0.826 0.458 0.071
Long run coefficient GDP 0.446 0.016 0.000 0.428 0.074 0.000 0.417 0.042 0.000 0.738 0.252 0.003
Lagged 1 CPI -0.423 0.012 0.000 -1.611 0.039 0.000 -0.056 0.028 0.046 0.364 0.423 0.388
Lagged 2 CPI -0.221 0.012 0.000 0.066 0.030 0.000 0.320 0.034 0.000 0.509 0.510 0.319
Lagged 3 CPI 0.100 0.015 0.000 0.338 0.045 0.000 -0.013 0.041 0.749 0.325 0.423 0.443
Long run coefficient CPI -0.214 -0.010 0.000 -0.478 -0.021 0.000 0.099 0.013 0.000 0.484 0.152 0.002
Lagged 1 GDP*lagged 1 asset -0.167 0.008 0.000 -0.749 0.058 0.000
Lagged 2 GDP*lagged 1 asset -0.127 0.010 0.000 0.030 0.035 0.402
Lagged 3 GDP*lagged 1 asset 0.063 0.011 0.000 0.452 0.036 0.000
Lagged 1 GDP*lagged 1 liquidity -3.719 0.358 0.000 1.980 0.967 0.041
Lagged 2 GDP*lagged 1 liquidity 3.785 0.169 0.000 0.061 0.633 0.923
Lagged 3 GDP*lagged 1 liquidity -0.079 0.598 0.000 -1.863 1.172 0.112
Lagged 1 GDP*lagged 1 capital 0.167 0.546 0.760 -5.892 2.298 0.010
Lagged 2 GDP*lagged 1 capital -0.079 0.675 0.907 -0.897 1.617 0.579
Lagged 3 GDP*lagged 1 capital -1.335 0.345 0.000 1.682 1.290 0.192
Lagged 1 CPI*lagged 1 asset 0.196 0.011 0.000 0.118 0.022 0.000
Lagged 2 CPI*lagged 1 asset 0.092 0.008 0.000 0.020 0.021 0.346
Lagged 3 CPI*lagged 1 asset 0.196 0.015 0.000 -0.098 0.031 0.002
Lagged 1 CPI*lagged 1 liquidity 3.326 0.101 0.000 -0.103 1.060 0.923
Lagged 2 CPI*lagged 1 liquidity 0.111 0.078 0.000 -1.515 1.463 0.300
Lagged 3 CPI*lagged 1 liquidity -1.076 0.127 0.000 0.614 1.169 0.599
Lagged 1 CPI*lagged 1 capital -0.915 0.196 0.000 -4.517 1.069 0.000
Lagged 2 CPI*lagged 1 capital -2.191 0.294 0.000 -1.524 1.184 0.198
Lagged 3 CPI*lagged 1 capital 0.059 0.304 0.846 -2.459 1.257 0.050
Lagged 1 Assets (Size) -0.057 0.004 0.000 -0.062 0.003 0.000
Lagged 1 CBI*lagged 1 asset -0.044 0.006 0.000 -0.432 0.036 0.000
Lagged 2 CBI*lagged 1 asset -0.039 0.003 0.000 -0.126 0.012 0.000
Lagged 3 CBI*lagged 1 asset -0.007 0.003 0.012 -0.055 0.008 0.000
Long run coefficient assets -0.035 -0.004 0.000 -0.248 -0.022 0.000
Lagged 1 Liquidity 0.153 0.013 0.000 0.483 0.122 0.000
Lagged 1 CBI*lagged 1 liquidity -3.224 0.117 0.000 1.128 0.205 0.000
Lagged 2 CBI*lagged 1 liquidity 1.031 0.092 0.000 0.135 0.178 0.448
Lagged 3 CBI*lagged 1 liquidity -1.876 0.096 0.000 -0.226 0.157 0.151
Long run coefficient liquidity -1.611 -0.068 0.000 0.419 0.173 0.016
Lagged 1 Capitalisation 0.277 0.022 0.000 1.143 0.077 0.000
Lagged 1 CBI* lagged 1 capital 0.773 0.090 0.000 -0.047 0.338 0.890
Lagged 2 CBI* lagged 1 capital -0.032 0.069 0.644 -0.408 0.205 0.046
Lagged 3 CBI*lagged 1 capital 0.332 0.044 0.000 0.635 0.155 0.000
Long run coefficient capital 0.425 0.046 0.000 0.073 0.202 0.719
p-value Sargan-Hansen 0.326 0.356 0.347 0.598
p-value MA2 0.086 0.414 0.084 0.956
p-value MA3 0.101 0.073 0.079 0.093
No of banks 113 113 113 113
No of observations 11752 11752 11752 11752
Size Liquidity Capital All
This table shows the result of loan equation with three period of lags of independent variables using two steps Generalised Method of Moment (Arellano Bond, 
1991) with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is loan growth. The set of explanatory variables are 1 month certificate Bank Indonesia rate (CBI), real 
GDP, prices (consumer price index-CPI), and some interactions between bank characteristics with CBI, GDP and CPI. Bank characteristics are log total asset (size), 
ratio of total liquid assets to total assets (liquidity), and capitalisation (ratio of total capital over total assets). Standard error and p-value are presented next to each 
coefficients. 
Dependent variable: log loan
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We present the results of interactions term in the first three columns in which 
size, liquidity and capital are estimated separately. The coefficient for the size 
and the liquidity are negative and for the capital is positive.  Most of the 
impacts of the bank characteristics are transmitted to bank loans since the first 
month. Nevertheless, during the last three months periods, the impact of 
monetary policy shock has been lessening. For example, the negative impact 
for the assets has reduced from 0.044% to 0.007%. The liquidity contraction 
has dropped from 3.22% to 1.87%. In the capital equation, the elasticity of loan 
growth has decreased from 0.77% to 0.33%. 
The final column of table 5.5 presents estimates that include a comprehensive 
set of bank characteristics in which size, liquidity and capital are combined in 
one estimation. The estimated coefficients on GDP growth and the change in 
the interest rate are positive and smaller than the one characteristic model. 
These variables absorb changes in loan demand quality over the business cycle, 
i.e., changes in the loan from different banks. Meanwhile, the coefficients of 
the interaction terms have similar signs with that of each bank characteristic 
models. The only different is that the coefficients are slightly larger for assets 
and capitalisation.  
The long run effects of monetary policy on loans of an average bank vary. It is 
a negative effect for size and liquidity i.e. larger and illiquid banks respond less 
than small and liquid banks. There is a positive effect for capitalisation i.e. 
better capitalised banks respond more in the long run. The estimated 
coefficients on the bank characteristics are overall and across all specifications 
statistically significant, economically relevant, and stable. The average banks 
reduce lending after a monetary contraction by 0.035% in size equation, 1.61% 
in liquidity equation following a contractionary monetary policy stance.  
Meanwhile, high capital banks are less responsive to the tight monetary policy 
with an increase in loans by 0.43%.  
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As we have seen, bank characteristics do emerge as a useful indicator for 
distributional effects of monetary policy. The only different is liquidity that 
gives negative effect in the specification with liquidity only but positive effect 
in all characteristics. In all bank characteristics specification, the effect of 
monetary change is more on large and highly liquid banks. Following tight 
monetary policy, those types of banks reduce their loan growth by 0.5% and 
0.4% respectively while high capital bank increase their lending by 2.7%. This 
could, however, be caused by liquidity segmentation in Indonesian banks 
where there are 13 banks are very liquid with average liquidity to asset ratio is 
62.4%. 
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Table 5.6 
Monetary policy transmission, 3 lags, GMM estimates and long run 
coefficients (narrative index) 
 
 
 
Variable
Explanatory variables
Coeff Std error p-value Coeff Std error p-value Coeff Std error p-value Coeff Std error p-value
Lagged 1 loans -0.120 0.001 0.000 -0.515 0.001 0.000 -0.177 0.002 0.000 -0.481 0.008 0.000
Lagged 2 loans -0.160 0.001 0.000 -0.529 0.001 0.000 -0.217 0.001 0.000 -0.462 0.009 0.000
Lagged 3 loans -0.123 0.001 0.000 -0.476 0.001 0.000 -0.130 0.001 0.000 -0.415 0.008 0.000
Lagged 1 narrative index (NI) -0.246 0.013 0.000 -0.181 0.008 0.000 -0.124 0.015 0.000 -0.147 0.084 0.000
Lagged 2 narrative index (NI) -0.168 0.014 0.000 -0.141 0.009 0.000 -0.340 0.023 0.000 -0.172 0.128 0.000
Lagged 3 narrative index (NI) -0.020 0.015 0.207 -0.036 0.009 0.000 -0.237 0.016 0.000 -0.163 0.112 0.000
Long run coefficient NI -0.309 -0.028 0.000 -0.142 -0.008 0.000 -0.460 -0.034 0.000 -1.026 -0.141 0.000
Lagged 1 GDP 0.493 0.053 0.000 0.053 0.095 0.574 7.103 0.116 0.000 4.997 0.882 0.000
Lagged 2 GDP 0.355 0.018 0.000 0.338 0.053 0.000 4.855 0.116 0.000 0.200 1.282 0.000
Lagged 3 GDP 0.102 0.019 0.000 0.177 0.109 0.104 -0.849 0.089 0.000 3.591 1.574 0.052
Long run coefficient GDP 0.677 0.033 0.000 0.226 0.072 0.002 7.290 0.116 0.000 7.278 0.968 0.000
Lagged 1 CPI 2.893 0.083 0.000 -0.363 0.064 0.000 0.941 0.119 0.000 7.056 1.035 0.000
Lagged 2 CPI -0.501 0.033 0.000 -0.103 0.029 0.000 3.386 0.063 0.000 -6.700 1.078 0.000
Lagged 3 CPI 0.068 0.019 0.000 -0.033 0.020 0.096 4.310 0.115 0.000 -1.774 0.982 0.000
Long run coefficient CPI 1.752 0.047 0.000 -0.198 -0.016 0.000 5.668 0.086 0.000 13.390 0.507 0.000
Lagged 1 GDP*lagged 1 asset 0.608 0.033 0.000 -6.275 0.208 0.000
Lagged 2 GDP*lagged 1 asset -0.189 0.012 0.000 -0.300 0.115 0.019
Lagged 3 GDP*lagged 1 asset 0.279 0.013 0.000 0.656 0.104 0.571
Lagged 1 GDP*lagged 1 liquidity 0.673 0.320 0.036 4.533 1.603 0.000
Lagged 2 GDP*lagged 1 liquidity 0.025 0.136 0.854 -1.364 2.079 0.000
Lagged 3 GDP*lagged 1 liquidity 0.101 0.345 0.770 -3.743 3.576 0.484
Lagged 1 GDP*lagged 1 capital -50.295 0.783 0.000 -34.980 5.777 0.000
Lagged 2 GDP*lagged 1 capital -32.191 0.790 0.000 6.078 5.399 0.115
Lagged 3 GDP*lagged 1 capital 3.419 0.564 0.000 9.941 4.121 0.000
Lagged 1 CPI*lagged 1 asset -2.780 0.030 0.000 -9.545 0.241 0.000
Lagged 2 CPI*lagged 1 asset 0.943 0.023 0.000 6.095 0.168 0.000
Lagged 3 CPI*lagged 1 asset 0.327 0.023 0.000 5.057 0.222 0.000
Lagged 1 CPI*lagged 1 liquidity 0.422 0.211 0.046 6.881 2.176 0.000
Lagged 2 CPI*lagged 1 liquidity 0.376 0.091 0.000 -6.215 3.548 0.005
Lagged 3 CPI*lagged 1 liquidity 0.069 0.068 0.306 -1.500 2.268 0.000
Lagged 1 CPI*lagged 1 capital 8.124 0.789 0.000 -64.501 5.835 0.000
Lagged 2 CPI*lagged 1 capital -27.323 0.695 0.000 39.995 3.091 0.000
Lagged 3 CPI*lagged 1 capital -30.431 0.730 0.000 26.222 4.234 0.000
Lagged 1 assets 0.044 0.004 0.000 0.965 0.051 0.000
Lagged 1 NI*lagged 1 asset 0.357 0.015 0.000 0.064 0.011 0.000
Lagged 2 NI*lagged 1 asset 0.376 0.011 0.000 0.452 0.020 0.000
Lagged 3 NI*lagged 1 asset 0.302 0.009 0.000 0.564 0.022 0.000
Long run coefficient assets 0.737 0.024 0.000 0.204 0.022 0.000
Lagged 1 liquidity 0.301 0.012 0.000 0.852 0.353 0.000
Lagged 1 NI*lagged 1 liquidity 0.286 0.017 0.000 0.391 0.111 0.000
Lagged 2 NI*lagged 1 liquidity 0.265 0.025 0.000 0.369 0.152 0.000
Lagged 3 NI*lagged 1 liquidity 0.049 0.028 0.077 -0.055 0.163 0.000
Long run coefficient liquidity 0.238 0.024 0.000 1.653 0.152 0.000
Lagged 1 capitalisation 5.125 0.058 0.000 -0.053 0.465 0.000
Lagged 1 NI* lagged 1 capital 0.081 0.088 0.359 -2.309 0.418 0.000
Lagged 2 NI* lagged 1 capital 1.474 0.146 0.000 0.653 0.653 0.000
Lagged 3 NI*lagged 1 capital 0.819 0.111 0.000 1.034 0.480 0.000
Long run coefficient capital 1.558 0.216 0.000 3.311 0.682 0.000
p-value Sargan-Hansen 0.276 0.445 0.180 0.860
p-value MA2 0.122 0.717 0.082 0.871
p-value MA3 0.065 0.051 0.922 0.310
No of banks 113 113 113 113
No of observations 11,752 11,752 11,752 11,752
This table presents the result of loan equation with three period of lags of independent variables using two steps Generalised Method of Moment (Arellano 
Bond, 1991) with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is loan growth. The set of explanatory variables are narrative index as monetary policy 
measure (NI), real GDP, prices (consumer price index-CPI), and some interactions between bank characteristics with CBI, GDP and CPI. Bank characteristics 
are log total asset (size), ratio of total liquid assets to total assets (liquidity), and capitalisation (ratio of total capital over total assets). Standard error and p-
value are presented next to each coefficients. 
Dependent variable: log loan
Size Liquidity Capital All
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In table 5.6 we present the result from GMM estimation using narrative index 
as monetary policy measure. Unlike the previous measure, higher narrative 
index means expansionary monetary policy.  
All type of banks responds more to the change of the index. The coefficients of 
each bank‘s characteristics are positive and significant.  The more relax 
monetary policy the more banks to expand their lending. Furthermore, the 
impacts of the bank characteristics seem to be transmitted to bank loans since 
the first month and lessening in the next two months. For example, the positive 
impact for the assets has decreased from 0.357% to 0.302%. 
In the combined model, the coefficients are mixed. Size and capitalisation have 
negative coefficients in the beginning and become positive toward the end of 
third month. Meanwhile, liquidity has different pattern that the coefficient is 
initially positive.  These results suggest that both large and high capitalised 
banks respond more and the high liquid banks respond less during the early 
months to a more relax monetary policy stance.  
In the long run, the interaction variables between monetary policy change and 
bank characteristics show that relax monetary policy stance is responded 
positively by banks with different characteristics. There is an increase of loans 
by 0.2% in size equation, 1.7% in liquidity equation and 3.3% in capitalization 
equation.  
While results are significant, there are some inconsistencies between table 5.5 
and 5.6, especially in the model in which all interaction of bank characteristics 
are used. 
In general the models are robust and explain that bank characteristics are 
important in monetary policy transmission in Indonesia. Moreover, the 
regressions specifications fit well and pass diagnostic tests against auto 
correlation which is applied to the differenced residuals and over identifying 
instruments at the 5% level of significance. Autocorrelation indicates that the 
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three lags of the dependent variable and any other variables used as instruments 
are strictly exogenous and thus good instruments.  In addition to, the results 
from over-identifying restrictions test find that the instruments, as a group, are 
appearing exogenous.  The Sargan-Hansen J statistic, which is the minimized 
value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is also robust. 
 
5.5.2. Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the results, we change the monetary policy measure 
using money market interest rates (MM rates), broad money as monetary 
measure and also alter the dependent variable to working capital loan (See table 
5.7). These alternative measures of monetary policy can be motivated by 
arguing that Bank Indonesia often indirectly targets the broad money and 
interbank interest rates (Agung et al., 2001).  
The model using interbank money market interest rates shows similar result 
with the baseline model using CBI interest rate. The coefficients of size and 
capitalisation are negative and of liquidity are mostly negative and significant. 
Large banks respond more to the tight monetary policy stance. As a response, 
those banks on average decrease lending by 0.03% after a monetary contraction 
In model 2 using broad money, the results for the effect of monetary policy 
change to bank characteristics shows similar and significant result with 
baseline model using CBI interest rate. The tight monetary policy caused large 
banks to reduce more lending by 0.025%. Meanwhile, high liquidity and highly 
capitalised banks manage to increase lending by 0.3% and 1.1% respectively.    
Finally in model 3, in order to ascertain whether or not there is a distributional 
effect of size, liquidity and capitalisation to the maturity structure of bank‘s 
loan portfolio, the dependent variable is replaced with short term loan. This 
exercise will provide information if there is a different response between 
different bank characteristics to the change of short term loan which is 
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uncollateralised. We find similar results that the contractionary monetary 
policy caused a reduction of lending by 3.7%. Furthermore, it seems that large 
banks‘ response was stronger than that of small banks as a result of monetary 
policy shock. Low liquid and low capitalised banks have significant positive 
effects. The tight in monetary policy increase their loan growth by 0.4% and 
1.1%. 
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Table 5.7 Robustness Checks 
 
Models:
Dependent variables:
Monetary policy measures:
Explanatory variables Coeff Std error p-value Coeff Std error p-value Coeff Std error p-value
Lagged 1 loans -0.506 0.002 0.000 -0.508 0.002 0.000 -0.516 0.002 0.000
Lagged 2 loans -0.521 0.002 0.000 -0.521 0.002 0.000 -0.522 0.003 0.000
Lagged 3 loans -0.456 0.003 0.000 -0.456 0.003 0.000 -0.460 0.004 0.000
Lagged 1 certificate BI int rate (CBI) 0.065 0.076 0.391 -0.036 0.045 0.420 -3.712 0.230 0.000
Lagged 2 certificate BI int rate CBI) -0.062 0.108 0.564 0.003 0.042 0.949 -1.147 0.094 0.000
Lagged 3 certificate BI int rate (CBI) 0.076 0.070 0.274 0.050 0.020 0.015 -0.828 0.074 0.000
Lagged 1 GDP 0.877 0.418 0.036 0.444 0.414 0.284 1.491 0.495 0.003
Lagged 2 GDP 0.479 0.168 0.004 0.471 0.203 0.020 0.162 0.387 0.675
Lagged 3 GDP 0.247 0.341 0.469 0.407 0.406 0.316 0.224 0.406 0.581
Lagged 1 CPI 0.008 0.266 0.977 0.372 0.178 0.037 0.341 0.385 0.377
Lagged 2 CPI 0.843 0.348 0.016 -0.066 0.380 0.863 -0.460 0.343 0.181
Lagged 3 CPI -0.023 0.393 0.953 0.338 0.518 0.514 0.957 0.510 0.061
Lagged 1 GDP*lagged 1 asset -0.237 0.051 0.000 -0.251 0.065 0.000 -0.818 0.078 0.000
Lagged 2 GDP*lagged 1 asset -0.069 0.029 0.018 -0.042 0.034 0.221 0.098 0.036 0.007
Lagged 3 GDP*lagged 1 asset 0.052 0.028 0.062 0.059 0.035 0.092 0.488 0.030 0.000
Lagged 1 GDP*lagged 1 liquidity 0.989 0.762 0.194 1.622 0.967 0.093 -0.796 1.222 0.514
Lagged 2 GDP*lagged 1 liquidity -0.302 0.396 0.445 -0.493 0.515 0.339 -0.246 0.620 0.692
Lagged 3 GDP*lagged 1 liquidity 0.305 0.851 0.720 -0.151 1.004 0.880 -0.523 1.069 0.625
Lagged 1 GDP*lagged 1 capital -6.484 2.182 0.003 -4.844 2.615 0.064 -5.920 2.426 0.015
Lagged 2 GDP*lagged 1 capital 0.083 1.086 0.939 0.567 1.371 0.679 1.159 1.827 0.526
Lagged 3 GDP*lagged 1 capital 0.507 0.896 0.571 -0.054 1.161 0.963 1.993 0.996 0.045
Lagged 1 CPI*lagged 1 asset -0.034 0.021 0.104 -0.065 0.019 0.001 0.133 0.025 0.000
Lagged 2 CPI*lagged 1 asset -0.194 0.019 0.000 -0.123 0.038 0.001 0.009 0.034 0.778
Lagged 3 CPI*lagged 1 asset 0.087 0.024 0.000 0.051 0.030 0.082 -0.078 0.038 0.038
Lagged 1 CPI*lagged 1 liquidity 0.674 0.499 0.177 0.018 0.367 0.960 -0.066 1.084 0.952
Lagged 2 CPI*lagged 1 liquidity -1.375 1.097 0.210 0.319 0.539 0.554 1.185 0.578 0.040
Lagged 3 CPI*lagged 1 liquidity 1.220 1.105 0.270 0.466 1.107 0.674 -1.290 1.327 0.331
Lagged 1 CPI*lagged 1 capital -3.343 1.159 0.004 -4.723 0.972 0.000 -4.586 1.086 0.000
Lagged 2 CPI*lagged 1 capital -4.504 0.602 0.000 -1.343 2.037 0.510 -0.843 1.891 0.656
Lagged 3 CPI*lagged 1 capital -1.219 1.301 0.349 -2.330 1.815 0.199 -2.545 1.962 0.195
Lagged 1 assets -0.030 0.003 0.000 -0.025 0.004 0.000 -0.041 0.005 0.000
Lagged 1 CBI*lagged 1 asset -0.093 0.011 0.000 -0.009 0.005 0.069 4.223 0.272 0.000
Lagged 2 CBI*lagged 1 asset -0.063 0.014 0.000 0.013 0.005 0.012 1.201 0.075 0.000
Lagged 3 CBI*lagged 1 asset -0.024 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.370 0.935 0.070 0.000
Lagged 1 liquidity 0.334 0.073 0.000 0.306 0.060 0.000 0.406 0.074 0.000
Lagged 1 CBI*lagged 1 liquidity -0.228 0.186 0.221 0.043 0.125 0.732 -0.043 0.066 0.518
Lagged 2 CBI*lagged 1 liquidity 0.208 0.178 0.244 -0.053 0.128 0.679 0.079 0.033 0.016
Lagged 3 CBI*lagged 1 liquidity -0.144 0.121 0.237 -0.183 0.057 0.001 0.002 0.029 0.950
Lagged 1 capitalisation 1.195 0.075 0.000 1.107 0.114 0.000 1.108 0.142 0.000
Lagged 1 CBI* lagged 1 capital -0.604 0.548 0.271 0.431 0.166 0.010 0.142 0.072 0.049
Lagged 2 CBI* lagged 1 capital -0.166 0.842 0.844 0.398 0.169 0.018 0.014 0.031 0.662
Lagged 3 CBI*lagged 1 capital -0.626 0.469 0.182 0.264 0.088 0.003 0.022 0.022 0.321
p-value Sargant-Hansen 0.589 0.659 0.621
p-value MA2 0.898 0.906 0.884
p-value MA3 0.069 0.070 0.156
No of banks 113 113 113
No of observations 11,752 11,752 11,712
21
This table shows 3 models estimated using two steps Generalised Method of Moment (Arellano Bond, 1991) with robust standard 
errors. Model 1 and 2 use  total loan growth as the dependent variable, while Model 3 uses working capital loan's growth. For the 
monetary measure: money market interest rates (MM) in model 1, log of broad money in model 2, and CBI interest rate in model 3. 
The set of explanatory variables are real GDP, prices (consumer price index-CPI), and interactions between bank characteristics and 
CBI, GDP, and CPI. Bank characteristics are log total asset (size), ratio of total liquid assets to total assets (liquidity), and 
capitalisation (ratio of total capital over total assets). Standard error and p-value are presented next to each coefficients. 
MM rates Log broad money (M1) 1 month CBI rates
Log total loans Log total loans Log Working capital loans
3
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In general the models have similar results and support the baseline model using 
1 month Certificate of Bank Indonesia. The regressions specifications fit well 
and pass diagnostic tests against serial correlation and over identifying 
instruments at the 5% level of significance. 
5.5.3. Economic significance of the results 
Following the example of Kashyap and Stein (2000), we analyze the economic 
significance of our estimation results. From table 5.5 the estimate of the long 
run effect of bank size is 0.035% using 1 month certificate of Bank Indonesia 
as monetary policy measure. We use the distribution data in September 2009 
(in Appendix 2) and find that the large bank has βj = Rp130.2 trillion and a 
small bank has βj =Rp3.6 trillion. These numbers correspond to the 90th and 
10th percentile of the distribution in September 2009. This implies that, one 
month after a 100 basis point rise in CBI funds rate, the level of loans of the 
small bank will be roughly 0.19% lower than that of the large bank. That is if 
both banks started with a level of loans equal to Rp1000 then purely on the 
basis of asset differences, we would predict a Rp0.19 gap between the two 
banks a month after the CBI rate shock. 
 
5.6. Conclusions 
This chapter is an empirical examination of the lending channel in Indonesia. 
The analysis focuses on the differential response of the loan supply to monetary 
policy across bank characteristics. The categorisation device is used in this 
chapter based on banks‘ financial strength measured by size, liquidity and 
capitalisation. This study use monthly dataset on all Indonesian banks from 
September 2000 to September 2009 and apply 1 month Certificate Bank 
Indonesia rate and narrative index based on Boschen and Mills index as the 
monetary policy measures.  
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The result from loan supply suggests that a lending channel is operative in 
Indonesia. We find clear evidence that in the short run large banks are more 
responsive (and some evidence high liquidity and high capitalisation banks are 
less responsive to the change of monetary policy). These bank characteristics 
are matter for the transmission process in Indonesia. 
We find that all factors are generally important for the way bank adjusts its 
lending to interest rate or monetary policy stance changes. This is similar to 
other developing countries results where large banks show stronger response to 
monetary policy.  
Liquidity is important to shape the response of a bank to monetary policy. 
Banks with a relatively low share of liquid assets reduce loan supply by more 
than more liquid banks on average. It appears that banks with liquid assets 
draw on their liquid assets to maintain their loan portfolio. A reason for doing 
this could be the existence of relationship lending in Indonesia, where bank 
customers are shielded to some extent from monetary policy effects.  
Following van den Heuvel (2001), the supply of credit is likely to be influence 
by the health of the banking system as well as the shocks hitting it at any point 
in time. Hence, to the extent that policymakers do not have precise knowledge 
of the state of the banking system, they will face considerable uncertainty when 
trying to evaluate the likely response of the economy to changes in monetary 
policy. This research may provide information about the behaviour of bank 
lending to the policymakers so they could apply the most appropriate monetary 
policy. Indonesian policy makers need to take account of how the response to 
monetary policy change varies with bank characteristics and especially with 
bank size. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. The construction of narrative index 
In order to construct narrative index, the episodes are first identified, followed 
by an assessment of the policy developments immediately before and after the 
source of each episode. The financial policy stance following each episode is 
then classified as ―tight‖, ―neutral‖, or ―loose‖ depending on the behaviour of a 
combination of policy instruments  including the growth of money supply, 
Bank Indonesia Policy rate, Certificate of Bank Indonesia rate, the change of 
the Rupiah‘s exchange rate, and loan to deposit ratio. We assign each of the 
policy instruments the expected impact on economic activity. 
The growth in money supply shows a downward pressure on the interest rate 
structure and encourages banks to reduce lending rates and increase the 
demand for lending. This type of policy action is an example of expansionary 
monetary policy whose expansionary impact is index 1 for moderate growth 
and 2 for significant growth of money supply. 
A high interest rate policy (Bank Indonesia rate) exerts an upward pressure on 
the interest rate structure, thus forcing banks to raise their deposit and lending 
rates, which in turn may discourage the demand for funds for expenditure by 
the consumers and investors. Such policy action is an example of tight 
monetary policy whose contractionary impact is index -1 for moderate impact 
and -2 for significant impact.  
Higher liquid assets or loan to deposit ratio will reduce the quantity of loanable 
funds available for intermediation hence has a potential of inducing an increase 
in the overall interest rate structure and in the end inducing a fall in the supply 
of and the demand for money and credit. A fall in the demand for liquidity 
shifts the aggregate demand curve inwards, and thus inducing a fall in the level 
national output. Again, such policy is classified as tight and contractionary and 
is indexed -1 for moderate change and -2 for significant change. 
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The change of Rupiah exchange rate has became the concern of the central 
bank. This is because most Indonesian manufacturing industries use imported 
material for example raw material and capital goods. The central bank 
sometimes intervenes to stabilize the market since high volatility and large 
Rupiah depreciation will have significant impact on the inflation increases. 
Therefore the realized Rupiah depreciation has been indexed as -1.  
Appendix 2: Banks’ characteristics for economic significance calculation 
Table Indonesian Banking– September 2009 
 
Column 1 and 2 in the above table shows that small banks are slightly more 
liquid and better capitalized. This result ﬁts with the standard idea that smaller 
banks need buffer stocks of securities to compensate their limited ability to 
raise external ﬁnance on the capital market. This interpretation is conﬁrmed on 
the liability side, where the percentage of core deposits (demand deposit and 
saving accounts) is greater among small banks, while their securities issues are 
more limited than the ones of large banks. It is worth noting that the ratio of 
deposit to loans for small banks is on average greater than one. In fact, small 
banks have a relatively high capacity in local deposit markets and fund-raising 
Large Small Liquid Low Liquid Well cap Poorly cap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of banks 12 104 13 103 12 104
Mean Asset (trillion  Rp) 130.2 6.8 5.5 21.3 3.4 21.4
Fraction of total asset 5.7 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.9
Mean deposit (trillion Rp) 69.2 4.3 3.7 12.0 1.5 12.1
Fraction of tot deposit 5.4 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.9
Mean lending (trillion Rp) 71.3 4.0 2.0 12.1 2.4 11.9
Fraction of total lending 0.06 0.00 0.16 0.95 0.19 0.94
Liquid asset to total asset ratio 26.8 30.2 62.4 25.7 41.6 28.5
Loan to asset ratio 55.0 57.6 30.8 60.7 40.1 59.3
Deposit to asset ratio 53.2 63.8 67.7 56.1 42.8 56.7
Deposit to loan ratio 97.1 97.1 186.1 99.1 61.9 101.7
Core deposit to total deposits ratio 36.3 37.9 42.1 36.6 54.6 36.6
Capital to asset ratio 11.9 19.3 33.6 16.6 59.1 13.9
Interbank lending/Total loan ratio 20.7 16.7 26.2 19.2 19.5 19.4
Core deposits are give by current accounts and demand deposits. A small bank has the average size of the banks below 90the 
percentile, while large bank has the average size of the banks above 90th percentile. A low liquid bank has the average liquidity 
ratio of the banks below the 10th percentile, a liquid bank has the average liquidity ratio of the banks above the 90th percentile. A 
poorly capitalized bank has a capital to asset ratio equal to the average equity ratio below the 10th percentile, a well capitalised 
bank has the average capitalization of the banks above 90th percentile.  Source: Bank Indonesia. September 2009. Unpublished.
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represents often their main business. In summary, high liquidity and 
capitalization ratios and speciﬁc institutional characteristics of the Indonesian 
system may counterbalance the traditional asymmetric information problems 
faced by small banks. 
The following columns in the table present that liquid banks are smaller and 
better capitalized than average. Banks with low holdings of liquid assets have 
more deposits and make fewer loans. They have also a higher percentage of 
short-term loans, which should increase the speed of the bank lending channel 
transmission.  
In the column 5 and 6, low capitalized banks make more loans, particularly 
long-term loans, and hold fewer liquid assets. On the liability side, they raise 
more deposits especially time deposits. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.1. Introduction 
The objective of this thesis was to investigate bank competition issues, cost-
efficiency, and the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in Indonesia. 
It began with an overview of Indonesia‘s geographical location, the evolution 
of the banking sector and monetary policy over ten years, and included reviews 
of the related theoretical and empirical studies of competition, efficiency, and 
monetary policy transmission. Using a comprehensive and supervisory data set 
of Indonesian banks, the thesis concentrated on: 
 Assessing how competitive the Indonesian provincial market is by testing 
whether there is support for the market power or for efficient-structure 
hypothesis.  
 Obtaining measures of cost-efficiency, with a view to assessing how the 
foreign acquisition influenced cost-efficiency and whether there are any 
differences in cost-efficiency between the new foreign banks, and private or 
state owned domestic banks. 
 Analyzing the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in Indonesia. 
The aim is to provide empirical evidences on the working mechanism of 
bank lending channel—in transmitting the monetary policy into banking 
loans. 
Chapter 2 reviewed Indonesia‘s banking sector from 2000-2009 providing the 
background for more detailed empirical analysis in subsequent chapters. The 
banking sector underwent significant changes after 2002, when the Indonesian 
government introduced a government divestment program, and a series of 
reforms in 2004.
11 
 
                                              
11
 Employing a gradual approach, from 2002 to 2004, the Indonesian government sold controlling 
stakes in some major private banks nationalized during the crisis to foreign investor including Bank 
Central Asia, Bank Danamon, Bank Permata, Bank International Indonesia, Bank Niaga, and Bank 
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The long term reform program was initiated with the objective of developing 
an effective, competitive and stable banking sector. To achieve this aim, BI 
introduced a package of financial reforms in the framework of Indonesian 
Banking Architecture (IBA), involving a mix of deregulation and new 
regulations. For example, regulation on merger and acquisition were relaxed, 
the introduction of single presence policy to shape large banks ownership etc.  
Chapter 3 examines the relationship between the bank performance with 
concentration ratio, and several banking variables including efficiency ratio, 
risk indicator, deposit market and geographical variables in provincial market. 
We utilize banking datasets of provincial banks in Indonesia to examine the 
issue. We compare market power hypothesis models (traditional SCP), 
efficient-structure hypothesis and the New Empirical Industrial Organization 
(NEIO) model by employing the data of all Indonesian banks during 2001-
2008.   
As has been the case for most previous structure-performance studies, the 
results using the SCP specification are not very robust. This study does not 
support SCP hypothesis and find modest supports for the ES hypothesis for the 
banks located in the provincial markets. This finding is also consistent to other 
studies that have examined the structure-performance relationship for emerging 
markets. Both Mohieldin (2000) and Perera (2007) find evidence that there is 
no significance relationship between market structure and bank‘s performance 
in Egypt and South Asia respectively. 
When PR approach is used, as done in other studies, it reveals much evidence 
of imperfect competition in Indonesian provincial markets. The estimated 
                                                                                                                                 
Lippo. Foreign institutions‘ investments continued in 2005-08, mostly acquiring smaller commercial 
banks focused on retail loans. These foreigners brought better risk management practices and operating 
procedures, as well as financial backing.  
The government also divested a portion of shares in state owned banks, such as Bank Mandiri, Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia and Bank Negara Indonesia, through public listings. Another noteworthy 
transformation of the banking landscape was the drop in the number of banks. Technological progress 
has also boosted competition by eliminating geographical barrier for foreign banks and facilitating 
product innovations. This development will make Indonesian banking sounder and better able to 
provide services to their customers. 
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values of H-statistics for the sample period 2001-2008 are positive ranging 
between 0.31 - 0.62 which is consistent with the study by Claessens and 
Laeven (2004). We find that the market in Java and Sumatra is more 
competitive than metropolitan and the periphery. H-statistic of metropolitan 
and the periphery are 0.31 and 0.52 respectively while Java and Sumatra is 
0.62. 
However, the weakness of PR modelling is that it does not tell us much about 
the sources of imperfect competition, what can be done to change matters. The 
estimation using ES hypothesis specification does not also reveal significant 
influence of the geography of Indonesia. There are only few significant results 
are found. Population density variable is negative and significant in demand 
deposit markets in metropolitan and the periphery. The other variable is the 
number of banks per population that is positive and significant in time deposit 
markets in metropolitan and demand deposit markets in metropolitan and Java 
and Sumatra. 
Although there is a modest impact of the geography of Indonesia on the level 
of competition, the development that help overcome geographical barriers, e.g. 
new banking technologies can usefully promote competition in Indonesian 
deposit markets. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates cost-efficiency using a translog cost function within 
banking system from 2000Q3 to 2009Q3. The results show that the mean of 
cost-efficiency was in the range of 40%-50%. State-owned banks were found to 
be relatively more cost-efficient than foreign banks. The analysis suggests 
several conclusions about banking efficiency in Indonesia. Firstly, foreign 
ownership has positive effect on improved cost efficiency of the banks. 
However, the changing effect is small. Secondly, it appears that although old 
foreign banks are able to maintain comparable efficiency to the new acquired 
foreign banks, old foreign banks‘ efficiency tend to worsen.  They need to hire 
more skilled workers and install better working environments.   
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Chapter 5 investigates the response of banks to a monetary policy shift. We 
study whether the central bank's monetary policy stance affects banks' lending 
behavior. Based on monthly datasets on all Indonesian banks from September 
2000 to September 2009, we use the 1 month Certificate Bank Indonesia 
interest rates and narrative indices based on Boschen-Mills index, and we find 
that the result from loan supply suggests that there is an operative lending 
channel in Indonesia. We also find evidence that large banks are more 
responsive, while high liquidity and high capitalisation banks are less 
responsive to the changes in monetary policy. 
This is similar to other developing countries‘ results, where large banks show 
stronger responses to monetary policy. The absent effects of liquidity and 
capitalisation are caused by informational asymmetries. To reduce 
informational frictions: the role of government is needed to improve 
transparency, increase efficiency, etc; banking networks should be expanded; 
and the number of bank failure in Indonesia should be decreased. 
The findings from various chapters are consistent with each other, and suggest 
that: (1) the geography of Indonesia has a modest impact on competition in 
some deposit markets. The developments which help overcome geographical 
barriers, e.g. new banking technologies, can usefully promote competition in 
Indonesian deposit markets. (2) The gradual reform strategy did improve the 
competitive structure of Indonesia‘s banking sector to some extent. However, 
policy should be directed to enabling the more efficient banks to gain more 
market shares. Given that the foreign banks were more efficient than domestic 
banks in the sample, the policy implication is to encourage the expansion of the 
foreign/joint venture banks to further improve competitive structure. (3) Cost-
efficiency is a critical issue that should receive more attention from researchers, 
bank regulators and managers. (4) Converting private owned banks to foreign 
owned or joint venture banks could improve their cost-efficiency.(5) The 
response to monetary policy varies according to bank characteristics, especially 
bank size.  
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6.2. Limitation of this Thesis 
As with other studies on bank competition and efficiency, this thesis has some 
drawbacks. The first issue concerns the limited number of observations, 
because of the relatively small number and short history of these banks. This 
rules out the use of some more sophisticated estimation methods, for example 
cost efficiency estimation, the data limitation will limit the possibility of 
employing some more advanced techniques, such as the Flexible Fourier 
functional form. 
A similar point can be made about the investigation of provincial banking 
competition. It will be beneficial to employ other techniques, based on panel 
data that can give accurate measures of competition over time. One example is 
techniques that do not require any information on the market structure of each 
bank or a market equilibrium assumption, and allows us to determine the 
degree of market power endogenously like the NEIO model developed by 
Uchida and Tsutsui (2005).  
In terms of the methodology, as indicated by Berger and Humphrey (1997), one 
problem with frontier analysis is that rankings of banks by their measured cost-
efficiency can differ, although central tendency of average cost-efficiency 
values for banks is generally similar across frontier techniques. To make this 
ex-post regression informative, cost-efficiency estimates should be obtained 
from other frontier techniques. However, this thesis only used one parametric 
technique, the stochastic frontier approach, to estimate cost-efficiency. More 
frontier techniques are needed to cross check the result
.12  
Another issue is that cost-efficiency is only a relative measure against the best 
practice bank within the sample. The best practice bank itself may or may not 
be really efficient in the real economic sense. The latter could cause the 
                                              
12
 There is a study on Indonesia using a non parametric DEA Slack Based Model (Hadad et al. 2008) 
find similar result that the average bank efficiency was reasonably stable during the sample period, 
ranging between 70% and 82%, with 92 of the 130 banks in existence at that time having efficiency 
scores of over 70%, including 10 with (super) efficiency scores above unity. 
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inaccurate measurement of the real efficiency level of Indonesia‘s banking 
sector. 
Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987) argue that the cost function only 
captures the cost, or supplies side benefits to the banks from joint production 
(spreading fixed costs and information production). Yet, it ignores the revenue, 
or demands side benefits, as in the last two resources (risk reduction and 
customer cost economies). Therefore, total economies from joint production 
may be understated in the empirical estimates here and in other studies. 
Finally, as discussed by Mester (2008), since inefficiency is derived from the 
regression residual, selection of the characteristics of the banks and the 
environmental variables to include in the frontier estimation is particularly 
important. The variable defines the peer group that determines the best practice 
performance against which a particular bank‘s performance is judged. She 
argues that estimates of bank cost efficiency can be biased if bank 
heterogeneity is ignored. 
6.3. Avenues for Future Research 
Several suggestions for future research may be derived from this thesis. First, 
the study of other endogeneity factors that may affect bank‘s cost and 
profitability such as debt maturity, resources allocated to risk management etc.  
While the thesis has made a contribution to estimating the structure-
performance relationship within Indonesia‘s banking sector, none of the 
theories are completely consistent with the observed relationship among 
profits, market structure and efficiency for banks. Further research is needed 
along those lines. 
Third, a larger data set should produce more reliable results by enabling more 
advanced techniques to address the efficiency and competition issues. Fourth, 
while this thesis is concentrated on the efficiency of cost in bank operations, 
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further work is needed to estimate the profit efficiency, which also takes the 
revenue of bank operations into account.  
Finally, there is a possibility for the bank lending channel to be enhanced 
through support from the government, as found from the recent crisis, and 
credit provision, so the current financial crisis should be a particularly fruitful 
period for investigation by researchers. The continuing efforts of researchers 
will hopefully find answers to these questions and shed more light on the 
factors that influence efficiency and competition in the banking sector and the 
role of banks in monetary policy transmission. 
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